ARTICLE XI

In the Eleventh Article We Ask: Is THE WILL A HIGHER POWER THAN THE INTELLECT, OR IS THE OPPOSITE TRUE?

Difficulties:

It seems that the intellect is the nobler and higher, for

1. The nobility of the soul consists in its being made to the image of God. But the soul is made to the image of God in virtue of reason or intelligence. Hence Augustine says: "Let us understand that man is made to the image of God in that particular in which he excels irrational animals; but that is reason, mind, or intelligence, or whatever it may more appropriately be called." Therefore the most excellent power of the soul is the intellect.

2. The answer was given that the image is in the will as well as in the intellect, since according to Augustine the image is seen in memory, intelligence, and will.--On the contrary, when the nobility of the soul is considered from the standpoint of the image, that in which the notion of image is most properly verified must be the most excellent part of the soul. Now even if the image is in both the will and the intellect, it is more properly in the intellect than in the will. Hence the Master of the Sentences says that the image is in the knowledge of truth and merely a likeness in the love of good. Therefore the intellect must still be nobler than the will.

3. Since we judge of the powers from their acts, that power must be the nobler whose act is the nobler. But to understand is nobler than to will. Therefore the intellect is nobler than the will. Proof of the minor: Since acts are specified by their terms, that act must be nobler whose term is nobler. But the act of the intellect involves a motion to the soul; that of the will, from the soul to things. Since the soul is nobler than external things, to understand is therefore nobler than to will.

4. Among all things arranged in an order the more distant anything is from the lowest member, the higher it is. But the lowest among the powers of the soul is sense, and the will stands closer to sense than does the intellect. For the will shares with the sense powers the condition of its object, because the will is concerned with particulars just as is sense. We wish for a particular health and not health as something universal. But the intellect is concerned with universals. The intellect is therefore a higher power than the will.

5. That which rules is nobler than the thing ruled. But the intellect rules the will. Therefore it is nobler than the will.

6. That from which something comes has authority over it and is greater than it if it is distinct in essence. But intelligence is from memory as the Son from the Father, and will is from memory and intelligence as the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son. Intelligence therefore has authority in regard to the will and is greater and stronger than it.

7. The simpler and more immaterial an act is, the nobler it is. But the act of the intellect is simpler and more immaterial than that of the will, because the intellect abstracts from matter, but not the will. The act of the intellect is therefore nobler than that of the will.

8. The intellect bears to the soul the same relation as brightness to material things, and the will or affective power, that of warmth, as appears from the sayings of the saints. But brightness is nobler than warmth, since it is the quality of a nobler body. The intellect is therefore also nobler than the will.

9. According to the Philosopher that which is proper to man as man is nobler than that which is shared by man and the other animals. But to understand is proper to man, whereas to will belongs to the other animals also. The Philosopher accordingly says, "Children and brutes share in what is voluntary." The intellect is therefore nobler than the will.

10. The nearer a thing is to its end, the nobler it is, since the goodness of means is from the end. But the intellect seems to be nearer to the end than the will, for a man first attains the end by his intellect by knowing it before he does so by his will by desiring it. The intellect is therefore nobler than the will.

11. Gregory says, "The contemplative life is . . . of greater merit than the active." But the contemplative life pertains to the intellect; the active, to the will. Then the intellect is also nobler than the will.

12. The Philosopher says that the intellect is the most excellent of the things which are in us. It is therefore nobler than the will.

To the Contrary:

1'. The habit of a more perfect power is more perfect. But the habit by which the will is perfected, charity, is nobler than faith and knowledge, by which the intellect is perfected, as is evident from what the Apostle says in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (13:2). The will is therefore nobler than the intellect.

2'. What is free is nobler than what is not. But the intellect is not free since it can be forced, but the will is free since it cannot be forced. The will is therefore nobler than the intellect.

3'. The order of the powers follows the order of their objects. But good, which is the object of the will, is nobler than the true, which is the object of the intellect. The will is therefore also nobler than the intellect.

4'. According to Dionysius the more common any one of the divine participations is, the nobler it is. But the will is more common than the intellect, because some things participate in will which do not participate in intellect, as was said above. The will is therefore nobler than the intellect.

5'. The nearer to God anything is, the nobler it is. But the will comes closer to God than the intellect, because, as Hugh of St. Victor says, love enters in where knowledge remains outside, for we love God more than we are able to know of Him. Therefore the will is nobler than the intellect.

REPLY:

A thing can be said to be more eminent than another either simply or in a certain respect. For something to be shown to be simply better than another the comparison must be made on the basis of what is essential to them and not on that of accidentals. In the latter case one thing would be shown to stand out over another merely in a certain respect. Thus if a man were to be compared to a lion on the basis of essential differences, he would be found to be simply nobler inasmuch as the man is a rational animal, the lion irrational. But if a lion is compared to a man on the basis of physical strength, he surpasses the man. But this is to be nobler only in a certain respect. To see, then, which of these two powers, the will or the intellect, is better without qualification, we must consider the matter from their essential differences.

The perfection and dignity of the intellect consists in this, that the species of the thing which is understood is in the intellect itself, since in this way it actually understands, and from this its whole dignity is seen. The nobility of the will and of its act, however, consists in this, that the soul is directed to some noble thing in the very existence which that thing has in itself. Now it is more perfect, simply and absolutely speaking, to have within oneself the nobility of another thing than to be related to a noble thing outside oneself. Hence, if the will and the intellect are considered absolutely, and not with reference to this or that particular thing, they have this order, that the intellect is simply more excellent than the will.

But it may happen that to be related in some way to some noble thing is more excellent than to have its nobility within oneself. This is the case, for instance, when the nobility of that thing is possessed in a way much inferior to that in which the thing has it within itself. But if the nobility of one thing is in another just as nobly or more nobly than it is in the thing to which it belongs, then without doubt that which has the nobility of that thing within itself is nobler than that which is related in any way whatsoever to that noble thing. Now the intellect takes on the forms of things superior to the soul in a way inferior to that which they have in the things themselves; for the intellect receives things after its own fashion, as is said in The Causes. And for the same reason the forms of things inferior to the soul, such as corporeal things, are more noble in the soul than in the things themselves.

The intellect can accordingly be compared to the will in three ways: (1) Absolutely and in general, without any reference to this or that particular thing. In this way the intellect is more excellent than the will, just as it is more perfect to possess what there is of dignity in a thing than merely to be related to its nobility. (2) With regard to material and sensible things. In this way again the intellect is simply nobler than the will. For example, to know a stone intellectually is nobler than to will it, because the form of the stone is in the intellect, inasmuch as it is known by the intellect, in a nobler way than it is in itself as desired by the will. (3) With reference to divine things, which are superior to the soul. In this way to will is more excellent than to understand, as to will God or to love Him is more excellent than to know Him. This is because the divine goodness itself is more perfectly in God Himself as He is desired by the will than the participated goodness is in us as known by the intellect.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Augustine takes reason and intelligence for the whole intellective part, which includes both the apprehension of the intellect and the appetite of the will; and so the will is not excluded from the image.

2. The Master appropriates to reason the fact of being an image because it is prior; and to love, likeness, because with reference to God knowledge is completed by love, just as a picture is achieved and beautified by colors and similar means, by which it is made like the original.

3. That argument is based upon things surpassed in nobility by the soul. But by the same reasoning can be shown the pre-eminence of the will in reference to things nobler than the soul.

4. The will has its object in common with the senses only in so far as it is directed to sensible things, which are inferior to the soul. But in so far as it is directed to intelligible and divine things, it is more distant from the senses than is the intellect, since the intellect can grasp less of divine things than the affective power desires and loves.

5. The intellect rules the will, not by inclining it to that to which it tends, but by showing it that to which it should tend. When, therefore, the intellect is less capable of exhibiting something noble than the inclination of the will is of being directed to it, the will surpasses the intellect.

6. The will does not proceed from intelligence directly but from the essence of the soul, intelligence being presupposed. From this, then, the order of dignity is not revealed, but only the order of origin, by which the intellect is naturally prior to the will.

7. The intellect abstracts from matter only when it knows sensible and material things; but when it knows things which are above it, it does not abstract; rather it receives things in a way that is less simple than the things are in themselves. Hence, the act of the will, which is directed to the things as they are in themselves, remains simpler and nobler.

8. Those expressions by which the intellect is compared to brightness and the will to warmth are metaphorical; and from such expressions no argument is to be drawn, as the Master says. Dionysius also says that symbolical theology is not argumentative.

9. Willing belongs to man alone as well as understanding, though tending appetitively belongs to other things besides man.

10. Although the soul is referred to God by the intellect before it is by the affections, nevertheless the affections attain Him more perfectly than does the intellect, as has been said.*

11. The will is not excluded from contemplation. Gregory says that the contemplative life is to love God and one's neighbor. Hence the pre-eminence of the contemplative life over the active is not prejudicial to the will.

12. The Philosopher is speaking of the intellect according as it is taken for the whole intellective part, which includes the will also.--Or it can be said that he is viewing the intellect and the other powers of the soul absolutely, not as referred to this or that particular object.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

1'. Charity is a habit perfecting the will with reference to God. In this reference the will is nobler than the intellect.

2'. The freedom of the will does not show that it is nobler simply, but that it is nobler in moving, as will appear more clearly from what follows.

3'. Since the true is a certain good (for it is the good of the intellect, as is made clear by the Philosopher , good should not be called nobler than the true, just as animal is not nobler than man, since man includes the nobility of animal and adds to it. We are now speaking of the true and the good in so far as they are the objects of the will and of the intellect.

4'. Willing is not found more extensively than understanding although tending appetitively is. It should, however, be observed that in this argument the passage from Dionysius is not used in his meaning for two reasons. (1) Dionysius is speaking on the supposition that one is included in the notion of the other, as being in living and living in understanding. He accordingly says that one is simpler than the other. (2) Although a participation which is simpler is nobler, nevertheless, if it is taken together with the mode in which it is found in things lacking additional perfections, it will be less noble. Thus if to be, which is nobler than to live, is taken together with the mode in which inanimate things are, that mode of being will be less noble than the being of living things, which is to live. It is accordingly not necessary that what is found more extensively should always be more noble; otherwise we should have to say that sense is nobler than intellect and the nutritive power nobler than the sensitive.

5'. That argument is concerned with the will in reference to God. In this sense it is granted to be more noble.