Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence men would not have been born in a state of righteousness. For Hugh of St. Victor says (De Sacram. i): "Before sin the first man would have begotten children sinless; but not heirs to their father's righteousness."

Objection 2: Further, righteousness is effected by grace, as the Apostle says (Rm. 5:16,21). Now grace is not transfused from one to another, for thus it would be natural; but is infused by God alone. Therefore children would not have been born righteous.

Objection 3: Further, righteousness is in the soul. But the soul is not transmitted from the parent. Therefore neither would righteousness have been transmitted from parents, to the children.

On the contrary, Anselm says (De Concep. Virg. x): "As long as man did not sin, he would have begotten children endowed with righteousness together with the rational soul."

I answer that, Man naturally begets a specific likeness to himself. Hence whatever accidental qualities result from the nature of the species, must be alike in parent and child, unless nature fails in its operation, which would not have occurred in the state of innocence. But individual accidents do not necessarily exist alike in parent and child. Now original righteousness, in which the first man was created, was an accident pertaining to the nature of the species, not as caused by the principles of the species, but as a gift conferred by God on the entire human nature. This is clear from the fact that opposites are of the same genus; and original sin, which is opposed to original righteousness, is called the sin of nature, wherefore it is transmitted from the parent to the offspring; and for this reason also, the children would have been assimilated to their parents as regards original righteousness.

Reply to Objection 1: These words of Hugh are to be understood as referring, not to the habit of righteousness, but to the execution of the act thereof.

Reply to Objection 2: Some say that children would have been born, not with the righteousness of grace, which is the principle of merit, but with original righteousness. But since the root of original righteousness, which conferred righteousness on the first man when he was made, consists in the supernatural subjection of the reason to God, which subjection results from sanctifying grace, as above explained (Question 95, Article 1), we must conclude that if children were born in original righteousness, they would also have been born in grace; thus we have said above that the first man was created in grace (Question 95, Article 1). This grace, however, would not have been natural, for it would not have been transfused by virtue of the semen; but would have been conferred on man immediately on his receiving a rational soul. In the same way the rational soul, which is not transmitted by the parent, is infused by God as soon as the human body is apt to receive it.

From this the reply to the third objection is clear.

Articulus 1

Argumentum 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homines non fuissent cum iustitia nati.

Dicit enim Hugo de sancto victore quod primus homo ante peccatum generaret quidem filios sine peccato, sed non paternae iustitiae haeredes.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, iustitia est per gratiam, ut apostolus dicit ad Rom. V.

Sed gratia non transfunditur, quia sic esset naturalis; sed a solo deo infunditur.

Ergo pueri cum iustitia nati non fuissent.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, iustitia in anima est. Sed anima non est ex traduce.

Ergo nec iustitia traducta fuisset a parentibus in filios.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod Anselmus dicit, in libro de conceptu virg., quod simul cum rationalem haberent animam, iusti essent quos generaret homo, si non peccaret.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod naturaliter homo generat sibi simile secundum speciem. Unde quaecumque accidentia consequuntur naturam speciei, in his necesse est quod filii parentibus similentur, nisi sit error in operatione naturae, qui in statu innocentiae non fuisset. In accidentibus autem individualibus non est necesse quod filii parentibus similentur. Iustitia autem originalis, in qua primus homo conditus fuit, fuit accidens naturae speciei, non quasi ex principiis speciei causatum, sed sicut quoddam donum divinitus datum toti naturae. Et hoc apparet, quia opposita sunt unius generis, peccatum autem originale, quod opponitur illi iustitiae, dicitur esse peccatum naturae; unde traducitur a parente in posteros.

Et propter hoc etiam filii parentibus assimilati fuissent quantum ad originalem iustitiam.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum Hugonis est intelligendum non quantum ad habitum iustitiae, sed quantum ad executionem actus.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod pueri non fuissent nati cum iustitia gratuita, quae est merendi principium, sed cum iustitia originali.

Sed cum radix originalis iustitiae, in cuius rectitudine factus est homo, consistat in subiectione supernaturali rationis ad deum, quae est per gratiam gratum facientem, ut supra dictum est; necesse est dicere quod, si pueri nati fuissent in originali iustitia, quod etiam nati fuissent cum gratia; sicut et de primo homine supra diximus quod fuit cum gratia conditus. Non tamen fuisset propter hoc gratia naturalis, quia non fuisset transfusa per virtutem seminis, sed fuisset collata homini statim cum habuisset animam rationalem. Sicut etiam statim cum corpus est dispositum infunditur a deo anima rationalis, quae tamen non est ex traduce.

Ad 3

Unde patet solutio ad tertium.