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separated from one another through an excess of friendship. But if they are separate from one another, each of them is in every way limited. But everything that is limited is not perfect. For it is defined by being limited. Otherwise, a boundary will also be sought for the limitation of both, so that, touching one another at their ends, both do not join their own properties to each other through their ends, and the one communicate with the other and destroy the boundary of their opposition; and if you were to place something separating them in the middle of both, the separating thing will no longer be similar to these, but it will be neither one of the two. For if the separating thing is made like one of the two aforementioned eternal things from one part, from the part made like, the separating thing would no longer be alien, but joined to the one it is made like, and through the part made equal there will be a connection and it will no longer be limited in the separation of the two natures from each other. And if it is neither like the two nor partaking from 3.38 a part of the other, there are no longer two eternal and ever-existing things, but rather there are three, and no longer two principles and two first things opposed to each other, but a third other, and opposed to both and unlike both and separating in the middle of the two and not communicating with the other on account of its strangeness and taking no likeness from either of them. And consequently there will no longer be two, but these three. Otherwise, another will also be sought, a fourth, who mediated and imposed this boundary. For the two were not able to set out the boundary or the wall, unless there were another who was the boundary-setter, who cast the separating thing in the middle of both, but also skilled in knowledge and wise in manner and fair and more glorious, so as to be able to persuade both to a reconciliation of peace. There will be, then, one setting the boundary and one separating thing and two being limited, and no longer two principles only, but also three and four. And in this way it is possible to turn the mind to many principles and to leave the things that are and to imagine the things that are not. 15. But in seeking for the accursed evil supposedly not to mix with God—for it is indeed absurd to attach evil to God. For it is confessed in the character of the ecclesiastical teaching that the divine is altogether alien and unmixed with evil. For God made nothing evil, but "all things very good," being good by nature, incomprehensible in essence, containing all things, but himself contained by nothing. Therefore, neither was evil always, nor has evil come from God. Therefore, since evil is not, nor is it always, nor has it come from God, it remains to seek in what way 3.39 that which is not always, but has had a beginning of its being, ceasing and perishing and not remaining to the end, from where it had its beginning. And when we seek this, we must first consider what kind of thing evil is and in what it comes to be, and if it is something circumscribable or a body, so to speak, or has a substance or can even possess a root. And when we consider these things in ourselves, evil will be found to be without substance and having no root, but it is effective only as far as the works of practical human activity. For evil exists in our doing it, but in not doing it, it does not exist, with the thought inventing what it is to do evil, not pleasing to God and neither able to speak against God nor to fight against the divine. For everything that can be cut off and destroyed by humans is much more impossible to withstand against God. 16. At the same time, we must also think this about the devil, that he was not created evil by nature from creation, but after a time invented for himself the doing of evil, it not being unknown what sort of being he was going to be, but created indeed well along with all things most usefully through the excess of justice. For God, through an excess of goodness, willed all people and all things to be good and set his own good things before all, according to

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ἀλλήλων ἀπαλλαττόμενα δι' ὑπερβολὴν φιλίας. εἰ δὲ χωρὶς ἀλλήλων ἐστί, πάντως ἕκαστον τούτων πεπέρασται. πᾶν δὲ τὸ πεπερασμένον οὐ τέλειον. ὁρίζεται γὰρ διὰ τοῦ πεπεράσθαι. ἄλλως δὲ καὶ ζητηθήσεται ὅριον εἰς διαπερασμὸν ἀμφοτέρων, ἵνα μὴ κατὰ τὰ τέρματα ἀλλήλων ἐφαπτόμενα ἀμφότερα τὰ ἴδια διὰ τῶν τερμάτων ἀλλήλοις συνάπτηται καὶ ἐπικοινωνήσειε θάτερον θατέρῳ καὶ τὸν τῆς ἐναντιότητος ἀφανίσῃ ὅρον· καὶ εἰ δῴης τι διεῖργον ἀνὰ μέσον τῶν ἀμφοτέρων, οὐκέτι τὸ διεῖργον ὅμοιον ἔσται τούτοις, ἀλλ' οὐθ' ἕτερον ἔσται τῶν ἀμφοτέρων. εἰ γὰρ ἀπὸ ἑνὸς μέρους ἀφομοιωθήσεται τὸ διεῖργον ἑνὶ τῶν δύο τῶν πρότερον εἰρημένων ἀιδίων, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀφομοιουμένου οὐκέτι ἀλλότριον εἴη τὸ διεῖργον, ἀλλὰ συναπτόμενον τῷ ἀφομοιουμένῳ, καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἐξισουμένου μέρους ἔσται ἡ συνάφεια καὶ οὐκέτι τερματισθήσεται ἐν τῇ τῶν δύο φύσεων ἀπ' ἀλλήλων διαστάσει. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἔστιν οὔτε ὅμοιον τῶν δύο οὔτε μέτοχον ἀπὸ 3.38 μέρους θατέρου, οὐκέτι δύο ἐστὶ τὰ ἀίδια καὶ ἀεὶ ὄντα, ἀλλὰ λοιπόν ἐστι τρία, καὶ οὐκέτι δύο ἀρχαὶ καὶ δύο ἀλλήλοις ἐναντία τὰ πρῶτα, ἀλλὰ τρίτον ἄλλο, καὶ ἐναντίον τῶν ἀμφοτέρων καὶ ἀνόμοιον τοῖς ἀμφοτέροις καὶ διεῖργον ἀνὰ μέσον τοῖν δυοῖν καὶ μὴ θατέρῳ ἐπικοινωνοῦν διὰ τὸ ἀλλόκοτον καὶ οὐδὲν ἀμφοτέρων λαμβάνον τὴν ὁμοίωσιν. καὶ λοιπὸν ἔσται οὐκέτι δύο, ἀλλὰ τρία ταῦτα. ἄλλως δὲ καὶ ζητηθήσεται ἄλλος ὁ μεσιτεύσας καὶ τὸν ὅρον τοῦτον ἐμβαλὼν τέταρτος. οὐ γὰρ ἠδύναντο οἱ δύο ἐκθέσθαι τὸν ὅρον ἢ τὸ τεῖχος, εἰ μὴ ἕτερος εἴη ὁ ὁροθέτης, ὁ τὸ διεῖργον ἀνὰ μέσον τῶν ἀμφοτέρων ἐμβαλών, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰδήμων τὴν ἐπιστήμην καὶ συνετὸς τὸν τρόπον καὶ ἐπιεικὴς καὶ ἐνδοξότερος, ὥστε δύνασθαι πεῖσαι ἀμφοτέρους εἰς συμβιβασμὸν εἰρήνης. ἔσται οὖν εἷς ὁ ὁροθετῶν καὶ ἓν τὸ διεῖργον καὶ δύο τὰ τερματιζόμενα, καὶ οὐκέτι δύο ἀρχαὶ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τρεῖς καὶ τέσσαρες. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐπὶ πολλὰς ἀρχὰς τὴν διάνοιαν τρέπειν ἔνεστι καὶ ἐᾶν τὰ ὄντα καὶ φαντάζεσθαι τὰ μὴ ὄντα. 15. Ἐν δὲ τῷ ζητεῖν τὸν ἀλιτήριον κακίαν δῆθεν μὴ προσμῖξαι θεῷ-καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἄτοπόν ἐστι κακίαν θεῷ προσάψαι. ὡμολόγηται γὰρ ἐν τῷ χαρακτῆρι τῆς ἐκκλησιαστικῆς διδασκαλίας ἀλλότριον παντάπασι τὸ θεῖον καὶ ἀμιγὲς κακίας ὑπάρχειν. θεὸς γὰρ οὐδὲν κακὸν ἐποίησεν, ἀλλὰ «πάντα καλὰ λίαν», ἀγαθὸς ὢν τὴν φύσιν, ἀκατάληπτος τὴν οὐσίαν, πάντα περιέχων, αὐτὸς δὲ ὑπ' οὐδενὸς περιεχόμενος. οὔτε τοίνυν τὸ κακὸν ἦν ἀεὶ οὔτε ἐκ θεοῦ τὸ κακὸν γεγένηται. μήτε οὖν ὄντος τοῦ κακοῦ μήτε ὄντος ἀεὶ μήτε ἐκ θεοῦ γεγενημένου, λοιπὸν ζητεῖν ἔστι, ποῖον τρόπον 3.39 τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀεί, ἀρχὴν δὲ ἐσχηκὸς τοῦ εἶναι, λῆγον τε καὶ ἀπολλύμενον καὶ εἰς τέλος μὴ παραμένον, πόθεν τε ἔσχε τὴν ἀρχήν. καὶ ὅταν τοῦτο ζητήσωμεν, πρῶτον διανοητέον ἐστὶν ὅτι ὁποῖόν ἐστι τὸ κακὸν καὶ ἐν ποίῳ γίνεται τὸ κακόν, καὶ εἰ ἔστιν ἐμπερίγραφόν τι ἢ σῶμα ὡς εἰπεῖν ἢ ὑπόστασιν ἔχει ἢ καὶ ῥίζαν δύναται κεκτῆσθαι. καὶ ὅταν ταῦτα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς διασκοπήσωμεν, ἀνυπόστατον εὑρεθήσεται τὸ κακὸν καὶ μηδεμίαν ῥίζαν ἔχον, ἀλλὰ ἕως ἔργων μόνον ἐστὶ πρακτικῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἐνεργείας ἀποτελεστικόν. ἐν τῷ γὰρ ποιεῖν ἡμᾶς τὸ κακὸν ἔστιν, ἐν δὲ τῷ μὴ ποιεῖν οὐχ ὑπάρχει, τῆς ἐννοίας ἐφευρισκούσης τὸ τί ποτέ ἐστι τὸ πονηρὸν ἐργάσασθαι, οὐκ ἀρέσκον θεῷ καὶ οὔτε δυνάμενον ἀντιλέγειν θεῷ οὐδὲ ἀντιμάχεσθαι πρὸς τὸ θεῖον. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων δυνάμενον ἐκκόπτεσθαι καὶ ἀναιρεῖσθαι πολλῷ μᾶλλον πρὸς θεὸν ἀντέχειν ἀδύνατον. 16. Ἅμα δὲ καὶ περὶ διαβόλου οὕτως διαληπτέον, οὐκ ἀπὸ κτίσεως φυσικῶς κακοῦ κεκτισμένου, ἀλλὰ ἑαυτῷ μετὰ χρόνον τὸ ποιεῖν κακὸν ἐφευραμένου, οὐκ ἀγνοουμένου δὲ ὁποῖος ἔμελλεν ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ κτισθέντος μὲν ἅμα πᾶσι καλῶς διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δικαιοσύνης χρησιμώτατα. τῷ τὸν θεόν, δι' ὑπερβολὴν ἀγαθότητος πάντας καὶ πάντα καλὰ θελήσαντα εἶναι καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὰ πᾶσι προθέμενον, κατὰ