Chapter LXXIV.

He next, in many words, blames us for asserting that God made all things for the sake of man.  Because from the history of animals, and from the sagacity manifested by them, he would show that all things came into existence not more for the sake of man than of the irrational animals.  And here he seems to me to speak in a similar manner to those who, through dislike of their enemies, accuse them of the same things for which their own friends are commended.  For as, in the instance referred to, hatred blinds these persons from seeing that they are accusing their very dearest friends by the means through which they think they are slandering their enemies; so in the same way, Celsus also, becoming confused in his argument, does not see that he is bringing a charge against the philosophers of the Porch, who, not amiss, place man in the foremost rank, and rational nature in general before irrational animals, and who maintain that Providence created all things mainly on account of rational nature.  Rational beings, then, as being the principal ones, occupy the place, as it were, of children in the womb, while irrational and soulless beings hold that of the envelope which is created along with the child.923    καὶ λόγον μὲν ἔχει τὰ λογικὰ, ἅπερ ἐστὶ προηγούμενα, παίδων γεννωμένων· τὰ δ᾽ ἄλογα καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα χωρίου συγκτιζομένου τᾷ παιδίῳ.  I think, too, that as in cities the superintendents of the goods and market discharge their duties for the sake of no other than human beings, while dogs and other irrational animals have the benefit of the superabundance; so Providence provides in a special manner for rational creatures; while this also follows, that irrational creatures likewise enjoy the benefit of what is done for the sake of man.  And as he is in error who alleges that the superintendents of the markets924    ἀγορανόμοι. make provision in no greater degree for men than for dogs, because dogs also get their share of the goods; so in a far greater degree are Celsus and they who think with him guilty of impiety towards the God who makes provision for rational beings, in asserting that His arrangements are made in no greater degree for the sustenance of human beings than for that of plants, and trees, and herbs, and thorns.

∆ιὰ πολλῶν δ' ἑξῆς ἐγκαλεῖ ἡμῖν ὡς τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ φάσκουσι πάντα πεποιηκέναι τὸν θεόν. Καὶ βούλεται ἐκ τῆς περὶ τῶν ζῴων ἱστορίας καὶ τῆς ἐμφαινομένης αὐτοῖς ἀγχινοίας δεικνύναι ὅτι οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἀνθρώπων ἢ τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων ἕνεκεν γέγονε τὰ πάντα. Καὶ δοκεῖ μοι ὅμοιόν τι εἰπεῖν τοῖς διὰ τὸ πρὸς τοὺς μισουμένους ἔχθος κατηγοροῦσιν αὐτῶν ἐφ' οἷς οἱ φίλτατοι αὐτῶν ἐπαινοῦνται. Ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτων τυφλοῖ τὸ ἔχθος πρὸς τὸ μὴ συνορᾶν ὅτι καὶ φιλτάτων κατηγοροῦσιν δι' ὧν κακῶς λέγειν νομίζουσι τοὺς ἐχθρούς, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ὁ Κέλσος συγχυθεὶς τὸν λογισμὸν οὐχ ἑώρακεν ὅτι καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς φιλοσόφων κατηγορεῖ, οὐ κακῶς προταττόντων τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἁπαξαπλῶς τὴν λογικὴν φύσιν πάντων τῶν ἀλόγων καὶ διὰ ταύτην λεγόντων προηγουμένως τὴν πρόνοιαν πάντα πεποιηκέναι. Καὶ λόγον μὲν ἔχει τὰ λογικά, ἅπερ ἐστὶ προηγούμενα, παίδων γεννωμένων· τὰ δ' ἄλογα καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα χορίου συγκτιζομένου τῷ παιδίῳ. Καὶ ἡγοῦμαί γε ὅτι, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν οἱ προνοούμενοι τῶν ὠνίων καὶ τῆς ἀγορᾶς δι' οὐδὲν ἄλλο προνοοῦνται ἢ διὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, παραπολαύουσι δὲ τῆς δαψιλείας καὶ κύνες καὶ ἄλλα τῶν ἀλόγων· οὕτως ἡ πρόνοια τῶν μὲν λογικῶν προηγουμένως προνοεῖ, ἐπηκολούθησε δὲ τὸ καὶ τὰ ἄλογα ἀπολαύειν τῶν δι' ἀνθρώπους γινομένων. Καὶ ὥσπερ ἁμαρτάνει ὁ λέγων τοὺς ἀγορανόμους προνοεῖν οὐ μᾶλλον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἢ τῶν κυνῶν, ἐπεὶ καὶ οἱ κύνες παραπολαύουσι τῆς δαψιλείας τῶν ὠνίων, οὕτω πολλῷ μᾶλλον Κέλσος καὶ οἱ τὰ αὐτὰ φρονοῦντες αὐτῷ ἀσεβοῦσιν εἰς τὸν προνοοῦντα τῶν λογικῶν θεόν, φάσκοντες· τί μᾶλλον ἀνθρώποις γίνεσθαι ταῦτα πρὸς τροφὴν ἢ τοῖς φυτοῖς δένδροις τε καὶ πόαις καὶ ἀκάνθαις;