ARTICLE VII

In the Seventh Article We Ask: DOES A PERSON MERIT BY WILLING WHAT HE WILLS NECESSARILY?

Difficulties:

It seems that he does not, for

1. What anyone necessarily wills he wills naturally. But we do not merit by what is natural. Therefore we do not merit by such an act of the will.

2. Merit and demerit apply to the same thing. But according to Augustine no one gets any demerit in anything that he cannot avoid.

3. No one merits except by an act of virtue. But every act of virtue is from a choice, not from a natural inclination. Then no one merits in anything that he does from necessity.

To the Contrary:

1'. Every creature naturally and necessarily seeks God. But in loving God we merit. It is therefore possible to merit in what one necessarily does.

2'. Happiness consists in eternal life. But saints merit by desiring eternal life. Therefore a person merits by willing what he wills necessarily.

REPLY:

In willing what he naturally wills a person merits in a certain sense and in a certain sense does not. For the explanation of this it should be observed that there is a difference in the way in which providence is exercised in regard to man and in regard to the other animals both as to his body and as to his soul. For other animals are provided with special coverings for their bodies, such as a tough hide, feathers, and the like, and also special weapons, such as horns, claws, and so forth. This is because they have just a few ways of acting to which they can adapt definite instruments. But man is provided with those things in a general way inasmuch as there has been given to him by nature hands by which he is able to prepare for himself a variety of coverings and protections. This is because man's reason is so manifold and extends to so many different things that definite tools sufficient for him could not be provided for him ahead of time.

The case is similar in regard to apprehension. Other animals have innate in them in the line of natural discretion certain specific conceptions necessary for them, as a sheep has a natural realization that a wolf is its enemy, and so on. But in place of these there are implanted in man certain naturally understood universal principles by means of which he can go on to [figure out] everything that is necessary for him.

In regard to their appetitive tendency also the same holds true. In other things there is implanted a natural appetite for something definite, as in a heavy body, to be down, and in every animal, whatever suits it according to its nature. But man has implanted in him an appetite for his last end in general so that he naturally desires to be complete in goodness. But in just what that completeness consists, whether in virtues or knowledge or pleasure or anything else of the sort, has not been determined for him by nature.

When, therefore, by his own reason with the help of divine grace he grasps as his happiness any particular good in which his happiness really does consist, then he merits, not because he desires happiness (which he naturally desires), but because he desires this particular good (which he does not naturally desire)--for example, the vision of God, in which his happiness does in truth consist. But if anyone were by erroneous reasoning to be brought to desire as his happiness some particular good--for example, bodily pleasures, in which his happiness does not in fact consist--he incurs demerit by so desiring. This is not because he desires happiness, but because he unwarrantedly desires as his happiness this particular thing in which his happiness is not found.

It is therefore clear that willing what anyone naturally wills is in itself neither meritorious nor blameworthy. But when it is specified to this or that, it can be either the one or the other. In this way the saints merit by desiring God and eternal life.

Answers to Difficulties:

From what has just been said the answers are clear.