ARTICLE VIII

In the Eighth Article We Ask: CAN THE FREE CHOICE OF A CREATURE BE CONFIRMED IN GOOD BY A GIFT OF GRACE?

Difficulties:

It seems that it cannot, for

1. Grace, coming to a nature, does not destroy but perfects it. Since it is a natural characteristic of the free choice of a creature that it can be turned to evil, it therefore seems that it cannot be removed from it by grace.

2. It is within the power of free choice to use grace or not to use it, for free choice is not forced by grace. But if free choice does not use a grace imparted to it, it falls into evil. Consequently no grace that comes to it can confirm free choice in good.

3. Free choice has the mastery of its own acts. But the use of grace is an act of free choice. It is therefore within the power of free choice to use it or not to use it, and so it cannot be confirmed by grace.

4. The possibility of turning to evil is in the free choice of a creature because it is from nothing, as Damascene says. But no grace can remove from a creature its origin from nothing. Then no grace can confirm our free choice in good.

5. Bernard says that free choice is "the most powerful thing" under God, that it gets no increase from grace and justice, and that it suffers no loss from a fault. But confirmation in good when added to free choice increases it, because according to Augustine "in things of great mass to be larger is to be better." Hence free choice cannot be confirmed in good by grace.

6. As is said in The Causes, whatever is in a subject is in it after the manner of that subject. But free choice is by its nature capable of change to good or evil. A grace that comes to it is therefore received into it in such a way that it can be turned to good or evil; and so it cannot confirm it in good.

7. Whatever God adds to a creature He could also, as it seems, confer upon it from the beginning of its creation. Consequently, if He could confirm free choice by a grace added to it, He could also confirm it by something implanted in the spiritual creature in the very constitution of the nature; and so it would be naturally confirmed in good. But this is impossible, as has been said. Then neither can it be confirmed through grace.

To the Contrary:

1'. The saints who are in their heavenly home are confirmed in good so as not to be able to sin any more; otherwise they would not be secure in their happiness and so would not be happy. But this confirmation is not in them by nature, as has been said. It is therefore by grace; and so free choice can be confirmed by a gift of grace.

2'. The human body is by nature corruptible, just as man's free choice is by nature capable of turning to evil. But the human body is made incorruptible by a gift of grace; for it is written in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (15:53): "For this corruptible must put on incorruption." Free choice can therefore be confirmed in good by grace.

REPLY:

Origen was in error concerning this question. He held that the free choice of a creature could in no way be confirmed in good, not even in the blessed, except in Christ because of the union to the Word. As a result of this error, moreover, he was forced to affirm that the happiness of the saints and even of the angels is not everlasting but is at some time to come to an end; and from this it follows that theirs is not true happiness, since changelessness and security are essential to happiness. Consequently because of its inadmissible consequences Origen's position is to be entirely rejected; and we must say without cavil that free choice can be confirmed in good by grace.

This is evident from the following consideration. The free choice of a creature cannot be naturally confirmed in good, because it does not have in its nature the note of perfect and absolute good but only of a certain particular good. By grace, however, free choice is united to this perfect and absolute good, that is, God. If the union should be perfect, so that free choice would have God Himself as the whole cause of its acting, it could not turn to evil. That does happen in some cases, and especially in that of the blessed.

The reason is this. The will naturally tends to good as its object. That it sometimes tends to evil happens only because the evil is presented to it under the aspect of a good. But evil is involuntary, as Dionysius says. Consequently there cannot be any sin in the motion of the will so that it tends to evil unless there previously exists some deficiency in the apprehensive power, as a result of which something evil is presented as good. This deficiency in reason can come about in two ways: either from reason itself, or from something extrinsic to it.

It can come about from reason itself because the knowledge of good in general, both of the good which is the end and of that which is a means, is had by it naturally and invariably and without error, but not of good in particular. In regard to the latter it can err so that it judges something which is not the end to be the end, or something which is not useful to the end to be useful. For this reason too the will naturally desires the good which is the end, namely, happiness in general, and likewise the good which is a means to the end (for everyone naturally desires his own profit); but the sin on the part of the will occurs in desiring this or that particular end or in choosing this or that means.

Reason proves deficient because of something extrinsic to it when the lower powers are drawn to something intensely and the act of reason is consequently interrupted so that it does not propose to the will its judgment about the good clearly and firmly. For example, someone with a proper regard for the necessity of observing chastity may desire something contrary to chastity through a lust for what is pleasurable, because the judgment of reason is in some sense fettered by concupiscence, as the Philosopher says.

Both of those types of deficiency will be entirely removed from the blessed by their union to God. For, seeing the divine essence, they will recognize that God Himself is the end to be loved above all else. They will know too in particular all the things which either unite a person with Him or separate one from Him, knowing God not only in Himself but also as the reason for which other things are to be desired. And from the clarity of this knowledge their minds will be strengthened to such an extent that no motion will be able to arise in the lower powers except according to the rule of reason. Consequently, just as we now invariably desire good in general, the minds of the blessed invariably desire in particular the good which they ought. Furthermore, over and above this natural inclination of the will they will have perfect charity binding them entirely to God. Sin will therefore be unable to occur in them in any way; and so they will be confirmed by grace.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. It is due to the deficiency of a created nature that it can turn to evil; and grace removes this deficiency by perfecting the nature, confirming it in good, just as light which comes to the air takes away the darkness which it naturally has without light.

2. It is within the power of free choice not to make use of a habit; yet even the non-use of a habit can be proposed to it under the aspect of good. But this cannot happen in the blessed regarding grace, as has been said.*

3. The answer to this is clear from what has just been said.

4. Because free choice is from nothing, it is consonant with it not to be naturally confirmed in good; nor can natural confirmation in good through grace be granted to it through grace. It is not, however, consonant with free choice as being from nothing to be incapable of confirmation in good in any way, just as it is not in air from its own nature to be altogether incapable of being illuminated, but merely to be not by nature actually luminous.

5. Bernard is speaking of free choice with reference to freedom from force, which does not admit of increase or lessening.

6. Concerning anything received into a subject we can consider its existence and its formal character. In regard to its existence it is in its subject after the manner of the subject, but it nevertheless draws the subject to its own formal character. Thus heat that is received into water has existence in the water after the manner of the water, being in the water as an accident in a subject; yet it draws the water from its natural state to one in which it is hot and takes on the character of heat. Similarly, light affects the air, though not against the nature of air. In the same way grace too in regard to its existence is in free choice after its manner as an accident in a subject; yet it draws free choice to the formal character of its own invariability, joining it to God.

7. The perfect good, God, can be united to the human mind by grace but not by nature. Consequently free choice can be confirmed in good by grace but not by nature.