Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that perfection of the body is not necessary for man's perfect Happiness. For perfection of the body is a bodily good. But it has been shown above (Question 2) that Happiness does not consist in bodily goods. Therefore no perfect disposition of the body is necessary for man's Happiness.

Objection 2: Further, man's Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, as shown above (Question 3, Article 8). But the body has not part in this operation, as shown above (Article 5). Therefore no disposition of the body is necessary for Happiness.

Objection 3: Further, the more the intellect is abstracted from the body, the more perfectly it understands. But Happiness consists in the most perfect operation of the intellect. Therefore the soul should be abstracted from the body in every way. Therefore, in no way is a disposition of the body necessary for Happiness.

On the contrary, Happiness is the reward of virtue; wherefore it is written (Jn. 13:17): "You shall be blessed, if you do them." But the reward promised to the saints is not only that they shall see and enjoy God, but also that their bodies shall be well-disposed; for it is written (Is. 66:14): "You shall see and your heart shall rejoice, and your bones shall flourish like a herb." Therefore good disposition of the body is necessary for Happiness.

I answer that, If we speak of that happiness which man can acquire in this life, it is evident that a well-disposed body is of necessity required for it. For this happiness consists, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) in "an operation according to perfect virtue"; and it is clear that man can be hindered, by indisposition of the body, from every operation of virtue.

But speaking of perfect Happiness, some have maintained that no disposition of body is necessary for Happiness; indeed, that it is necessary for the soul to be entirely separated from the body. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxii, 26) quotes the words of Porphyry who said that "for the soul to be happy, it must be severed from everything corporeal." But this is unreasonable. For since it is natural to the soul to be united to the body; it is not possible for the perfection of the soul to exclude its natural perfection.

Consequently, we must say that perfect disposition of the body is necessary, both antecedently and consequently, for that Happiness which is in all ways perfect. Antecedently, because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35), "if body be such, that the governance thereof is difficult and burdensome, like unto flesh which is corruptible and weighs upon the soul, the mind is turned away from that vision of the highest heaven." Whence he concludes that, "when this body will no longer be 'natural,' but 'spiritual,' then will it be equalled to the angels, and that will be its glory, which erstwhile was its burden." Consequently, because from the Happiness of the soul there will be an overflow on to the body, so that this too will obtain its perfection. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.) that "God gave the soul such a powerful nature that from its exceeding fulness of happiness the vigor of incorruption overflows into the lower nature."

Reply to Objection 1: Happiness does not consist in bodily good as its object: but bodily good can add a certain charm and perfection to Happiness.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the body has not part in that operation of the intellect whereby the Essence of God is seen, yet it might prove a hindrance thereto. Consequently, perfection of the body is necessary, lest it hinder the mind from being lifted up.

Reply to Objection 3: The perfect operation of the intellect requires indeed that the intellect be abstracted from this corruptible body which weighs upon the soul; but not from the spiritual body, which will be wholly subject to the spirit. On this point we shall treat in the Third Part of this work (2.2, Question 82, seqq.).

Articulus 6

Argumentum 1

Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod perfectio corporis non requiratur ad beatitudinem hominis perfectam.

Perfectio enim corporis est quoddam corporale bonum.

Sed supra ostensum est quod beatitudo non consistit in corporalibus bonis. Ergo ad beatitudinem hominis non requiritur aliqua perfecta dispositio corporis.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, beatitudo hominis consistit in visione divinae essentiae, ut ostensum est.

Sed ad hanc operationem nihil exhibet corpus, ut dictum est.

Ergo nulla dispositio corporis requiritur ad beatitudinem.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, quanto intellectus est magis abstractus a corpore, tanto perfectius intelligit. Sed beatitudo consistit in perfectissima operatione intellectus. Ergo oportet omnibus modis animam esse abstractam a corpore. Nullo ergo modo requiritur aliqua dispositio corporis ad beatitudinem.

Sed Contra

Sed contra, praemium virtutis est beatitudo, unde dicitur Ioan. XIII, beati eritis, si feceritis ea.

Sed sanctis repromittitur pro praemio non solum visio dei et delectatio, sed etiam corporis bona dispositio, dicitur enim Isaiae ult., videbitis, et gaudebit cor vestrum, et ossa vestra quasi herba germinabunt.

Ergo bona dispositio corporis requiritur ad beatitudinem.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, si loquamur de beatitudine hominis qualis in hac vita potest haberi, manifestum est quod ad eam ex necessitate requiritur bona dispositio corporis. Consistit enim haec beatitudo, secundum philosophum, in operatione virtutis perfectae. Manifestum est autem quod per invaletudinem corporis, in omni operatione virtutis homo impediri potest. Sed si loquamur de beatitudine perfecta, sic quidam posuerunt quod non requiritur ad beatitudinem aliqua corporis dispositio, immo requiritur ad eam ut omnino anima sit a corpore separata.

Unde Augustinus, XXII de CIV. Dei, introducit verba Porphyrii dicentis quod ad hoc quod beata sit anima, omne corpus fugiendum est.

Sed hoc est inconveniens. Cum enim naturale sit animae corpori uniri, non potest esse quod perfectio animae naturalem eius perfectionem excludat. Et ideo dicendum est quod ad beatitudinem omnibus modis perfectam, requiritur perfecta dispositio corporis et antecedenter et consequenter.

Antecedenter quidem, quia, ut Augustinus dicit XII super Gen. Ad litt., si tale sit corpus, cuius sit difficilis et gravis administratio, sicut caro quae corrumpitur et aggravat animam, avertitur mens ab illa visione summi caeli.

Unde concludit quod, cum hoc corpus iam non erit animale, sed spirituale, tunc Angelis adaequabitur, et erit ei ad gloriam, quod sarcinae fuit.

Consequenter vero, quia ex beatitudine animae fiet redundantia ad corpus, ut et ipsum sua perfectione potiatur.

Unde Augustinus dicit, in Epist. Ad dioscorum, tam potenti natura deus fecit animam, ut ex eius plenissima beatitudine redundet in inferiorem naturam incorruptionis vigor.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in corporali bono non consistit beatitudo sicut in obiecto beatitudinis, sed corporale bonum potest facere ad aliquem beatitudinis decorem vel perfectionem.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod, etsi corpus nihil conferat ad illam operationem intellectus qua dei essentia videtur, tamen posset ab hac impedire. Et ideo requiritur perfectio corporis, ut non impediat elevationem mentis.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod ad perfectam operationem intellectus requiritur quidem abstractio ab hoc corruptibili corpore, quod aggravat animam, non autem a corpore spirituali, quod erit totaliter spiritui subiectum, de quo in tertia parte huius operis dicetur.