ARTICLE XIV

In the Fourteenth Article We Ask: IS FREE CHOICE CAPABLE OF GOOD WITHOUT GRACE?

Difficulties:

It seems that it is, for

1. A commandment is not given about something impossible. Jerome says in this respect: "Cursed is he who says that God has commanded man to do anything impossible." But man is commanded to do good. Man is therefore able to do good by his free choice.

2. No one should be reprimanded if he does not do what he is not able to do. But a man is justly reprimanded if he omits doing good. Hence man is able by his free choice to do good.

3. Man is able by his free choice to avoid sin to some extent, at least as regards a single act. But it is good to avoid sin. Man can therefore do something good by his free choice.

4. Everything is more capable of what is natural to it than of what is against its nature. But free choice is naturally ordained to good, and sin is against its nature. It is therefore more capable of good than of evil. But it is capable of evil by itself. Much more, then, is it capable of good.

5. A creature retains a likeness to the Creator by reason of the vestige, and much more by reason of the image. But the Creator can do good by Himself. Then so too can a creature, especially free choice, which pertains to the image.

6. According to the Philosopher it is by the same causes that virtue is destroyed and engendered. But by free choice virtue can be destroyed, because mortal sin, which a man can commit of his free choice, destroys virtue. By his free choice, then, man is capable of engendering the good which is virtue.

7. In the first Epistle of St. John (5:3) it is said: "His commandments are not heavy." But what is not heavy man can do by his free choice. Man can therefore of his free choice fulfill the commandments, and that is good above all.

8. According to Anselm free choice "is the power of preserving the rectitude of the will for its own sake." But the rectitude of the will is preserved only by doing good. A person can therefore do good by his free choice.

9. Grace is stronger than sin. But grace does not so bind free choice that man cannot commit sin. Then neither does sin so bind free choice that a man in the state of sin cannot do good without grace.

To the Contrary:

1'. In the Epistle to the Romans (7:18) we read: "For to will, is present with me; but to accomplish that which is good, I find not." Man therefore cannot do good by his free choice.

2'. Man can do good only by an external or an internal act. But free choice does not suffice for either; for, as is said in the Epistle to the Romans (9:16): "It is not of him that willeth"; i.e., to will, which refers to the internal act, [is not in his power]; "nor of him that runneth"; i.e., to run, which refers to the external act; "but of God that sheweth mercy." Free choice without grace can therefore in no way do good.

3'. Commenting on the words of the Epistle to the Romans (7:15): "The evil which I hate, that I do," the Gloss says: "Man wills good naturally, to be sure; but this will always is without effect unless God's grace has strengthened his act of willing." Without grace, then, man cannot accomplish any good.

4'. The thought of good precedes the doing of good, as the Philosopher makes clear. But man cannot think anything good by himself; for it is said in the second Epistle to the Corinthians (3:5): "Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves." Hence man cannot do good by himself.

REPLY:

Nothing acts outside the limits of its own species. But everything can act according to the requirements of its species, since nothing is deprived of its proper activity.

Now there are two kinds of good, one which is proportioned to human nature, and another which is beyond the ability of human nature. If we are speaking of acts, these two kinds of good do not differ in the substance of the act but in the manner of acting. Take, for instance, the act of giving alms. It is a good proportioned to human powers in so far as a man is moved to it by a certain natural love or kindness; but it is beyond the ability of human nature in so far as a man is led to it by charity, which unites man's heart to God.

It is apparent that without grace free choice is incapable of the kind of good which is above human nature; and--because it is by this kind of good that man merits eternal life--it is apparent that man cannot merit without grace. The kind of good which is proportioned to human nature, however, man can accomplish by his free choice. Augustine accordingly says that man can cultivate fields, build houses, and do a number of other things by his free choice without actual grace.

Although man can perform good actions of this kind without ingratiatory grace, he cannot perform them without God, since nothing can enter upon its natural operation except by the divine power, because a secondary cause acts only by the power of the first cause, as is said in The Causes. This is true of both natural and voluntary agents. Yet it is verified in a different way in either case.

In natural beings God is the cause of their natural operation inasmuch as He gives and conserves the intrinsic principle of their natural operation, and from that principle a determined operation flows of necessity. In the element earth, for example, He conserves its heaviness, which is the principle of its motion downward. But man's will is not determined to any particular operation but remains indifferent in regard to many. It is thus in some sense in potency unless it is moved by an activating principle, which is either something presented to it from the outside, such as an apprehended good, or something which works within it interiorly, as God Himself. Augustine explains this, showing that God works in the hearts of men in many ways. All external motions, moreover, are also governed by divine providence, according as God judges that someone is to be aroused to good by such and such particular actions. Should we wish, accordingly, to call the grace of God, not a habitual gift, but the very mercy of God by which He interiorly moves the mind and arranges external conditions for man's salvation, in this sense also man cannot do any good without God's grace. But commonly speaking, we use the name of grace for a habitual gift which justifies. It is accordingly clear that each set of reasons comes to a conclusion in some sense false. Consequently answers must be given to both.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. What God commands is not impossible for man to observe; for the substance of the act can be observed by his free choice; and the prescribed manner--by which the act is raised above the ability of nature, that is, in so far as it is done from charity--can be observed by a gift of grace, though not by man's free choice alone.

2. A man who does not fulfill the commandments is rightly reprimanded, because it is by reason of his negligence that he does not have the grace by which he can observe the commandments even as to the manner (since he could, even without grace, observe them as to their substance).

3. By performing an act that is good generically man avoids sin, though he does not merit a reward. Consequently, even though man can avoid a particular sin by his free choice, it still does not follow that he is capable of any meritorious good by his free choice alone.

4. By his free choice man is capable of a good which is natural to him; but a meritorious good is above his nature, as has been said.*

5. Although in a creature there is a likeness to the Creator, it is not perfect. Such a likeness is exclusively proper to the Son. It is therefore not necessary that whatever is found in God be found in a creature.

6. The Philosopher is speaking of political virtue, which is acquired by acts; not of infused virtue, which is the only principle of a meritorious act.

7. As Augustine says, the commandments of God are understood to be easy for love but hard for fear. It accordingly does not follow that they can be fulfilled perfectly by anyone but a person having charity. Though a person without charity could fulfill a particular one as to its substance and with difficulty, he could not fulfill all, just as he could not avoid all sins.

8. Though free choice can keep the rectitude which it has, it cannot keep it when it does not have it.

9. Free choice does not need to be bound for it to be incapable of meritorious good, since this is beyond its nature, just as a man is incapable of flying even if he is not bound.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

The answers to these are clear, because they are either arguing on the basis of meritorious good, or they show that man can do no good without the operation of God.