Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Truth (De Veritate)

2. Something is just by reason of its agreement with a law. But a law seems to be nothing but the expression of the will of a sovereign, because "what has pleased the prince has the force of law," as the Legislator says. Since the sovereign of all things is the divine will, it therefore seems that the whole character of justice depends upon it alone.

3. Political justice, which is found in human affairs, has its model in natural justice, which consists in the fulfillment of its own nature by anything whatever. But each thing participates in the order of its nature because of the divine will; for Hilary says: "The will of God has conferred upon all creatures their essence." All justice therefore depends merely upon the will of God.

4. Since justice is a certain correctness, it depends upon the imitation of some rule. But the rule of the effect is its due cause. Since the first cause of all things is the divine will, it therefore seems to be the first rule from which everything just is judged.

5. God's will cannot be anything but just. If the character of justice depended upon anything else besides the divine will, that would restrict and, in a sense, bind the divine will. But that is impossible.

6. Every will which is just by a principle other than itself is such that its principle should be sought. But "the cause of God's will is not to be sought," as Augustine says. The principle of justice therefore depends upon no other than the divine will.

To the Contrary:

1'. The works of justice are distinguished from the works of mercy. But the works of divine mercy depend upon God's will. Hence something else besides the mere will of God is demanded for the character of justice.

2'. According to Anselm justice is "correctness of will." But correctness of will is distinct from the will. In us it is really distinct, since our will can be correct or not. In God it is distinct at least conceptually or according to our manner of understanding it. Therefore the character of justice does not depend upon the divine will alone.

REPLY:

Since justice is a certain "correctness," as Anselm says, or "equation," as the Philosopher teaches, the essential character of justice must depend first of all upon that in which there is first found the character of a rule according to which the equality and correctness of justice is established in things. Now the will does not have the character of the first rule; it is rather a rule which has a rule, for it is directed by reason and the intellect. This is true not only in us but also in God, although in us the will is really distinct from the intellect. For this reason the will and its correctness are not the same thing. In God, however, the will is really identical with the intellect, and for this reason the correctness of His will is really the same as His will itself. Consequently the first thing upon which the essential character of all justice depends is the wisdom of the divine intellect, which constitutes things in their due proportion both to one another and to their cause. In this proportion the essential character of created justice consists. But to say that justice depends simply upon the will is to say that the divine will does not proceed according to the order of wisdom, and that is blasphemous.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Nothing can be just unless it is willed by God. Yet what is willed by God has the first cause of its justice from the order of divine wisdom.

2. Although the will of the prince, by the fact of its being a will, has the coercive force of law, yet it does not have the character of justice except from being led by reason.

3. God works in natural things in two ways: (1) by establishing the natures themselves, and (2) by providing each thing with whatever belongs to its nature. The essence of justice demands something due. Now, since it is no way due that creatures be brought into being, but purely voluntary, the first operation does not have the note of justice, but it depends simply upon the divine will. It might, however, conceivably be said to have the note of justice because of the ordination of the thing made to the will. For it is of obligation from the very fact that God wills it that everything which God wills be done. But in the fulfillment of this ordination it is wisdom which does the directing as the first rule. In the second sort of operation, however, there is found the character of something due, not on the part of the agent, since God is indebted to no one, but rather on the part of the recipient. It is due to every natural being that it have the things which its nature calls for both in essentials and in accidentals. But what is due depends upon the divine wisdom inasmuch as the natural being should be such as to imitate the idea of it which is in the divine mind. In this way the divine wisdom is found to be the first rule of justice. In all the divine operations, however, by which God bestows upon the creature anything beyond the debt of nature, as in the gifts of grace, the same sort of justice is found as is assigned in the first sort of operation, by which God establishes natures.

4. According to our manner of understanding, the divine will presupposes wisdom, which first has the character of a rule.

5. Since intellect and will do not really differ in God, by the fact of being directed and determined to something definite the will is not restricted by anything other than itself; but it is moved according to its own nature, since it is natural for that will always to act according to the order of wisdom.

6. On the part of the One willing there cannot be any cause of the divine will other than the will itself as its reason for willing. For in God will, wisdom, and goodness are really identical. But on the part of the thing willed the divine will has a principle, which is that of the thing willed, not that of the One willing, according to which the thing willed is ordained to something else either by desert or by fitness. This ordination belongs to the divine wisdom. Hence this is the first root of justice.