ARTICLE IX

In the Ninth Article We Ask: IS THE JUSTIFICATION OF SINNERS INSTANTANEOUS?

Difficulties:

It seems that it is not, for

1. It is impossible for the same power to have several motions at one and the same time, just as a single matter is not under different distinct forms at one and the same time. But in the justification of sinners two different motions of free choice are required, as is clear from what has been said. The justification of sinners therefore cannot be instantaneous.

2. The answer was given that those two motions belong to different powers; for the motion of free choice toward God belongs to the concupiscible power, and that toward sin, being a sort of detestation of sin, is in the irascible.--On the contrary, to detest is the same as to hate. But hatred, like love, is in the concupiscible power, as the Philosopher teaches. To detest is therefore not in the irascible power.

3. According to Damascene the irascible and concupiscible powers are parts of sense appetite. But sense appetite extends only to a good suited to it or to the contrary of this. But objects of this kind are not God Himself and sin under the aspect of being detestable. The motions in question therefore do not pertain to the concupiscible and irascible powers but to the will; and so they belong to the same power.

4. It was said in answer that the motion of free choice toward God is the motion of faith, which belongs to the intellect, whereas contrition belongs to the will, whose business it is to sorrow for sin; and thus they are not motions of a single power.--On the contrary, according to Augustine "man cannot believe unless he so wills." Consequently, even though an act of the intellect is required in believing, there is nevertheless required in it an act of the will. We are accordingly left with the conclusion that two motions of the same power are required for the justification of sinners.

5. To be moved from one term to another belongs to the same being. But to detest sin is to be moved from a term, and to be moved toward God is to be moved to a term. Consequently contrition, which is detestation for sin, is an act of the same power to which motion toward God belongs; and so they cannot coexist.

6. Nothing is moved at the same time to distinct and contrary terms. But God and sin are distinct and contrary terms. The soul therefore cannot at the same time be moved toward God and toward sin; and so we must conclude as before.

7. Grace is given only to one who is worthy. But as long as a person is subjected to guilt he is not worthy of grace. Guilt must therefore be driven out before grace is infused. Then justification, which includes the two, is not instantaneous.

8. A form susceptible of more or less must, it seems, come to be in a subject successively, just as a form not susceptible of more or less comes to be in the subject all at once, as is clear of substantial forms. But grace is intensified in its subject. It therefore seems to be introduced successively; and so the infusion of grace is not instantaneous, and consequently neither is the justification of sinners.

9. In the justification of sinners, as in any change, two terms must be set down, a starting point and a finish. But the two terms of any change are incompatible; that is, they cannot coexist. In the justification of sinners, then, two things are included which are related as prior and posterior; and so the justification of sinners is successive and not instantaneous.

10. Nothing which is in the process of becoming before it is in the state of having become, comes into being instantaneously. But grace is in the process of becoming before it is in the state of having become. The infusion of grace is therefore not instantaneous. Thus the conclusion is the same as above. Proof of the minor: In permanent beings what is becoming is not; but when it has become it already is. But grace belongs to permanent beings. If, then, it is becoming and has become at the same time, it at the same time is and is not. But that is impossible.

11. All motion is in time. But in the justification of sinners a motion of free choice is required. The justification of sinners therefore takes place in time, and so it is not instantaneous.

12. Contrition for sins is required for the justification of sinners. But when someone has committed many sins, he cannot at the same instant be contrite for all his sins or even think of them. Consequently the justification of sinners cannot be instantaneous.

13. Whenever there is anything intermediate between the extremes of a change, the change is successive and not instantaneous. But between guilt and grace there is something intermediate, the state of created nature. The justification of sinners is therefore a successive change.

14. Guilt and grace are not in the soul simultaneously. Then the instant at which guilt is last in the soul is distinct from the instant at which grace is first there. But between any two instants a time intervenes. Then a time intervenes between the expulsion of guilt and the infusion of grace. But justification includes both of these. Therefore justification takes place in time and is not instantaneous.

To the Contrary:

1'. The justification of sinners is a sort of spiritual enlightenment. But corporeal enlightenment takes place instantaneously, not in time. Now since spiritual beings are simpler than corporeal and less subject to time, it therefore seems that the justification of sinners is instantaneous.

2'. The more powerful an agent is, the shorter the time in which it produces its effect. But God, who has infinite power, works justification. Justification is therefore instantaneous.

3'. In The Causes we read that both the substance and the action of a spiritual substance (which is the genus to which the soul belongs) is in a moment of eternity and not in time. But justification pertains to the action of the soul. It is therefore not in time.

4'. At the same instant at which the disposition is complete in the matter, the form also is present. But the motion of free choice which is required in justification is a complete disposition for grace. Therefore, at the same instant at which those motions are given, grace is present.

REPLY:

The justification of sinners is instantaneous.

For the clarification of this matter it should be noted that, when any change is said to be instantaneous, we do not mean that its two terms exist at the same instant; for this is impossible, since every change is between terms that are, properly speaking, opposed. We mean rather that the passage from one term to the other is instantaneous. That does in fact happen in some opposites, though in others it does not.

Whenever any mean must be recognized between the terms of a motion, the passage from one term to the other must be successive, because the thing which is undergoing continuous motion is first changed to the mean before it is changed to the final term, as the Philosopher makes clear. And by "mean" I refer to any sort of distance from the extremes, whether it be distance in situation, as is had in local motion; or distance in the line of quantity, as is had in increase and decrease; or in the line of form, as in alteration; and this whether the mean is of another species, as gray is between white and black, or of the same species, as the less warm is between the more warm and cold.

Whenever, on the other hand, there cannot be a mean between the two terms of a motion or change in any of the ways mentioned, then the passage from one term to the other is not in time but is instantaneous. This occurs whenever the terms of motion or change are affirmation and negation or privation and form. For between affirmation and negation there is no mean in any sense, nor between privation and form with regard to its proper subject. I am speaking here in the sense in which there is a mean of another species between the extremes.

But in the sense in which there is a mean in intensity and slackness, even though there cannot be a mean essentially, there nevertheless can be a mean accidentally. For essentially negation or privation is neither intensified nor abated; but accidentally some intensification or abatement of it can be viewed on the basis of its cause. Thus a man who has his eye gouged out may be said to be more blind than one who has a bandage over his eye, because the cause of blindness is more efficacious.

If, then, we take such changes according to their proper terms and speak essentially, they must be instantaneous and not in time. Examples are illumination, coming to be and perishing, and the like. But if we take them from the point of view of the causes of their terms, we can consider succession in them. This is evident in illumination; for, although the air passes straightway from darkness to light, the cause of darkness is successively removed, that is, the absence of the sun, since by means of local motion the sun becomes successively present. In this way illumination is the term of a local motion and is indivisible, like any term of a continuum.

I say, then, that the extremes of justification are grace and the privation of grace, between which no mean as regards their proper subject intervenes. The passage from the one to the other must accordingly be instantaneous, although the cause of such a privation is removed successively, either inasmuch as by taking thought the man disposes himself for grace, or at least inasmuch as a time passes after which God has preordained that He will give grace. Thus the infusion of grace takes place instantaneously. And because the driving out of guilt is the formal effect of the grace infused, hence it is that the whole justification of sinners is instantaneous; for the form and the disposition for the form and the loss of the other form are all instantaneous.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. When the two motions are altogether different, they cannot coexist in the same power. But if one is the reason for the other, then they can coexist, because they are in some sense a single motion. When, for example, a person desires something for the sake of an end, he at the same time desires the end and the means. In the same way when someone flees from what is repugnant to the end, he at the same time desires the end and flees from the contrary. It is in this way that the will at the same time is moved toward God and hates sin as contrary to God.

2. Such motions of free choice pertain to the will, not to the irascible and the concupiscible power. This is because their object is something intelligible, not something sensible. Yet they are sometimes found to be attributed to the irascible and the concupiscible powers in so far as the will itself is sometimes called irascible or concupiscible because of the resemblance of its act to theirs. In this case contrition can be attributed both to the concupiscible power inasmuch as the man hates sin, and to the irascible inasmuch as he is worked up against the sin, purposing within himself revenge for it.

3-5. The answers to these are clear from the above.

6. The will is not moved at the same time to pursue contraries, but it can be moved at the same time to flee from one thing and to pursue another, particularly if the pursuit of the one is the reason for the flight from the other.

7. Grace is given to one worthy of it, not in the sense that anyone is sufficiently worthy before he has grace, but in the sense that grace by being given makes the man worthy. Hence he is at the same time worthy of grace and in possession of grace.

8. It is not the intensification or abatement of the form itself in a subject, but rather the intensification or abatement of the contrary form or opposite term, which brings about the successive reception of the form in its subject. Now the privation of grace is not susceptible of more or less except accidentally, by reason of its cause, as has already been explained.* Consequently it is not necessary for grace to be received successively in its subject. If, however, it did abate in the subject, this could have some influence upon the successive loss of grace; but grace does not abate in the same subject. Therefore it is not successively lost, because it does not abate itself; nor is it successively introduced, because its privation does not abate.

9. The answer is clear from what has been said;* for a change is not said to be instantaneous because the two terms coexist at the same instant, as has been explained.*

10. The coming to be of a permanent being can be taken in two senses: (1) Properly. In this sense a thing is said to be coming to be so long as the motion, whose term is the coming of the thing into existence, continues. So what comes to be is not in permanent beings, but the becoming of the thing takes place through a succession. It is in this sense that the Philosopher says that what is in process of becoming was becoming and will become. (2) Improperly, so that a thing is said to come to be at the instant at which it first has become, and this because that instant, inasmuch as it is the term of the previous time in which the thing was becoming, appropriates to itself what rightly belongs to the previous time. In this sense it is not true that what is in process of becoming is not, but rather that it is now for the first time and was not before this. This is the meaning of the statement that in things that become all at once, the becoming and the having become are simultaneous.

11. Motion is not taken in the present context as a passage from potency to act (in which sense it is measured by time); but the motion of free choice is taken for its very operation, and this is an "act of a perfect being," as is said in The Soul. It can accordingly be instantaneous, just as to be perfect is also instantaneous.

12. At the instant at which a man is justified it is not required that he have contrition in particular for each one of his sins, but in general for all of them, with particular contrition for each sin either preceding or following.

13. After a man has fallen into sin there cannot be any mean between grace and guilt, because guilt is not taken away except through grace, as is evident from what was said above. Nor is grace destroyed except through guilt, though before guilt there would be a mean between grace and guilt in the opinion of some.

14. We should not take the last instant at which there was guilt, but the last time, as was said above.