ARTICLE I

The Question Is about the Justification of Sinners, and in the First Article We Ask: IS THE JUSTIFICATION OF SINNERS THE FORGIVENESS OF SINS?

Difficulties:

It seems that it is not, for

1. Justification gets its name from justice, which is one of the virtues. But the forgiveness of sins is not effected by one virtue alone, for sins are not opposed to just one virtue but to all. Justification is therefore not the forgiveness of sins.

2. The answer was given that the forgiveness of sins is effected by generic justice.--On the contrary, generic justice is the same as all virtue, according to the Philosopher. But the forgiveness of sins is not the effect of virtue but of grace. The forgiveness of sins should therefore not be called justification but rather the conferring of grace.

3. If the forgiveness of sins is effected by any virtue, it should be by that one in particular which cannot coexist with sin. But this is charity, which is never unformed. The forgiveness of sins should therefore not be attributed to justice but rather to charity.

4. The same is seen from the words of Proverbs (10:12): "Charity covereth all sins."

5. Sin is the spiritual death of the soul. Now life is opposed to death. Since in Holy Scripture spiritual life is especially attributed to faith, as in Habacuc (2:4) and the Epistle to the Romans (1:17): "The just man liveth by faith," it therefore seems that the forgiveness of sins should be ascribed to faith and not to justice.

6. The same is seen from the words of the Acts (15:9): ". . . purifying their hearts by faith."

7. Justification precedes grace just as a motion precedes its term. But the forgiveness of sins follows grace as an effect follows its cause. Justification is therefore prior to the forgiveness of sins, and so the two are not the same.

8. The act of justice is to return what is due. But what is due to a sinner is not pardon but rather punishment. The forgiveness of sins should therefore not be attributed to justice.

9. "Justice is concerned with merit; mercy, with misery," as Bernard says. But a sinner has no merit but is rather in a state of misery, because "sin maketh nations miserable," as is written in Proverbs (14:34). The forgiveness of sins should therefore not be attributed to justice but rather to mercy.

10. The answer was given that, although there is no condign merit in the sinner, there is congruous merit.--On the contrary, justice demands equality. But congruous merit is not equal to the reward. Then congruous merit is not sufficient for the notion of justice.

11. The forgiveness of sins is one of four prerequisites for the justification of sinners. The justification of sinners is therefore not the forgiveness of sins.

12. Whoever becomes just is justified. But some have become just without having had any sins forgiven, as Christ and (if he had grace) the first man while in the state of innocence. Justification is therefore not the forgiveness of sins.

To the Contrary:

In commenting upon the words of the Epistle to the Romans (8:30): "Whom he called, them he also justified," the Gloss adds "by the forgiveness of sins." The forgiveness of sins is therefore justification.

REPLY:

There is a difference between motion and change. For a single motion is that by which something signified affirmatively is lost and something else signified affirmatively is acquired. "Motion is from a subject to a subject," as is said in the Physics. By subject is meant here something affirmatively designated, as white or black. Hence there is a single motion of alteration by which white is lost and black is acquired. But it is otherwise with becoming and perishing, which are types of change. For becoming is a change from a non-subject to a subject, as from non-white to white; and perishing is a change from a subject to a non-subject, as from white to non-white. Thus in the loss of one thing that is affirmed and in the acquisition of another two changes must be understood, one of which is becoming and the other perishing, in either an unrestricted or a restricted sense. If, then, in the passage from whiteness to blackness we consider the motion itself, the very same motion is designated by the removal of the one and the introduction of the other. But the same change is not designated, but rather different ones which are nevertheless associated, because the becoming of the one does not take place without the perishing of the other.

Now justification means a motion to justice, just as whitening means a motion to whiteness, though justification could also signify the formal effect of justice; for justice justifies in the same way as whiteness makes white.

If, then, justification is taken as a motion, since we must mean the same motion by which sin is removed and justice is introduced, justification will be the same as the forgiveness of sins. They will differ only in concept, seeing that both names apply to the same motion, but one designates it with reference to the starting point, the other with reference to the final term. If, however, justification is taken in the line of change, then justification will signify one change, namely, the coming of justice into being, and the forgiveness of sins will signify another, the perishing of guilt. From this point of view justification and the forgiveness of sins will not be the same except by association. But in whichever way justification is taken, it must get its name from a justice which is opposed to any sin whatever; for not only is motion from contrary to contrary, but also becoming and perishing, when taken in a common reference, apply to contraries. Justice is used, however, in three different ways:

(1) As a specific virtue distinguished from the other cardinal virtues. In this sense justice is spoken of as the virtue by which man is directed in acts which contribute to community life, such as the different types of contracts. Now this virtue is not contrary to every sin, but only to those sins which are concerned with such interchanges, as theft, robbery, and the like. Justice cannot, therefore, be taken in this sense in the present context.

(2) It is used of legal justice, identified by the Philosopher with all virtue, as differing from virtue only in concept. In so far as virtue directs its act to the common good, which is also the aim of the legislator, it is called legal justice because it upholds the law, as when a brave man fights valiantly on the field of battle for the safety of the commonwealth. It is thus evident that, although every virtue is in some sense legal justice, yet not every act of virtue is an act of legal justice, but only one which is directed to the common good, as can be true of the act of any virtue. Consequently, neither is every act of sin opposed to legal justice. Then neither can the justification which is identified with the forgiveness of sins be so designated from legal justice.

(3) Justice designates a distinctive state in which man stands in the right relation to God, to his neighbor, and to himself, so that his lower powers are subject to the higher. This is what the Philosopher calls "justice taken metaphorically," since it is viewed as between different powers of the same person, whereas justice in the proper sense is always between different persons. To justice in this sense every sin is opposed, since some of the order mentioned is destroyed by every sin. Consequently it is from this sort of justice that justification gets its name, whether it is taken as a motion from a starting point or as the formal effect of a form.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. That objection is based upon specific justice.

2. Justification is not so called from legal justice, which is all virtue, but from the justice which means a general good order in the soul; for it is from this good order rather than from grace that justification gets its name, because every sin is opposed directly and immediately to this good order, involving as it does all the soul's powers, whereas grace is in the essence of the soul.

3. Charity is called the cause of the forgiveness of sins because by it man is united to God, from whom he had been turned away in sinning. Yet not every sin is directly and immediately opposed to charity, but rather to the justice mentioned above.*

4. The answer is clear from what has just been said.

5. Spiritual life is attributed to faith because in the act of faith spiritual life is first manifested. Life is said in The Soul to be in living beings by reason of the vegetative soul, not because every act of physical life is due to the vegetative soul, but because in its act life first appears. In the same way not every act of spiritual life is an act of faith, but it may be of the other virtues as well. Hence not every sin is directly and immediately opposed to faith.

6. The purifying of hearts is attributed to faith in so far as the movement of faith first appears in the said purification, as is expressed in the Epistle to the Hebrews (11:6): "For he that cometh to God must believe that he is."

7. Not only justification but also the forgiveness of guilt can be taken either as the motion to justice or as the formal effect of justice; for justice not only formally justifies but also formally casts out guilt, just as whiteness formally casts out blackness. Thus the forgiveness of guilt, as the formal effect of justice, like justification, follows grace; but taken as a motion, it is, like justification, understood prior to grace.

8. An operation can get its name in two ways: either from its principle or from its end. Thus the action by which a physician acts upon a sick person is called medication from the point of view of the principle, because it is the effect of medicine; but it is called healing from the point of view of the end, because it is the way to health. The forgiveness of sins is accordingly called justification from the term or end. It is also called having mercy from the principle, inasmuch as it is a work of divine mercy. Nevertheless in the forgiveness of sins a sort of justice is observed, since "all the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth" (Psalm 24:10). This is especially true on the part of God, since in forgiving sins He does what befits Him, as Anselm says: "When You pardon sinners it is just, for it does befit You." And that is what is said in the Psalm (30:1): "Deliver me in thy justice." From another point of view also, but not adequately, justice appears on the part of the one whose sin is forgiven inasmuch as there is found in him some disposition for grace, though inadequate.

9-10. The answer to these is clear from what has just been said.

11. The forgiveness of sins is in some sense distinguished from justification either in reality or in concept, and so it is differentiated from the infusion of grace and listed as one of the four prerequisites for the justification of sinners.

12. The conferring of justice belongs to justification as such, but the forgiveness of sins pertains to it as the justification of sinners. In this sense it is not referable to Christ or even to man in the state of innocence.