ARTICLE II

In the Second Article We Ask: Is SENSUALITY ONE SIMPLE POWER OR IS IT DIVIDED INTO SEVERAL: THE IRASCIBLE AND THE CONCUPISCIBLE

POWERS?

Difficulties:

It seems that it is one simple power not divided into several, for

1. In its definition sensuality is said to be a lower power of the soul. This would not be said if it contained several powers. It therefore does not seem to be divided into several powers.

2. One and the same power of the soul "is concerned with one contrariety, as sight is concerned with white and black," as is said in The Soul. But agreeable and harmful are contraries. One and the same power of the soul is therefore referred to both. But the concupiscible power is referred to the agreeable, and the irascible to the harmful. The irascible and the concupiscible are therefore one and the same power, and sensuality is accordingly not divided into several powers.

3. It is by the same force that a person withdraws from one extreme and approaches the other, as by reason of gravity a stone leaves the top and goes to the bottom. But by the irascible power the soul withdraws from the harmful by shunning it; and by the concupiscible power it approaches the agreeable by craving it. The irascible and the concupiscible are therefore the same power of the soul. Thus the conclusion is the same as before.

4. The proper object of joy is the agreeable. Now joy is found only in the concupiscible power. The proper object of the concupiscible power is therefore the agreeable. But the agreeable is the object of the whole of sensuality, as is evident from the definition of sensuality explained above; for the body's concerns are things agreeing with the body. Consequently the whole of sensuality is nothing but the concupiscible power. Then either the irascible and the concupiscible powers are the same, or the irascible does not belong to sensuality. Whichever of these two is granted, the thesis (that sensuality is one simple power) stands.

5. The answer was given that the object of sensuality is also the harmful or disagreeable, which the irascible power attains.--On the contrary, the harmful or disagreeable is the object of sadness, just as the agreeable is the object of joy. But both joy and sadness are found in the concupiscible power. Consequently both the agreeable and the harmful are the object of the concupiscible. Thus, whatever is the object of sensuality is the object of the concupiscible. And so the same must be concluded as above.

6. Sense appetite presupposes apprehension. But the agreeable and the harmful are apprehended by the same apprehensive power. Then the same appetitive power is concerned with both. Thus the conclusion is the same as above.

7. According to Augustine "hatred is inveterate anger." But hatred is in the concupiscible power, as is proved in the Topics, because love is in the same power. But anger is in the irascible. Therefore the irascible and the concupiscible are one and the same power, for otherwise anger could not be in both.

8. That function of the soul which belongs to every power does not require a definite power distinct from the rest. But to crave (concupiscere) belongs to every power of the soul, as is evident from the fact that every power of the soul delights in its object and craves it. Consequently a power distinct from the rest need not be referred to craving. Thus the concupiscible power is not distinct from the irascible.

9. Powers are distinguished according to their acts. But in any act of the irascible power the act of the concupiscible is included, for anger has a craving for revenge, and so of the others. The concupiscible is therefore not a power distinct from the irascible.

To the Contrary:

1'. Damascene distinguishes the sensitive appetite into the irascible and the concupiscible powers, and so does Gregory of Nyssa. But the lower appetite is sensuality. Sensuality therefore includes several powers.

2'. In Spirit and Soul these three motive powers are distinguished: "the rational, the concupiscible, and the irascible." But the rational power is distinct from the irascible. Then so also is the irascible from the concupiscible.

3'. The Philosopher places in the sensitive appetite "desire and high spirit," that is, the concupiscible and the irascible.

REPLY:

The appetite of sensuality contains these two powers: the irascible and the concupiscible, which are faculties distinct from one another. This can be seen from the following consideration.

Sense appetite has something in common with natural appetite inasmuch as both tend to a thing agreeing with the subject of the tendency. Natural appetite is found to tend to two things in accordance with the two types of operation of a natural being. One of these is that by which the natural being strives to acquire what is capable of preserving its nature, as a heavy body moves downward in order to be preserved there. The other type is that by which the natural being destroys its contraries by an active quality. This is necessary for a corruptible being because, if it did not have the strength to conquer its contrary, it would be destroyed by it.

Natural appetite accordingly has a twofold tendency: to obtain what is suited and favorable to this nature, and to gain, as it were, a victory over whatever is opposed to it. The first is done by way of reception, the second by way of action. They are consequently reduced to different principles, for receiving and acting are not from the same principle, as fire is borne upward by its lightness and by heat destroys things contrary to it.

In sense appetite those same two tendencies are likewise found. For by its appetitive faculty an animal desires what is suited and favorable to it. This is done by the concupiscible power, whose proper object is what is delightful to sense. It also seeks to gain the mastery and victory over things that are contrary to it. This it does by the irascible power. Its object is accordingly said to be something arduous.

From this it is clear that the irascible is a different power from the concupiscible. If something is pleasurable it has a different reason for its appetibility than if it is arduous, since the arduous sometimes keeps us away from pleasure and involves us in affairs that bring sadness, as when an animal leaves the pleasure which he was enjoying and enters a fight and is not made to withdraw from it by the pains which he incurs. One of the two, moreover, the concupiscible power, seems to be directed to reception; for it tends in order that the object of its delight may be joined to it. The other, however, the irascible power, is directed to action, because by its action it overcomes something which is contrary or harmful to it, getting the upper hand by victory over it. It is found to be the case among the powers of the soul in general that receiving and acting belong to different powers, as is clear of the agent and possible intellect. It is for this reason too that according to Avicenna courage and faintness of heart pertain to the irascible power as the faculty directed to action, whereas the expansion and contraction of the heart pertain to the concupiscible power as the faculty directed to reception.

It is clear, then, from what has been said that the irascible power is in some sense subordinated to the concupiscible as its defender. For it is necessary for an animal to gain victory over the things contrary to it by means of the irascible power, as has been said, in order that the concupiscible may possess the object of its delight without hindrance. An indication of this is the fact that animals fight among themselves on account of things that give them pleasure, such as copulation and food, as is said in Animals. For this reason all the passions of the irascible power have their beginning and end in the concupiscible. Anger, for instance, begins with some sadness that has been caused (in the concupiscible power) and, after revenge has been got, ends with joy (which is likewise in the concupiscible power). In the same way hope begins with desire or love and ends in enjoyment.

It should be noted, however, that not only in the apprehensive powers but also in the appetitive there is something which belongs to the sensitive soul in accordance with its own nature and something else according as it has some slight participation in reason, coming into contact at its highest level of activity with reason at its lowest. There is verified here the statement of Dionysius that the divine wisdom "joins the ends of the first things to the beginnings of the second."

Thus the imaginative power belongs to the sensitive soul in accordance with its own nature, because forms received from sense are stored up in it; but the estimative power, by which an animal apprehends intentions not received by the senses, such as friendship or hostility, is in the sensitive soul according as it shares somewhat in reason. It is accordingly in virtue of this estimative power that animals are said to have a sort of prudence, as is seen in the beginning of the Metaphysics. A sheep, for example, flees from a wolf whose hostility it has never sensed.

The same principle is verified also in regard to the appetitive power. The fact that an animal seeks what is pleasurable to its senses (the business of the concupiscible power) is in accordance with the sensitive soul's own nature; but that it should leave what is pleasurable and seek something for the sake of a victory which it wins with pain (the business of the irascible), this belongs to it according as it in some measure reaches up to the higher appetite. The irascible power, therefore, is closer to reason and the will than the concupiscible. On this account a man unable to control his anger is less base than one unable to control his concupiscence, being less deprived of reason, as the Philosopher says.

It is therefore clear from what has been said that the irascible and the concupiscible are distinct powers, and also what is the object of each and how the irascible power helps the concupiscible and is higher and nobler than it, like the estimative among the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Sensuality is called a power in the singular because it is one in genus although it is divided into different species or parts.

2. Both the agreeable object of delight and the harmful object of sadness belong to the concupiscible inasmuch as one is to be fled, the other to be pursued. But to get the upper hand over both of them, so as to be able to overcome the harmful and possess with some security the pleasurable, belongs to the irascible power.

3. To draw away from the harmful and to draw near to the pleasurable are both the business of the concupiscible power. But to fight against and overcome what can be harmful pertains to the irascible.

4-5. From the above answer the answer to these also is clear, because the agreeable is the object of the concupiscible power inasmuch as it is pleasurable, but it is the object of the whole of sensuality inasmuch as it is in any way advantageous to the animal, either by way of the arduous or by way of the pleasurable.

6. The same concupiscible appetitive power pursues the agreeable and flees the disagreeable. Consequently the irascible and the concupiscible powers are not distinguished on the basis of the agreeable and the harmful, as appears from what has been said.

7. The statement that "hatred is inveterate anger" is a predication by cause, not by essence; for the passions of the irascible power end in the passions of the concupiscible, as has been said.*

8. To crave (concupiscere) with an animal appetite belongs to the concupiscible power alone; but to crave with natural appetite belongs to every power, for every power of the soul is a nature and naturally inclines to something. And the same distinction is to be applied to love and pleasure and the like.

9. In the definition of the passions of the irascible power there is placed the common act of the appetitive power, to tend, but not anything that belongs to the concupiscible except as the beginning or the end, as would be the case if one were to say that anger is the desire for revenge because of a previous saddening.