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he thinks it fitting to apply 'offspring' to the one who made and 'creature' to the one who has begotten, saying 20that the essence of the Son admits to itself the appellations of 'offspring' and 'creature' and 'created thing,' and that it preserves undivided the relation to the one who begot and made and created?20; 3.2.110 For the one thing does not have a nature to be divided according to different relations, but the Son is proper to the Father and what is begotten to the one who begot, while the creature has its reference to the one who made it; unless one might consider some improper use in some indiscriminate custom of words to be more proper than the appropriate meaning. 3.2.111 By what reasonings, then, and by what arguments according to that invincible dialectic, having changed the opinions of the many to the contrary, does he authoritatively set forth these things, that, while the God over all is conceived and spoken of as both creator and father, the Son is suited to both appellations, being called equally both creature and offspring? 3.2.112 For since the custom and precision of language appropriately distinguishes such names, speaking of the name of 'begetting' in reference to those begotten from the essence itself, but that of 'creation' in reference to those constituted outside the nature of the one who fashioned them, and for this reason the divine doctrines in the tradition of the knowledge of God have handed down Father and Son, not creator and work, so that there might not be any corruption towards blasphemy, pushing the Son away from what is alien and foreign in such an appellation, and that the impious doctrines which separate the only-begotten from the Father's kinship according to essence might find no access, he who says that the appellation of 'creature' is fitting for the Son will certainly say consequently that the title of 'son' is also appropriate in the case of a creature, so that, if the Son is a creature, the heaven is also a son, and each of the things that have come to be is properly named by the appellation of 'son,' according to the author. 3.2.113 For if he has the name not by sharing the nature of the one who begot him, but is named Son insofar as he is created, the same reasoning will grant that a lamb and a dog and a frog and all things, whatever came to be by the will of the maker, be named by the appellation of 'son.' But if each of these, because it is outside the nature of God, is not a son nor is called god, consequently, by all means, the Son in the proper sense, because he is from the very nature of the one who begot, is Son and is confessed to be God. 3.2.114 But he abhors the concept of generation and separates it from the divine doctrines, slandering the name with carnal physics. But the argument has sufficiently shown concerning these things in what has gone before that, according to the prophet, they fear a fear where there is no fear. For if in the case of humans not every generation was shown to consist in passion, but the material one is through passion, while the spiritual one is pure and undefiled (for that which is born of the spirit becomes spirit and not flesh, and no passible disposition is associated with the spirit), since it seemed necessary to the author to reason about the divine power through examples from our own lives, let him persuade himself to conceive of the impassibility concerning the divine generation from the other mode of generation. 3.2.115 But by confusing these three appellations with one another, of which two are equivalent, he thinks to carry his hearers away through the fellowship in meaning of the two terms to think the third one also in the same way. For since the appellation of 'creature' and 'created thing' indicates that which is made to be outside the nature of the maker, he attaches to these the term 'offspring,' so that this too might be interpreted along with the aforementioned terms. But such a kind of argument is called malice and deceit and trickery, not a well-considered and skillful proof. 3.2.116 For only that which reveals what is unknown through what is agreed upon is called proof, but to reason fallaciously through malice and to steal away from refutation and to confuse the mind with superficial deceits

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ἁρμόζειν <δεῖν> οἴεται τῷ πεποιηκότι τὸ γέννημα καὶ τῷ γεγεννηκότι τὸ ποίημα, λέγων 20τοῦ υἱοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν εἰς ἑαυτὴν δέχεσθαι τὰς τοῦ γεννήματος καὶ ποιήματος καὶ κτίσματος προσηγορίας, ἀμέριστον δὲ σῴζειν τὴν πρὸς τὸν γεγεννηκότα καὶ ποιήσαντα καὶ κτίσαντα 3.2.110 σχέσιν20; τὸ γὰρ ἓν πρᾶγμα πρὸς διαφόρους σχέσεις κατα μερισθῆναι φύσιν οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν υἱὸς τῷ πατρὶ προσ ωκείωται καὶ τὸ γεννηθὲν τῷ γεννήσαντι, τὸ δὲ ποίημα πρὸς τὸν πεποιηκότα τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἔχει· πλὴν εἰ μή τινα κατάχρησιν ἐν ἀδιαφόρῳ τινὶ συνηθείᾳ ῥημάτων κυριωτέραν ἡγοῖτό τις εἶναι τῆς προσφυοῦς σημασίας. 3.2.111 Τίσιν οὖν λογισμοῖς καὶ ποίαις κατασκευαῖς κατὰ τὴν ἄμαχον διαλεκτικὴν ἐκείνην εἰς τοὐναντίον τὰς δόξας τῶν πολλῶν μεταστήσας ταῦτα κατ' ἐξουσίαν διέξεισιν, ὅτι τοῦ ἐπὶ πάντων θεοῦ καὶ κτίστου καὶ πατρὸς νοουμένου τε καὶ λεγομένου ὁ υἱὸς πρὸς ἀμφοτέρας τὰς προσηγορίας ἐπιτη δείως ἔχει, καὶ κτίσμα καὶ γέννημα κατὰ τὸ ἴσον λεγό 3.2.112 μενος; τῆς γὰρ τοῦ λόγου συνηθείας τε καὶ ἀκριβείας οἰκείως διακρινούσης τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ τὸ μὲν τῆς γεννήσεως ὄνομα ἐπὶ τῶν ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς οὐσίας γεννω μένων λεγούσης, τὸ δὲ τῆς κτίσεως ἐπὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν τῆς τοῦ κατασκευάζοντος φύσεως συνισταμένων, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τῶν θείων δογμάτων ἐν τῇ παραδόσει τῆς θεογνωσίας πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν παραδεδωκότων, οὐ κτίστην καὶ ἔργον, ὡς ἂν μή τις γένοιτο παραφθορὰ πρὸς τὸ βλάσφημον, εἰς τὸ ἀλλότριόν τε καὶ ξένον τῆς τοιαύτης προσηγορίας τὸν υἱὸν ἀπωθούσης, μηδέ τινα πάροδον λάβοι τὰ ἄθεα δόγματα τὰ τῆς κατ' οὐσίαν οἰκειότητος τὸν μονογενῆ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀφο ρίζοντα, ὁ λέγων τῷ υἱῷ τὴν τοῦ ποιήματος ἁρμόζειν προσ ηγορίαν ἐρεῖ πάντως κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποιή ματος τὴν τοῦ υἱοῦ κλῆσιν προσφυῶς ἔχειν, ὥστε, εἰ ὁ υἱὸς κτίσμα καὶ ὁ οὐρανὸς υἱὸς καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν γεγονότων κυρίως κατὰ τὸν λογογράφον τῇ τοῦ υἱοῦ προσ 3.2.113 ηγορίᾳ κατονομάζεται. εἰ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος οὐχὶ τῷ κοινωνεῖν τῷ γεγεννηκότι τῆς φύσεως ἔχει τὸ ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ καθὸ κτιστός ἐστι, κατὰ τοῦτο υἱὸς ὀνομάζεται, ὁ αὐτὸς δώσει λόγος καὶ ἀμνὸν καὶ κύνα καὶ βάτραχον καὶ πάντα, ὅσα θελήματι τοῦ πεποιηκότος ὑπέστη, τῇ τοῦ υἱοῦ προσηγορίᾳ κατονομάζεσθαι. εἰ δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον διὰ τὸ ἔξω τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ φύσεως εἶναι υἱὸς οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲ θεὸς λέγεται, κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον πάντως ὁ κυρίως υἱὸς διὰ τὸ ἐξ αὐτῆς εἶναι τοῦ γεγεννηκότος τῆς φύσεως υἱός ἐστι καὶ θεὸς εἶναι 3.2.114 ὁμολογεῖται. ἀλλὰ μυσάττεται τὴν τῆς γεννήσεως ἔννοιαν καὶ ἀφορίζει τῶν θείων δογμάτων τῇ σαρκώδει φυσιολογίᾳ διαβάλλων τὸ ὄνομα. ἀλλ' ἱκανῶς ὑπὲρ τούτων ἐν τοῖς φθάσασιν ὁ λόγος ἀπέδειξεν ὅτι κατὰ τὸν προφήτην φο βοῦνται φόβον ὅπου οὐκ ἔστι φόβος. εἰ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀν θρώπων οὐ πᾶσα γέννησις ἐδείχθη κατὰ πάθος συνιστα μένη, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ὑλικὴ διὰ πάθους, ἡ δὲ πνευματικὴ καθαρὰ καὶ ἀκήρατος (τὸ γὰρ γεγεννημένον ἐκ τοῦ πνεύ ματος πνεῦμα καὶ οὐχὶ σὰρξ γίνεται, τῷ δὲ πνεύματι οὐδεμία παθητικὴ συνθεωρεῖται διάθεσις), ἐπειδὴ διὰ τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς ὑποδειγμάτων ἀναγκαῖον ἐφάνη τῷ λογογράφῳ τὴν θείαν ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δύναμιν, πεισάτω ἑαυτὸν ἐκ τοῦ ἑτέρου τῆς γεννήσεως τρόπου τὸ περὶ τὴν θείαν γέννησιν 3.2.115 ἀπαθὲς ἐννοεῖν. ἀλλὰ τὰς τρεῖς ταύτας μετ' ἀλλήλων προσηγορίας συγχέας, ἐξ ὧν ἰσοδυναμοῦσιν αἱ δύο, συναρ πάζειν οἴεται τοὺς ἀκούοντας διὰ τῆς τῶν δύο φωνῶν κατὰ τὸ σημαινόμενον κοινωνίας τὸ καὶ τὴν τρίτην ὡσαύτως οἴεσθαι. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ποιήματος καὶ κτίσματος προσ ηγορία ἔξω τῆς τοῦ πεποιηκότος φύσεως εἶναι τὸ πεποιη μένον ἐνδείκνυται, προσάπτει τούτοις τὴν φωνὴν τοῦ γεννή ματος, ὡς ἂν καὶ τοῦτο τοῖς προειρημένοις συνερμηνεύοιτο. ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος τοῦ λόγου κακουργία καὶ ἀπάτη καὶ φενακισμὸς ὀνομάζεται, οὐ πεφροντισμένη καὶ τεχνική 3.2.116 τις ἀπόδειξις. μόνη γὰρ ἡ διὰ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων φανε ροῦσα τὸ ἀγνοούμενον ἀπόδειξις λέγεται, τὸ δὲ παραλογί ζεσθαι διὰ κακουργίας καὶ ὑπεκκλέπτειν τὸν ἔλεγχον καὶ συγχεῖν ἐν ταῖς ἐπιπολαίοις ἀπάταις τὴν διάνοιαν