ARTICLE II

In the Second Article We Ask: CAN THERE BE FORGIVENESS OF SINS WITHOUT GRACE?

Difficulties:

It seems that there can, for

1. It is easier to tear down than to build up. But man is able to build up sin by himself. He is therefore able to tear it down by himself, and so the forgiveness of sins can take place without grace.

2. Contrary sins cannot be in the same subject at the same time. But a person who has been in sin of one kind can by himself pass to its contrary, as a man who has been a miser can by himself become a spendthrift. A person can therefore free himself from a sin in which he has been; and so grace is apparently not required for the forgiveness of sins.

3. It was said in answer that sins are contrary as contrary acts, not as contrary forms.--On the contrary, as Augustine says, sin still remains when its act has passed; and it is not enough for the forgiveness of sins that the act of sin has passed. Something therefore remains from the sin which needs forgiveness. But contraries have contrary effects. The remnants of contrary sins are therefore contrary and so cannot coexist. Thus the same conclusion follows as before.

4. One mediated contrary can be removed without introducing the other, as blackness can be driven out independently of the introduction of whiteness. But between the state of guilt and the state of grace there is a mean, the state of created nature, in which according to some man had neither grace nor guilt. It is therefore not necessary for the forgiveness of sins that a person receive grace.

5. God can repair more than man can spoil. But man was able to plunge from the state of nature, in which he did not have grace, to the state of guilt. Consequently without grace God can lead man back from the state of guilt to the state of nature.

6. After the act of sin has passed its guilt is said to remain, according to Augustine, in the sense that the past act of a sin is laid to the account of the sinner for punishment. Then contrariwise it is said to be forgiven in the sense that it is not laid to his account for punishment, according to the words of the Psalm (31:2): "Blessed is the man to whom the Lord hath not imputed sin." But to impute or not to impute implies something positive only in God, who imputes or does not. For the forgiveness of sin grace is therefore not required in the one whose sin is forgiven.

7. Whoever is the complete cause of anything has complete power over it both to tear it down and to set it up, because the effect ceases when the operation of the cause ceases. But man is the complete cause of sin. He therefore has complete power over the tearing down or the setting up of sin, and so man seemingly does not need grace for the forgiveness of sin.

8. Since sin is in the soul, the forgiveness of sins can be brought about only by something which enters into the soul. But according to Augustine only God enters into the soul. Consequently only God can forgive sin by Himself and without grace.

9. If grace removes guilt, it is either a grace which exists or one which does not. Now it is not a grace which does not exist, because what does not exist does nothing. But neither is it a grace which exists, because it is an accident and its existence is to exist in something. When, however, grace is in the soul, guilt is not there; and so it cannot be driven out. Grace is therefore not required for the forgiveness of guilt.

10. Grace and guilt cannot be in the soul together. If, then, grace is infused for the forgiveness of guilt, the guilt must first have been in the soul when grace was not. Now since the guilt has ceased to be, a last instant can be designated in which the guilt existed. Similarly, since the grace begins to be, a first instant can be designated in which grace exists in the soul. But these must be two distinct instants, because grace and guilt cannot exist in the soul at the same time, as has been said. Between any two instants, however, there is an intervening time, as is proved in the Physics. There will therefore be a time in which man has neither guilt nor grace, and so grace is seemingly not necessary for the forgiveness of guilt.

11. Augustine says that God gives us gifts because He loves us, and not the other way about. The gift of grace therefore presupposes divine love. But that divine love by which God the Father loves His only-begotten Son and His members, is not had for a man in the state of guilt. The forgiveness of guilt therefore precedes grace in the order of nature; and so grace is not required for the forgiveness of sins.

12. In the Old Law original sin was forgiven by circumcision, as Bede makes clear. Circumcision, however, did not confer grace, because, since the least grace is sufficient for resisting any temptation, man in the state of the Law would have had the means of conquering concupiscence. Then the Old Law would not have killed by giving occasion, as it is said to have done in the Epistle to the Romans (7:11). The death of Christ, moreover, would not have been necessary, because "if justice be by the law, then Christ dies in vain" (Galatians 2:21). But this cannot be admitted. It therefore seems inadmissible that circumcision conferred grace. Thus the forgiveness of sins can take place without grace.

To the Contrary:

1'. The words of the Psalm (77:39): "He remembered that they are flesh: a wind that goeth and returneth not," are explained in the Gloss as meaning "a wind that of itself goeth into sin and of itself returneth not from sin; therefore God calls men back because of themselves they cannot return."

2'. In the Epistle to the Romans (3:24) it is written: "Being justified freely by his grace. . . ."

REPLY:

There can by no means be any forgiveness of sins without ingratiatory grace. For the clarification of this point it should be borne in mind that, since there are two elements in sin, turning away from something and turning toward something, the forgiveness and retention of sin do not have reference to the turning toward but rather to the turning away and its consequences. For this reason, when a person ceases to have the will to sin, he does not by this fact have his sin forgiven, even if he should change to a contrary attitude of will. Augustine accordingly says: "If ceasing to sin were the same as not having any sins, it would be enough for Scripture (Ecclesiasticus 21:1) to admonish us: 'My son, hast thou sinned? Do so no more.' But that is not enough; Scripture has added: 'But for thy former sins also pray that they may be forgiven thee.'" Sin is therefore said to be forgiven in so far as the turning away and its consequences, the result of a past act of sin, are healed.

From the point of view of turning away, there are three factors which account for the impossibility of having sins forgiven without grace: the turning away, the offense against God, and the imputability. For the turning away is from the unchangeable good, which the person could have possessed but in regard to which he has made himself impotent; otherwise the turning away would not be culpable. The turning away in question cannot, then, be removed unless there is brought about a union with the unchangeable good from which the man withdrew by his sin. But this union is effected only by means of grace, by which God dwells in souls and the soul cleaves to God by the love of charity. The healing of this turning away, accordingly, requires the infusion of grace and charity, just as the healing of blindness requires the restoration of the power of sight.

The offense, moreover, which follows from sin cannot be blotted out without grace, whether the offense is viewed from the standpoint of man, inasmuch as by sinning he has offended God, or from the standpoint of God, inasmuch as He has taken offense at the sinner, according to the words of the Psalm (5:7): "Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity." For whoever puts the more worthy beneath the less worthy insults it, and the more so, the more worthy it is. Now whoever places his end in anything temporal, as everyone who sins mortally does, by this very fact prefers in his own affections a creature to the Creator, loving a creature more than the Creator; for the end is that which is loved most. Since God infinitely surpasses a creature, one who sins mortally will have offered to God an infinite offense from the point of view of the dignity of Him who is insulted, seeing that God and His commandments are contemned. Human strength is accordingly incapable of blotting out this offense; the good offices of divine grace are required.

God Himself, moreover, is said to take offense at the sinner or to hate him--not with a hate that is opposed to the love which He has for all things, for in this sense He hates none of the things which He has made, as is said in Wisdom (11:25); but with a hate that is opposed to the love which He has for the saints, preparing for them eternal goods. The effect of this love is the gift of ingratiatory grace, as was explained in the question on grace. The offense which God takes at man is accordingly not removed except by His giving grace.

The imputability of sin, furthermore, is an obligation not merely to sensible pain, but especially to the pain of loss, which is the lack of glory. The imputability is therefore not canceled so long as man is not given the means to arrive at glory. This is grace; and so without grace there cannot be any forgiveness of sins.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Sin itself is the demolition of grace, whereas the forgiveness of sin is its erection. It is consequently easier to incur sin than to get free of it.

2. There is contrariety among sins in so far as they imply turning toward something, but the forgiveness of sins does not have reference to this aspect, as has been said.* From the viewpoint of turning away and its consequences, however, they are on common ground. As a result, nothing prevents the imputability of contrary preceding acts from remaining in the soul at the same time; for a man who turns from avarice does not cease to have the imputability of avarice but only its act or habit.

3. Even though sins are contrary from the viewpoint of turning toward something, the residual conditions of aversion or imputability do not have to be contrary, because they are the indirect effects of turning toward creatures since they come about independently of the intention of the agent. From the contrariety of causes there results the contrariety of the effects which are direct, not of those which are indirect. From contrary acts there accordingly follow contrary habits and dispositions, for these are the effects of sinful acts and agree with them in species.

4. If we grant the opinion that Adam at one time had neither grace nor guilt (though some will not concede it), we must say that nothing prevents some contraries from having a mean with regard to some particular subject taken simply, which nevertheless have no mean when limited by a definite time. With reference to a dog, for instance, blind and seeing have a mean, but not after the ninth day. Similarly with reference to man in the state of created nature, grace and guilt are related to each other as contraries with a mean. But from the time when Adam received grace, or could have received it, in such a way that it would be handed on to all his posterity, no one is without grace except by reason of guilt, either actual or original.

5. Even though Adam in the state in which he was created did not have grace, as some hold, he is nevertheless held by the same theologians to have been given grace before the fall. He consequently fell from the state of grace and not just from the state of nature. But even if he had fallen only from the state of nature, the gift of divine grace would nonetheless be required for the expiation of an infinite offense.

6. God's love for us leaves in us a certain ensuing effect, namely grace, by which we are made worthy of eternal life; for that is the extent to which He loves us. In the same way God's abstention from holding us accountable for our sins resultantly leaves in us something by which we deserve to be absolved of the imputability in question; and this is grace.

7. A sinner is the direct cause of his sin from the point of view of turning to something; but from that of turning away and the consequences of this he is the indirect cause, since he does not intend these. They cannot in fact have a direct cause, since the character of evil in sin comes from these, and evil does not have a cause, as Dionysius holds.

Or the answer can be and is better given that the sinner is the cause of his sin in its becoming, but not the cause of the permanence of the remains of the sin. The cause of these is rather in part the divine justice, by which it has been justly ordained that anyone who has not wished to remain in grace when he could, should not be able to do so even if he should so wish; in part the cause is the deficiency of the powers of nature, which are insufficient for this expiation, for the reasons already indicated.* When a man jumps into a ditch, he is the cause of his fall, but the state of rest which follows upon it is from nature; and for this reason he cannot get out of the ditch as he was able to jump into it. It is the same in the question at hand.

8. The expression to bring about the forgiveness of guilt can be taken in either of two ways, effectively or formally, as making something white applies to the painter effectively, but formally to whiteness. Now in the forgiveness of guilt grace is the means of bringing it about, not effectively, but only formally. When it is said that only God enters into the soul, the qualities of the soul, either natural or gratuitous, are not excluded; for by these the soul is informed. But other subsistent substances are excluded; for they cannot be within the soul in the same way as God, who is within it even more intimately than the forms just mentioned. God is in the very existence of the soul, causing and conserving it; whereas the forms or qualities in question do not reach to the existence but surround as it were the essence of the soul.

9. Grace which exists and exists in the soul drives out guilt--not a guilt which exists, but rather one which does not exist but formerly existed. It does not drive out guilt in the same way as an efficient cause, for in that case it would have to act upon an existing guilt in order to expel it. Rather it drives it out formally. From the fact that grace informs the subject it follows that guilt is not in the subject, as is seen in the example of health and sickness.

10. To this and similar difficulties a number of answers are ordinarily given.

The first is that, although that instant is really one, it is nevertheless several in thought, being the beginning of the future and the end of the past; and so nothing prevents guilt and grace from being in the soul at the same time, but in such a way that guilt is in that instant in so far as it is the end of the past, whereas grace is in it in so far as it is the beginning of the future.

But this cannot stand. For the distinction given implies different aspects of the instant which do not multiply its substance but leave it one. The real consequence is that guilt and grace are in the soul in the same indivisible point of time; for the term instant means an indivisible point of time. But this is to be together at the same time; and so it follows that contraries are in the same subject at the same time. Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, when anything in moving makes use of one point as two, a period of rest must intervene. It is by this argument that he proves that reciprocating motions are not continuous. Likewise, if anyone makes use of one instant as two, he must understand some interval; as a consequence the soul would at some time be without guilt or grace. But this is inadmissible.

On this account others say that, just as a line extends between two points on a single line but not between two points on two line-segments in contact at their end-points; in the same way it is not necessary that between the instant which is the last of the time in which guilt was present and the instant which is the first of the time in which grace is present, there be any intervening time, since they are instants of distinct times.

But this again cannot stand. Because a line is an intrinsic measure, it is divided according to the distinction of real things. But time is an extrinsic measure and is one with regard to all things that are in time; for the existence of guilt is not measured by one time and that of grace by another, unless we mean by another time another part of the same continuous time. It is therefore necessary that between any two instants, whatever the things to which they may be referred, there should be an intervening time. Furthermore, two points on two line-segments in contact described on located bodies are united at a single point designated on an external line on the locating body; for contiguous beings are those whose extremities coincide. If, then, it is granted that distinct beings have distinct times which are not continuous but in a sense contiguous, it will nevertheless be necessary that in the time serving as the extrinsic measure there correspond to their end-points a single indivisible instant. Consequently the same inadmissible conclusion mentioned above, that guilt and grace are together, comes back again.

For this reason others say that such spiritual changes are not measured by a time which is the number of the movement of the heavens, because the soul and every spiritual substance are above time; but they have their own time inasmuch as there is found in them a before and after. But this time is not continuous, since according to the Philosopher the continuity of time is dependent upon the continuity of motion, whereas the affections of the soul are not continuous.

But this likewise has no place in the matter at hand. For not only things essentially in time, which is the movement of the heavens, are measured by time, but also those having an accidental reference to the movement of the heavens because they are dependent upon things that have an essential reference to the time just mentioned. And this holds even for the justification of sinners, which is dependent upon thoughts, conversations, and other such motions that are essentially measured by the time of the movement of the heavens.

A different explanation must therefore be given: we cannot indicate the last instant in which the sinner had guilt, but the last time. We can, however, indicate the first instant in which he has grace, and this instant is the end of the time in which he had guilt; but between a time and the end of that time nothing intervenes. We therefore do not have to indicate any time or instant in which a person would have neither guilt nor grace.

This is explained as follows. Since the infusion of grace takes place in an instant, it is the end of a continuous movement, such as a meditation by which the will is disposed for the reception of grace; and the end of the same movement is the forgiveness of guilt, for guilt is forgiven by the very fact that grace is infused. In that first instant, then, there is the end of the forgiveness of guilt, that is, the absence of guilt, and the end of the infusion of grace, that is, the possession of grace. Then in the whole preceding time that ends at this instant, by which the movement of the meditation just mentioned was measured, the sinner had guilt and not grace, except only at the last instant, as we have said. But before the last instant of this time we cannot pick out another immediately next to it, because, if any instant at all other than the last is taken, between it and the last there will be an infinite number of intervening instants.

Thus it is clear that we cannot distinguish a last instant in which the person justified would have guilt and not have grace; but we can distinguish a first instant in which he has grace and does not have guilt. This solution can be gathered from the words of the Philosopher.

11. By His love God not only causes the gift of grace in us but also the forgiveness of guilt. Consequently the forgiveness of guilt does not have to precede grace. Such a necessity would follow, however, if the forgiveness of guilt preceded God's love instead of following from it.

12. The sacraments cause by signifying, for they cause what they represent. And because circumcision has its signification in removing, its effectiveness was directly related to the removal of original guilt and only consequently to grace, whether grace was given in virtue of circumcision in the same way as it is given in virtue of baptism, as some say, or was given by God concomitantly with circumcision. Thus the forgiveness of guilt did not take place without grace. Yet that grace did not as completely repress concupiscence as does the grace of baptism. It was accordingly harder for a circumcised person to resist concupiscence than it is for a baptized person. From this circumstance the Old Law was said to kill by giving occasion, although circumcision is not included among the sacraments of the Mosaic law because it is not "of Moses but of the fathers," as is said in John (7:22). Thus, if circumcision gave any grace, this is not contrary to the statement that the Old Law did not justify.