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It is our own property that to have something and to will it are not often present in us at the same time, but at one moment we will to have something we do not have, and after this we obtain what we willed to obtain. But in the case of the simple and all-powerful nature, all things are conceived together and at the same time, both the willing of the good and the having of what it willed. For the good and eternal will is always contemplated as active and essential and subsistent in the eternal nature, neither coming into being from some peculiar beginning nor 3.6.18 able to be conceived without the object of will. For it is not possible with God either for the good will not to exist, or for the object of will not to be together with the volition, since there is no cause either preventing what is fitting for the Father from always existing, or hindering the having of what is willed. Since, therefore, the only-begotten God is good by nature, or rather, is beyond all good, and the good is not contrary to the will of the Father, it is clearly demonstrated through these things that the Son's conjunction with the Father is also immediate, and the will, which always subsists in the good nature, is not thrust aside or excluded by the unmediated conjunction. But if anyone listens to the argument without prejudice, I wish to add something of this sort to what has been said. 3.6.19 Just as if someone (I speak hypothetically) were to give to a flame a certain power of choice, it would be clear that as soon as the flame exists, it will also will to shine forth its radiance from itself; and having willed this, it will by no means be unable, since its natural power brings to completion, at the same time as the constitution of the flame, its will concerning the radiance, so that irrefutably, if it were granted that the flame moves by choice, the concurrence of all things would be conceived at the same time—both of the lighting of the fire, and of the will concerning the radiance, and of the radiance itself—as the motion of choice in no way hinders the swift subsistence of the radiance—so, according to the example we have stated, by also confessing the good will in the Father you will not separate the 3.6.20 Son from the Father through his will; for it is not likely that the will for him to exist should become an impediment to his existing immediately, but just as in the eye, seeing is an activity of nature and the will to see is an impulse of choice, yet this very movement of choice does not cause a delay in the activity of seeing (for each of these is contemplated individually and in itself, one not becoming an impediment to the existence of the other, but the two are in a certain manner with each other, with the natural activity accompanying the choice and the choice in turn not being left behind by the 3.6.21 natural movement); as therefore perception is connatural to the eye and the will to see has caused no postponement with respect to the act of seeing, but it both wills for itself to have sight and what it wills, exists, so also in the case of the ineffable nature that is beyond all conception, our thought of all things arises at the same time: of the eternal existence of the Father, of the will concerning the Son, and of the Son himself who, as John says, was in the beginning and is 3.6.22 not conceived as after the beginning; and the beginning of all is the Father. But in this beginning the Son also has been proclaimed to exist, being by nature that which the beginning is. For the beginning is God, and the Word who is in the beginning is God. And since "the beginning" indicates what is eternal, John well joins the Word to the beginning, saying that the Word is in it, establishing this, as I think, so that the concept of the beginning might not arise alone by itself for the hearer, but before this is impressed on the thought, the Word who is in it might also be understood together with the beginning, entering along with it into the conception of the hearer and arising in the hearing along with the beginning. 3.6.23 Now that the doctrine has been thus clarified by us, it would be time also to set forth and consider the contrary argument, examining it in parallel and comparing it with our own suppositions. It speaks thus: 20For there being two things20, it says, 20stated by us, namely that the substance of the Only-begotten did not exist before his own generation, and that, having been generated, he existed before all things, neither of the things said proves the other false. For neither as before the

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ἴδιον, τὸ μὴ ἐν ταὐτῷ πολλάκις παρεῖναι ἡμῖν καὶ τὸ ἔχειν τι καὶ τὸ βούλεσθαι, ἀλλὰ νῦν μὲν βουλόμεθά τι ἔχειν ὧν οὐκ ἔχομεν, μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ τυγχάνομεν ὧν τυχεῖν ἠβουλήθημεν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἁπλῆς καὶ παντοδυνάμου φύσεως ὁμοῦ τὰ πάντα καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὸν νοεῖται, καὶ τὸ θέλειν τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἔχειν ὅπερ ἠθέλησε. πάντοτε γὰρ ἐνεργὸν καὶ ἐνούσιον καὶ ἐνυπόστατον τῇ ἀϊδίῳ φύσει τὸ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ τὸ ἀΐδιον ἐνθεωρεῖται θέλημα, οὔτε ἀπό τινος ἰδιαζούσης ἀρχῆς ἐγγινόμενον οὔτε 3.6.18 δίχα τοῦ θελητοῦ νοηθῆναι δυνάμενον. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται παρὰ τῷ θεῷ ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν θέλημα μὴ εἶναι ἢ μὴ συνεῖναι τὸ θελητὸν τῷ βουλήματι, οὐδεμιᾶς αἰτίας οὔτε τὸ πρέπον τῷ πατρὶ μὴ πάντοτε εἶναι [μὴ] οὔσης οὔτε πρὸς τὸ ἔχειν τὸ βουλητὸν ἐμποδιζούσης. ἐπεὶ οὖν φύσει τὸ ἀγαθόν, μᾶλλον δὲ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἐπέκεινα ὁ μονογενὴς θεός, οὐκ ἀβούλητον δὲ τῷ πατρὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, φανερῶς ἀποδείκνυται διὰ τούτων ὅτι καὶ ἄμεσός ἐστι τοῦ υἱοῦ ἡ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα συνάφεια καὶ οὐκ ἐξωθεῖται οὐδὲ ἐξείργεται ὑπὸ τῆς ἀδια στάτου συναφείας τὸ βούλημα τὸ τῇ ἀγαθῇ φύσει διὰ παντὸς ἐνυπάρχον. εἰ δέ τις ἀνεπηρεάστως ἀκούει τοῦ λόγου, καὶ τοιοῦτόν τι τοῖς εἰρημένοις προσθεῖναι βούλομαι. 3.6.19 Ὥσπερ εἴ τις (λέγω δὲ καθ' ὑπόθεσιν) προαιρετικήν τινα τῇ φλογὶ δύναμιν δοίη, δῆλον ἂν εἴη ὅτι ὁμοῦ τῷ εἶναι ἡ φλὸξ καὶ τὴν αὐγὴν ἐκλάμπειν ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς θελήσει, θελήσασα δὲ πάντως οὐκ ἀδυνατήσει, τῆς φυσικῆς δυνά μεως ἐπιτελὲς ποιούσης ὁμοῦ τῷ συστῆναι τὴν φλόγα τὸ περὶ τὴν αὐγὴν βούλημα, ὡς ἀναντιρρήτως εἰ τοῦτο δοθείη τὸ προαιρετικῶς κινεῖσθαι τὴν φλόγα, πάντων κατὰ ταὐτὸν τὴν συνδρομὴν νοεῖσθαι, τῆς τε τοῦ πυρὸς ἐξάψεως καὶ τοῦ περὶ τὴν αὐγὴν θελήματος καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς αὐγῆς, ὡς μηδὲν τῆς προαιρετικῆς κινήσεως πρὸς τὴν ὀξεῖαν τῆς αὐγῆς ὑπόστασιν ἐμποδιζούσης-οὕτως κατὰ τὸ ῥηθὲν ἡμῖν ὑπόδειγμα καὶ τῷ πατρὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν θέλημα συνομο λογῶν οὐκ ἀποστήσεις διὰ τοῦ θελήματος τοῦ πατρὸς τὸν 3.6.20 υἱόν· οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰκός ἐστι τὸ τοῦ εἶναι αὐτὸν βούλημα ἐμπόδιον τοῦ εὐθὺς εἶναι γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ τό τε βλέπειν καὶ τὸ θέλειν βλέπειν τὸ μὲν φύσεώς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια τὸ δὲ ὁρμὴ προαιρέσεως, οὐ μὴν ἀναβολὴν ἐμποιεῖ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τοῦ βλέπειν πρὸς αὐτὸ τοῦτο τῆς προ αιρέσεως ἡ κίνησις (ἰδίᾳ γὰρ τούτων ἑκάτερον καὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ θεωρεῖται, οὐδὲν ἐμπόδιον πρὸς τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ γινόμενον, ἀλλὰ τὰ δύο τρόπον τινὰ μετ' ἀλλή λων ἐστί, τῆς τε φυσικῆς ἐνεργείας τῇ προαιρέσει παρο μαρτούσης καὶ τῆς προαιρέσεως πάλιν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν οὐκ 3.6.21 ἀπολιμπανομένης κινήματος)· ὡς οὖν τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ ἡ κατα νόησις συμφυής ἐστι καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὁρᾶν βούλησις οὐδεμίαν ὑπέρθεσιν πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ὁρᾶν ἐνεποίησεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ θέλει αὐτῷ εἶναι τὴν ὅρασιν καὶ ὃ θέλει ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρρήτου καὶ ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν ἔννοιαν φύσεως πάντων ἅμα κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἐγγίνεται ἡμῖν ἡ διάνοια, τῆς τε ἀϊδίου τοῦ πατρὸς ὑπάρξεως καὶ τοῦ περὶ τὸν υἱὸν θελήματος καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ, καθώς φησιν ὁ Ἰωάννης, ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ ὄντος καὶ 3.6.22 οὐ μετὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν νοουμένου· ἀρχὴ δὲ τοῦ παντὸς ὁ πατήρ. ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ ταύτῃ καὶ ὁ υἱὸς εἶναι κεκήρυκται ἐκεῖνο ὢν κατὰ τὴν φύσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρχή. θεὸς γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ ὁ ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ ὢν λόγος θεός ἐστιν. τῆς δὲ ἀρχῆς τὸ ἀΐδιον ἐνδεικνυμένης καλῶς ὁ Ἰωάννης τῇ ἀρχῇ συν άπτει τὸν λόγον ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι λέγων τὸν λόγον, τοῦτο ὡς οἶμαι κατασκευάζων, ἵνα μὴ φθάσῃ μόνη καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἐγγενέσθαι ἡ ἀρχὴ τῷ ἀκούσαντι, ἀλλὰ πρὶν ταύτην ἐν τυπωθῆναι τῇ διανοίᾳ συγκατανοηθῇ τῇ ἀρχῇ καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ ἐν ἐκείνῃ ὤν, συνεισελθὼν μετ' αὐτῆς εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἀκού οντος ἔννοιαν καὶ μετὰ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῇ ἀκοῇ ἐγγενόμενος. 3.6.23 Οὑτωσὶ δὲ τοῦ δόγματος ἡμῖν διευκρινηθέντος καιρὸς ἂν εἴη καὶ τὸν ἐναντίον προθεῖναι καὶ θεωρῆσαι λόγον ἐκ παραλλήλου πρὸς τὰς ἡμετέρας ὑπολήψεις ἀντεξετάζοντα. λέγει δὲ οὕτως· 20δύο γὰρ ὄντων20, φησί, 20τῶν ὑφ' ἡμῶν εἰρημένων, τοῦ τε πρὸ τῆς ἰδίας γεννήσεως μὴ εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ μονογενοῦς καὶ τοῦ γεν νηθεῖσαν πρὸ πάντων εἶναι, οὐθέτερον τῶν εἰρημένων ἐλέγχει ψεῦδος. οὔτε γὰρ ὡς πρὸ τῆς