Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that the body is necessary for Happiness. For the perfection of virtue and grace presupposes the perfection of nature. But Happiness is the perfection of virtue and grace. Now the soul, without the body, has not the perfection of nature; since it is naturally a part of human nature, and every part is imperfect while separated from its whole. Therefore the soul cannot be happy without the body.

Objection 2: Further, Happiness is a perfect operation, as stated above (Question 3, Articles 2,5). But perfect operation follows perfect being: since nothing operates except in so far as it is an actual being. Since, therefore, the soul has not perfect being, while it is separated from the body, just as neither has a part, while separate from its whole; it seems that the soul cannot be happy without the body.

Objection 3: Further, Happiness is the perfection of man. But the soul, without the body, is not man. Therefore Happiness cannot be in the soul separated from the body.

Objection 4: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13) "the operation of bliss," in which operation happiness consists, is "not hindered." But the operation of the separate soul is hindered; because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35), the soul "has a natural desire to rule the body, the result of which is that it is held back, so to speak, from tending with all its might to the heavenward journey," i.e. to the vision of the Divine Essence. Therefore the soul cannot be happy without the body.

Objection 5: Further, Happiness is the sufficient good and lulls desire. But this cannot be said of the separated soul; for it yet desires to be united to the body, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore the soul is not happy while separated from the body.

Objection 6: Further, in Happiness man is equal to the angels. But the soul without the body is not equal to the angels, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore it is not happy.

On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 14:13): "Happy are the dead who die in the Lord."

I answer that, Happiness is twofold; the one is imperfect and is had in this life; the other is perfect, consisting in the vision of God. Now it is evident that the body is necessary for the happiness of this life. For the happiness of this life consists in an operation of the intellect, either speculative or practical. And the operation of the intellect in this life cannot be without a phantasm, which is only in a bodily organ, as was shown in the 1, Question 84, Articles 6,7. Consequently that happiness which can be had in this life, depends, in a way, on the body. But as to perfect Happiness, which consists in the vision of God, some have maintained that it is not possible to the soul separated from the body; and have said that the souls of saints, when separated from their bodies, do not attain to that Happiness until the Day of Judgment, when they will receive their bodies back again. And this is shown to be false, both by authority and by reason. By authority, since the Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:6): "While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord"; and he points out the reason of this absence, saying: "For we walk by faith and not by sight." Now from this it is clear that so long as we walk by faith and not by sight, bereft of the vision of the Divine Essence, we are not present to the Lord. But the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, are in God's presence; wherefore the text continues: "But we are confident and have a good will to be absent . . . from the body, and to be present with the Lord." Whence it is evident that the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, "walk by sight," seeing the Essence of God, wherein is true Happiness.

Again this is made clear by reason. For the intellect needs not the body, for its operation, save on account of the phantasms, wherein it looks on the intelligible truth, as stated in the 1, Question 84, Article 7. Now it is evident that the Divine Essence cannot be seen by means of phantasms, as stated in the 1, Question 12, Article 3. Wherefore, since man's perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, it does not depend on the body. Consequently, without the body the soul can be happy.

We must, however, notice that something may belong to a thing's perfection in two ways. First, as constituting the essence thereof; thus the soul is necessary for man's perfection. Secondly, as necessary for its well-being: thus, beauty of body and keenness of perfection belong to man's perfection. Wherefore though the body does not belong in the first way to the perfection of human Happiness, yet it does in the second way. For since operation depends on a thing's nature, the more perfect is the soul in its nature, the more perfectly it has its proper operation, wherein its happiness consists. Hence, Augustine, after inquiring (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) "whether that perfect Happiness can be ascribed to the souls of the dead separated from their bodies," answers "that they cannot see the Unchangeable Substance, as the blessed angels see It; either for some other more hidden reason, or because they have a natural desire to rule the body."

Reply to Objection 1: Happiness is the perfection of the soul on the part of the intellect, in respect of which the soul transcends the organs of the body; but not according as the soul is the natural form of the body. Wherefore the soul retains that natural perfection in respect of which happiness is due to it, though it does not retain that natural perfection in respect of which it is the form of the body.

Reply to Objection 2: The relation of the soul to being is not the same as that of other parts: for the being of the whole is not that of any individual part: wherefore, either the part ceases altogether to be, when the whole is destroyed, just as the parts of an animal, when the animal is destroyed; or, if they remain, they have another actual being, just as a part of a line has another being from that of the whole line. But the human soul retains the being of the composite after the destruction of the body: and this because the being of the form is the same as that of its matter, and this is the being of the composite. Now the soul subsists in its own being, as stated in the 1, Question 75, Article 2. It follows, therefore, that after being separated from the body it has perfect being and that consequently it can have a perfect operation; although it has not the perfect specific nature.

Reply to Objection 3: Happiness belongs to man in respect of his intellect: and, therefore, since the intellect remains, it can have Happiness. Thus the teeth of an Ethiopian, in respect of which he is said to be white, can retain their whiteness, even after extraction.

Reply to Objection 4: One thing is hindered by another in two ways. First, by way of opposition; thus cold hinders the action of heat: and such a hindrance to operation is repugnant to Happiness. Secondly, by way of some kind of defect, because, to wit, that which is hindered has not all that is necessary to make it perfect in every way: and such a hindrance to operation is not incompatible with Happiness, but prevents it from being perfect in every way. And thus it is that separation from the body is said to hold the soul back from tending with all its might to the vision of the Divine Essence. For the soul desires to enjoy God in such a way that the enjoyment also may overflow into the body, as far as possible. And therefore, as long as it enjoys God, without the fellowship of the body, its appetite is at rest in that which it has, in such a way, that it would still wish the body to attain to its share.

Reply to Objection 5: The desire of the separated soul is entirely at rest, as regards the thing desired; since, to wit, it has that which suffices its appetite. But it is not wholly at rest, as regards the desirer, since it does not possess that good in every way that it would wish to possess it. Consequently, after the body has been resumed, Happiness increases not in intensity, but in extent.

Reply to Objection 6: The statement made (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) to the effect that "the souls of the departed see not God as the angels do," is not to be understood as referring to inequality of quantity; because even now some souls of the Blessed are raised to the higher orders of the angels, thus seeing God more clearly than the lower angels. But it refers to inequality of proportion: because the angels, even the lowest, have every perfection of Happiness that they ever will have, whereas the separated souls of the saints have not.

Articulus 5

Argumentum 1

Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad beatitudinem requiratur corpus. Perfectio enim virtutis et gratiae praesupponit perfectionem naturae. Sed beatitudo est perfectio virtutis et gratiae. Anima autem sine corpore non habet perfectionem naturae, cum sit pars naturaliter humanae naturae, omnis autem pars est imperfecta a suo toto separata.

Ergo anima sine corpore non potest esse beata.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, beatitudo est operatio quaedam perfecta, ut supra dictum est.

Sed operatio perfecta sequitur esse perfectum, quia nihil operatur nisi secundum quod est ens in actu.

Cum ergo anima non habeat esse perfectum quando est a corpore separata, sicut nec aliqua pars quando separata est a toto; videtur quod anima sine corpore non possit esse beata.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, beatitudo est perfectio hominis. Sed anima sine corpore non est homo. Ergo beatitudo non potest esse in anima sine corpore.

Argumentum 4

Praeterea, secundum philosophum, in VII ethic., felicitatis operatio, in qua consistit beatitudo, est non impedita.

Sed operatio animae separatae est impedita, quia, ut dicit Augustinus XII super Gen. Ad litt., inest ei naturalis quidam appetitus corpus administrandi, quo appetitu retardatur quodammodo ne tota intentione pergat in illud summum caelum, idest in visionem essentiae divinae.

Ergo anima sine corpore non potest esse beata.

Argumentum 5

Praeterea, beatitudo est sufficiens bonum, et quietat desiderium.

Sed hoc non convenit animae separatae, quia adhuc appetit corporis unionem, ut Augustinus dicit.

Ergo anima separata a corpore non est beata.

Argumentum 6

Praeterea, homo in beatitudine est Angelis aequalis.

Sed anima sine corpore non aequatur Angelis, ut Augustinus dicit.

Ergo non est beata.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod dicitur Apoc. XIV, beati mortui qui in domino moriuntur.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est beatitudo, una imperfecta, quae habetur in hac vita; et alia perfecta, quae in dei visione consistit. Manifestum est autem quod ad beatitudinem huius vitae, de necessitate requiritur corpus. Est enim beatitudo huius vitae operatio intellectus, vel speculativi vel practici.

Operatio autem intellectus in hac vita non potest esse sine phantasmate, quod non est nisi in organo corporeo, ut in primo habitum est.

Et sic beatitudo quae in hac vita haberi potest, dependet quodammodo ex corpore. Sed circa beatitudinem perfectam, quae in dei visione consistit, aliqui posuerunt quod non potest animae advenire sine corpore existenti; dicentes quod animae sanctorum a corporibus separatae, ad illam beatitudinem non perveniunt usque ad diem iudicii, quando corpora resument.

Quod quidem apparet esse falsum et auctoritate, et ratione.

Auctoritate quidem, quia apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. V, quandiu sumus in corpore, peregrinamur a domino; et quae sit ratio peregrinationis ostendit, subdens, per fidem enim ambulamus, et non per speciem.

Ex quo apparet quod quandiu aliquis ambulat per fidem et non per speciem, carens visione divinae essentiae, nondum est deo praesens. Animae autem sanctorum a corporibus separatae, sunt deo praesentes, unde subditur, audemus autem, et bonam voluntatem habemus peregrinari a corpore, et praesentes esse ad dominum.

Unde manifestum est quod animae sanctorum separatae a corporibus, ambulant per speciem, dei essentiam videntes, in quo est vera beatitudo. Hoc etiam per rationem apparet. Nam intellectus ad suam operationem non indiget corpore nisi propter phantasmata, in quibus veritatem intelligibilem contuetur, ut in primo dictum est.

Manifestum est autem quod divina essentia per phantasmata videri non potest, ut in primo ostensum est.

Unde, cum in visione divinae essentiae perfecta hominis beatitudo consistat, non dependet beatitudo perfecta hominis a corpore. Unde sine corpore potest anima esse beata. Sed sciendum quod ad perfectionem alicuius rei dupliciter aliquid pertinet. Uno modo, ad constituendam essentiam rei, sicut anima requiritur ad perfectionem hominis. Alio modo requiritur ad perfectionem rei quod pertinet ad bene esse eius, sicut pulchritudo corporis, et velocitas ingenii pertinet ad perfectionem hominis. Quamvis ergo corpus primo modo ad perfectionem beatitudinis humanae non pertineat, pertinet tamen secundo modo. Cum enim operatio dependeat ex natura rei, quando anima perfectior erit in sua natura, tanto perfectius habebit suam propriam operationem, in qua felicitas consistit.

Unde Augustinus, in XII super Gen. Ad litt., cum quaesivisset, utrum spiritibus defunctorum sine corporibus possit summa illa beatitudo praeberi, respondet quod non sic possunt videre incommutabilem substantiam, ut sancti Angeli vident; sive alia latentiore causa, sive ideo quia est in eis naturalis quidam appetitus corpus administrandi.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod beatitudo est perfectio animae ex parte intellectus, secundum quem anima transcendit corporis organa, non autem secundum quod est forma naturalis corporis.

Et ideo illa naturae perfectio manet secundum quam ei beatitudo debetur, licet non maneat illa naturae perfectio secundum quam est corporis forma.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod anima aliter se habet ad esse quam aliae partes. Nam esse totius non est alicuius suarum partium, unde vel pars omnino desinit esse, destructo toto, sicut partes animalis destructo animali; vel, si remanent, habent aliud esse in actu, sicut pars lineae habet aliud esse quam tota linea.

Sed animae humanae remanet esse compositi post corporis destructionem, et hoc ideo, quia idem est esse formae et materia, et hoc est esse compositi. Anima autem subsistit in suo esse, ut in primo ostensum est.

Unde relinquitur quod post separationem a corpore perfectum esse habeat, unde et perfectam operationem habere potest; licet non habeat perfectam naturam speciei.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod beatitudo est hominis secundum intellectum, et ideo, remanente intellectu, potest inesse ei beatitudo. Sicut dentes Aethiopis possunt esse albi, etiam post evulsionem, secundum quos Aethiops dicitur albus.

Ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod dupliciter aliquid impeditur ab alio.

Uno modo, per modum contrarietatis, sicut frigus impedit actionem caloris, et tale impedimentum operationis repugnat felicitati.

Alio modo, per modum cuiusdam defectus, quia scilicet res impedita non habet quidquid ad omnimodam sui perfectionem requiritur, et tale impedimentum operationis non repugnat felicitati, sed omnimodae perfectioni ipsius. Et sic separatio a corpore dicitur animam retardare, ne tota intentione tendat in visionem divinae essentiae. Appetit enim anima sic frui deo, quod etiam ipsa fruitio derivetur ad corpus per redundantiam, sicut est possibile. Et ideo quandiu ipsa fruitur deo sine corpore, appetitus eius sic quiescit in eo quod habet, quod tamen adhuc ad participationem eius vellet suum corpus pertingere.

Ad 5

Ad quintum dicendum quod desiderium animae separatae totaliter quiescit ex parte appetibilis, quia scilicet habet id quod suo appetitui sufficit. Sed non totaliter requiescit ex parte appetentis, quia illud bonum non possidet secundum omnem modum quo possidere vellet. Et ideo, corpore resumpto, beatitudo crescit non intensive, sed extensive.

Ad 6

Ad sextum dicendum quod id quod ibidem dicitur, quod spiritus defunctorum non sic vident deum sicut Angeli, non est intelligendum secundum inaequalitatem quantitatis, quia etiam modo aliquae animae beatorum sunt assumptae ad superiores ordines Angelorum, clarius videntes deum quam inferiores Angeli. Sed intelligitur secundum inaequalitatem proportionis, quia Angeli, etiam infimi, habent omnem perfectionem beatitudinis quam sunt habituri, non autem animae separatae sanctorum.