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having abandoned the technical methods, you yourself also take refuge in irrational assent, you who have often reproached in your writing those who attempt things without logical expertise, you who say to Basil that 20by saying that it is impossible for men to render accounts for spiritual doctrines, you convict your own ignorance20, and again elsewhere, bringing forward the same point, that 20you make your own weakness common, declaring what is not20 20possible for you to be impossible for all?20 You who say these and such things, do you thus engage the hearing of one seeking the cause for which the Father delayed becoming the Father of such a one? Do you think it is sufficient for proof to say that He begot when He willed, 3.7.16 and let there be no inquiry about this? Has your apprehensive imagination become so weak for you for the construction of your doctrines? Where are the dilemmatic propositions? Where are the forceful constructions? How have the fearful and inescapable conclusions of your syllogisms vanished from your art, fleeting and insubstantial, having flowed away? 20He begot the Son when He willed, and let there be no inquiry about this20. Are these the results of your many labors, these the results of your immense promises? What was the question? If it is good and fitting for God to have such a Son, why is it not believed that the good was always with Him? What is the answer that he has fashioned for us from the very 3.7.17 inner sanctums of philosophy, having bound the argument with indissoluble necessities? He made the Son when He willed, and let there be no inquiry about this, as to why not sooner. But if the investigation were proposed concerning some irrational creature acting according to some natural impulse, as to why it did not accomplish its purpose sooner, either the spider its threads, or the bee its honeycomb, or the turtledove its nest, what else could you say? Or would not this very answer have been ready at hand, that it did it when it willed, and let there be no inquiry about this? 3.7.18 But also concerning some sculptor or painter who produces his work through mimetic art either in paintings or in sculptures, when, not being subject to any authority, he brings his art into action, I think such a statement is fitting for one wishing to learn why he did not put his art into action sooner, that having no necessity, he has made his choice the occasion of his action. For men, because they neither always will the same things nor for the most part have the power to cooperate with their will, do something according to their judgment then, when both their choice inclines toward the work 3.7.19 and nothing from without hinders it. But that which is always the same, for which no good is acquired, in which every difference of counsels that arises from opposition through some error and ignorance has no place, which becomes nothing by change that it was not before, nor chooses anything afterwards that it did not perceive as good from the beginning—to say of this that it does not always have the good, but later chose to have something that it had not chosen before, this belongs to the wisdom that surpasses 3.7.20 us. For we have learned that the divine is always full of every good, or rather, it is itself the fullness of goods <ἀ>lways and needs no addition for its perfection, but is itself, by its own nature, the perfection of the good. But the perfect is equally foreign to increase and decrease; and for this reason the perfection of goods observed in the divine nature we say is always the same, to whatever point we extend our thought, 3.7.21 perceiving it to be such there. Therefore, the divine is never void of good. But indeed the Son is the fullness of all good; therefore He is always seen in the Father, whose nature is perfection in every good. But, he says, let there be no inquiry as to why not sooner. To whom we shall say that it is one thing, O most wise one, <τὸ> to legislate something according to your judgment by command, and another to be brought to reason concerning disputed matters. Therefore, as long as you have no cause to state for which it is pious to say that the Son was added to the Father later, your command will be ineffective among the prudent. 3.7.22 So then for us from his technical method Eunomius brings the truth into the open

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κατα λιπὼν τὰς τεχνικὰς περιόδους ἐπὶ τὴν ἄλογον συγκατάθεσιν καὶ αὐτὸς καταφεύγεις ὁ πολλὰ τοῖς ἄνευ λογικῆς ἐντρε χείας ἐπιχειροῦσι τῷ γράφειν ἐπονειδίσας, ὁ πρὸς Βασίλειον λέγων ὅτι 20δι' ὧν ἀδύνατον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἶναι λέγεις τὰς ὑπὲρ τῶν πνευματικῶν λόγων εὐ θύνας, τὴν ἰδίαν ἐλέγχεις ἄγνοιαν20, καὶ πάλιν ἑτέρωθι τὸ ἴσον προφέρων ὅτι 20τὴν ἰδίαν ἀσθένειαν κοινοποιεῖς, τὸ σοὶ20 μὴ 20δυνατὸν πᾶσιν ἀδύνατον ἀποφαινόμενος20; ὁ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγων οὕτω προσάγεις τὴν ἀκοὴν τοῦ ἐπιζητοῦντος τὴν αἰτίαν καθ' ἣν ἀναβάλλεται τοιούτου γενέσθαι πατὴρ ὁ πατήρ; ἀρκεῖν οἴει πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν τὸ εἰπεῖν ὅτι τότε ἐγέννησεν ὅτε ἐβούλετο, 3.7.16 καὶ μηδεμία ἔστω περὶ τούτου ζήτησις; οὕτως σοι πρὸς τὴν κατασκευὴν τῶν δογμάτων ἠσθένησεν ἡ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία; ποῦ αἱ διλήμματοι προτάσεις; ποῦ αἱ βίαιοι κα τασκευαί; πῶς σοι φροῦδα καὶ ἀνυπόστατα διαρρυέντα τῆς τέχνης οἴχεται τὰ φοβερά τε καὶ ἄφυκτα τῶν συλλογισμῶν συμπεράσματα; 20τότε ἐγέννησε τὸν υἱὸν ὅτε ἐβούλετο, καὶ μηδεμία ἔστω περὶ τούτου ζήτησις20. ταῦτα τῶν πολλῶν ἱδρώτων, ταῦτα τῶν ὑπερόγκων ἐπαγ γελμάτων <τὰ> ἀποτελέσματα; τί τὸ ἐρώτημα ἦν; εἰ καλὸν καὶ πρέπον θεῷ τοιοῦτον ἔχειν υἱόν, διὰ τί μὴ ἀεὶ τὸ καλὸν μετ' αὐτοῦ εἶναι πιστεύεται; τίς ἡ ἀπόκρισις ἣν ἐξ αὐτῶν 3.7.17 ἡμῖν τῶν ἀδύτων τῆς φιλοσοφίας πεποίηται, ταῖς ἀλύτοις ἀνάγκαις διασφίγξας τὸν λόγον; τότε ἐποίησε τὸν υἱὸν ὅτε ἐβούλετο, μηδεμία δὲ περὶ τούτου ζήτησις ἔστω, διὰ τί μὴ πρότερον. εἰ δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀλόγων τινὸς ἡ σκέψις προέκειτο τῶν κατά τινα φυσικὴν ὁρμὴν ἐνεργούντων, διὰ τί μὴ πρότερον τὸ δοκοῦν κατειργάσατο ἢ ὁ ἀράχνης τὰ νήματα ἢ τὸ κηρίον ἡ μέλιττα ἢ τὴν καλιὰν ἡ τρυγών, τί ἂν ἕτερον εἰπεῖν ἔσχες; ἢ οὐκ αὐτὴ πρόχειρος ἂν ἦν ἡ ἀπόκρισις ὅτι τότε ἐποίησεν ὅτε ἐβούλετο, καὶ μηδεμία ἔστω περὶ τούτου ζή 3.7.18 τησις; ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ πλάστου τινὸς ἢ ζωγράφου τὸ δο κοῦν διὰ τῆς μιμητικῆς ἐνεργοῦντος τέχνης ἢ ἐν γραφαῖς ἢ ἐν πλάσμασιν, ὅταν μὴ ὑποχείριος ὢν ἐξουσίᾳ τινὶ πρὸς ἐνέργειαν ἄγῃ τὴν τέχνην, ἁρμόζειν οἶμαι τὴν τοιαύτην φωνὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ μαθεῖν ἐθέλοντος, διὰ τί μὴ πρότερον ἐν εργὸν τὴν τέχνην ἐποίησεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχων ἀνάγκην καιρὸν τῆς ἐνεργείας πεποίηται τὴν προαίρεσιν. ἄνθρωποι γὰρ διὰ τὸ μήτε ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ βούλεσθαι μήτε συνεργοῦσαν ἔχειν ὡς τὰ πολλὰ τῇ βουλήσει τὴν δύναμιν τότε ποιοῦσί τι τῶν κατὰ γνώμην, ὅταν αὐτοῖς ἥ τε προαίρεσις πρὸς τὸ ἔργον 3.7.19 ῥέψῃ καὶ μηδὲν κωλύῃ τῶν ἔξωθεν. τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον, ᾧ ἐπίκτητον τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστιν οὐδέν, ἐν ᾧ πᾶσα διαφορὰ βουλευμάτων ἡ κατὰ τὸ ἐναντίον κατά τινα πλάνην καὶ ἄγνοιαν ἐγγινομένη χώραν οὐκ ἔχει, ὃ οὐδὲν ἐκ μετα βολῆς γίνεται ὃ μὴ πρότερον ἦν, μηδὲ αἱρεῖταί τι μετὰ ταῦτα ὃ μὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὡς ἀγαθὸν κατενόησε-περὶ τού του λέγειν μὴ ἀεὶ τὸ καλὸν ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ὕστερον ἑλέσθαι τι ἔχειν ὃ μὴ πρότερον εἵλετο, ταῦτα τῆς ὑπερβαλλούσης 3.7.20 ἡμᾶς σοφίας ἐστίν. ἡμεῖς γὰρ ἐμάθομεν ὅτι τὸ θεῖον ἀεὶ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ πλῆρές ἐστιν, μᾶλλον δὲ αὐτὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστι τὸ πλήρωμα <ἀ>εὶ καὶ οὐδεμιᾶς προσθήκης εἰς τε λείωσιν δέεται, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τελειότης ἐστί· τὸ δὲ τέλειον ἐπίσης αὐξήσεώς τε καὶ μειώσεως ἠλλοτρίωται· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν ἐπιθεωρουμένην τῇ θείᾳ φύσει τῶν ἀγαθῶν τελειότητα πάντοτέ φαμεν τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι, καθ' ὅπερ ἂν τὴν διάνοιαν ἑαυτῶν ἐπεκτεί 3.7.21 νωμεν, ἐκεῖ τοιαύτην καταλαμβάνοντες. οὐκοῦν οὐδέποτε κενὸν ἀγαθοῦ τὸ θεῖον. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοῦ παντὸς πλή ρωμα ὁ υἱός· πάντοτε ἄρα ἐν τῷ πατρὶ θεωρεῖται, ᾧ φύσις ἡ ἐν παντὶ ἀγαθῷ τελειότης. ἀλλά, φησί, μηδεμία ἔστω ζήτησις, διὰ τί μὴ πρότερον. πρὸς ὃν ἐροῦμεν ἡμεῖς ὅτι ἄλλο ἐστίν, ὦ σοφώτατε, <τὸ> νομοθετεῖν τι τῶν κατὰ γνώμην ἐξ ἐπιτάγματος καὶ ἕτερον τὸ λόγῳ περὶ τῶν ἀμφι βαλλομένων προσάγεσθαι. ἕως ἂν τοίνυν μηδεμίαν ἔχῃς αἰτίαν εἰπεῖν, καθ' ἣν εὐσεβές ἐστιν ὕστερον τῷ πατρὶ τὸν υἱὸν προσγεγενῆσθαι λέγειν, ἀργήσει σοι τὸ ἐπίταγμα παρὰ τοῖς σωφρονοῦσιν. 3.7.22 Οὕτω μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν ἐκ τῆς τεχνικῆς ἐφόδου τὴν ἀλή θειαν Εὐνόμιος εἰς τὸ ἐμφανὲς