Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that happiness consists in an act of the will. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 10,11), that man's happiness consists in peace; wherefore it is written (Ps. 147:3): "Who hath placed peace in thy end ". But peace pertains to the will. Therefore man's happiness is in the will.

Objection 2: Further, happiness is the supreme good. But good is the object of the will. Therefore happiness consists in an operation of the will.

Objection 3: Further, the last end corresponds to the first mover: thus the last end of the whole army is victory, which is the end of the general, who moves all the men. But the first mover in regard to operations is the will: because it moves the other powers, as we shall state further on (Question 9, Articles 1,3). Therefore happiness regards the will.

Objection 4: Further, if happiness be an operation, it must needs be man's most excellent operation. But the love of God, which is an act of the will, is a more excellent operation than knowledge, which is an operation of the intellect, as the Apostle declares (1 Cor. 13). Therefore it seems that happiness consists in an act of the will.

Objection 5: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that "happy is he who has whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss." And a little further on 6. he adds: "He is most happy who desires well, whatever he desires: for good things make a man happy, and such a man already possesses some good---i.e. a good will." Therefore happiness consists in an act of the will.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 17:3): "This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the only true God." Now eternal life is the last end, as stated above (Article 2, ad 1). Therefore man's happiness consists in the knowledge of God, which is an act of the intellect.

I answer that, As stated above (Question 2, Article 6) two things are needed for happiness: one, which is the essence of happiness: the other, that is, as it were, its proper accident, i.e. the delight connected with it. I say, then, that as to the very essence of happiness, it is impossible for it to consist in an act of the will. For it is evident from what has been said (Articles 1,2; Question 2, Article 7) that happiness is the attainment of the last end. But the attainment of the end does not consist in the very act of the will. For the will is directed to the end, both absent, when it desires it; and present, when it is delighted by resting therein. Now it is evident that the desire itself of the end is not the attainment of the end, but is a movement towards the end: while delight comes to the will from the end being present; and not conversely, is a thing made present, by the fact that the will delights in it. Therefore, that the end be present to him who desires it, must be due to something else than an act of the will.

This is evidently the case in regard to sensible ends. For if the acquisition of money were through an act of the will, the covetous man would have it from the very moment that he wished for it. But at the moment it is far from him; and he attains it, by grasping it in his hand, or in some like manner; and then he delights in the money got. And so it is with an intelligible end. For at first we desire to attain an intelligible end; we attain it, through its being made present to us by an act of the intellect; and then the delighted will rests in the end when attained.

So, therefore, the essence of happiness consists in an act of the intellect: but the delight that results from happiness pertains to the will. In this sense Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is "joy in truth," because, to wit, joy itself is the consummation of happiness.

Reply to Objection 1: Peace pertains to man's last end, not as though it were the very essence of happiness; but because it is antecedent and consequent thereto: antecedent, in so far as all those things are removed which disturb and hinder man in attaining the last end: consequent inasmuch as when man has attained his last end, he remains at peace, his desire being at rest.

Reply to Objection 2: The will's first object is not its act: just as neither is the first object of the sight, vision, but a visible thing. Wherefore, from the very fact that happiness belongs to the will, as the will's first object, it follows that it does not belong to it as its act.

Reply to Objection 3: The intellect apprehends the end before the will does: yet motion towards the end begins in the will. And therefore to the will belongs that which last of all follows the attainment of the end, viz. delight or enjoyment.

Reply to Objection 4: Love ranks above knowledge in moving, but knowledge precedes love in attaining: for "naught is loved save what is known," as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1). Consequently we first attain an intelligible end by an act of the intellect; just as we first attain a sensible end by an act of sense.

Reply to Objection 5: He who has whatever he desires, is happy, because he has what he desires: and this indeed is by something other than the act of his will. But to desire nothing amiss is needed for happiness, as a necessary disposition thereto. And a good will is reckoned among the good things which make a man happy, forasmuch as it is an inclination of the will: just as a movement is reduced to the genus of its terminus, for instance, "alteration" to the genus "quality."

Articulus 4

Argumentum 1

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat in actu voluntatis.

Dicit enim Augustinus, XIX de CIV. Dei, quod beatitudo hominis in pace consistit, unde in Psalmo CXLVII, qui posuit fines tuos pacem.

Sed pax ad voluntatem pertinet.

Ergo beatitudo hominis in voluntate consistit.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, beatitudo est summum bonum. Sed bonum est obiectum voluntatis. Ergo beatitudo in operatione voluntatis consistit.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, primo moventi respondet ultimus finis, sicut ultimus finis totius exercitus est victoria, quae est finis ducis, qui omnes movet. Sed primum movens ad operandum est voluntas, quia movet alias vires, ut infra dicetur.

Ergo beatitudo ad voluntatem pertinet.

Argumentum 4

Praeterea, si beatitudo est aliqua operatio, oportet quod sit nobilissima operatio hominis. Sed nobilior operatio est dilectio dei, quae est actus voluntatis, quam cognitio, quae est operatio intellectus, ut patet per apostolum, I ad Cor. XIII.

Ergo videtur quod beatitudo consistat in actu voluntatis.

Argumentum 5

Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in XIII de Trin., quod beatus est qui habet omnia quae vult, et nihil vult male.

Et post pauca subdit, propinquat beato qui bene vult quodcumque vult, bona enim beatum faciunt, quorum bonorum iam habet aliquid, ipsam scilicet bonam voluntatem.

Ergo beatitudo in actu voluntatis consistit.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod dominus dicit, Ioan. XVII, haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te, deum verum unum.

Vita autem aeterna est ultimus finis, ut dictum est.

Ergo beatitudo hominis in cognitione dei consistit, quae est actus intellectus.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod ad beatitudinem, sicut supra dictum est, duo requiruntur, unum quod est essentia beatitudinis; aliud quod est quasi per se accidens eius, scilicet delectatio ei adiuncta.

Dico ergo quod, quantum ad id quod est essentialiter ipsa beatitudo, impossibile est quod consistat in actu voluntatis.

Manifestum est enim ex praemissis quod beatitudo est consecutio finis ultimi. Consecutio autem finis non consistit in ipso actu voluntatis. Voluntas enim fertur in finem et absentem, cum ipsum desiderat; et praesentem, cum in ipso requiescens delectatur.

Manifestum est autem quod ipsum desiderium finis non est consecutio finis, sed est motus ad finem. Delectatio autem advenit voluntati ex hoc quod finis est praesens, non autem e converso ex hoc aliquid fit praesens, quia voluntas delectatur in ipso.

Oportet igitur aliquid aliud esse quam actum voluntatis, per quod fit ipse finis praesens volenti. Et hoc manifeste apparet circa fines sensibiles. Si enim consequi pecuniam esset per actum voluntatis, statim a principio cupidus consecutus esset pecuniam, quando vult eam habere. Sed a principio quidem est absens ei; consequitur autem ipsam per hoc quod manu ipsam apprehendit, vel aliquo huiusmodi; et tunc iam delectatur in pecunia habita.

Sic igitur et circa intelligibilem finem contingit. Nam a principio volumus consequi finem intelligibilem; consequimur autem ipsum per hoc quod fit praesens nobis per actum intellectus; et tunc voluntas delectata conquiescit in fine iam adepto. Sic igitur essentia beatitudinis in actu intellectus consistit, sed ad voluntatem pertinet delectatio beatitudinem consequens; secundum quod Augustinus dicit, X confess., quod beatitudo est gaudium de veritate; quia scilicet ipsum gaudium est consummatio beatitudinis.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod pax pertinet ad ultimum hominis finem, non quasi essentialiter sit ipsa beatitudo; sed quia antecedenter et consequenter se habet ad ipsam. Antecedenter quidem, inquantum iam sunt remota omnia perturbantia, et impedientia ab ultimo fine. Consequenter vero, inquantum iam homo, adepto ultimo fine, remanet pacatus, suo desiderio quietato.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod primum obiectum voluntatis non est actus eius sicut nec primum obiectum visus est visio, sed visibile. Unde ex hoc ipso quod beatitudo pertinet ad voluntatem tanquam primum obiectum eius, sequitur quod non pertineat ad ipsam tanquam actus ipsius.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod finem primo apprehendit intellectus quam voluntas, tamen motus ad finem incipit in voluntate.

Et ideo voluntati debetur id quod ultimo consequitur consecutionem finis, scilicet delectatio vel fruitio.

Ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod dilectio praeeminet cognitioni in movendo, sed cognitio praevia est dilectioni in attingendo, non enim diligitur nisi cognitum, ut dicit Augustinus in X de Trin..

Et ideo intelligibilem finem primo attingimus per actionem intellectus; sicut et finem sensibilem primo attingimus per actionem sensus.

Ad 5

Ad quintum dicendum quod ille qui habet omnia quae vult, ex hoc est beatus, quod habet ea quae vult, quod quidem est per aliud quam per actum voluntatis. Sed nihil male velle requiritur ad beatitudinem sicut quaedam debita dispositio ad ipsam.

Voluntas autem bona ponitur in numero bonorum quae beatum faciunt, prout est inclinatio quaedam in ipsa, sicut motus reducitur ad genus sui termini, ut alteratio ad qualitatem.