Contra Celsum ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΝ ΕΠΙΓΕΓΡΑΜΜΕΝΟΝ ΚΕΛΣΟΥ ΑΛΗΘΗ ΛΟΓΟΝ ΩΡΙΓΕΝΟΥΣ ΤΟΜΟΙ Ηʹ
ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΝ ΕΠΙΓΕΓΡΑΜΜΕΝΟΝ ΚΕΛΣΟΥ ΑΛΗΘΗ ΛΟΓΟΝ ΩΡΙΓΕΝΟΥΣ ΤΟΜΟΣ ΠΡΩΤΟΣ
ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΝ ΕΠΙΓΕΓΡΑΜΜΕΝΟΝ ΚΕΛΣΟΥ ΑΛΗΘΗ ΛΟΓΟΝ ΩΡΙΓΕΝΟΥΣ ΤΟΜΟΣ ∆ΕΥΤΕΡΟΣ
ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΝ ΕΠΙΓΕΓΡΑΜΜΕΝΟΝ ΚΕΛΣΟΥ ΑΛΗΘΗ ΛΟΓΟΝ ΩΡΙΓΕΝΟΥΣ ΤΟΜΟΣ ΤΡΙΤΟΣ
ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΝ ΕΠΙΓΕΓΡΑΜΜΕΝΟΝ ΚΕΛΣΟΥ ΑΛΗΘΗ ΛΟΓΟΝ ΩΡΙΓΕΝΟΥΣ ΤΟΜΟΣ ΤΕΤΑΡΤΟΣ
ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΝ ΕΠΙΓΕΓΡΑΜΜΕΝΟΝ ΚΕΛΣΟΥ ΑΛΗΘΗ ΛΟΓΟΝ ΩΡΙΓΕΝΟΥΣ ΤΟΜΟΣ ΠΕΜΠΤΟΣ
ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΝ ΕΠΙΓΕΓΡΑΜΜΕΝΟΝ ΚΕΛΣΟΥ ΑΛΗΘΗ ΛΟΓΟΝ ΩΡΙΓΕΝΟΥΣ ΤΟΜΟΣ ΕΚΤΟΣ
ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΝ ΕΠΙΓΕΓΡΑΜΜΕΝΟΝ ΚΕΛΣΟΥ ΑΛΗΘΗ ΛΟΓΟΝ ΩΡΙΓΕΝΟΥΣ ΤΟΜΟΣ ΕΒ∆ΟΜΟΣ
ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΝ ΕΠΙΓΕΓΡΑΜΜΕΝΟΝ ΚΕΛΣΟΥ ΑΛΗΘΗ ΛΟΓΟΝ ΩΡΙΓΕΝΟΥΣ ΤΟΜΟΣ ΟΓ∆ΟΟΣ
Chapter LXV.
Celsus proceeds to say of God that “of Him are all things,” abandoning (in so speaking), I know not how, all his principles;1542 For αὐτοῦ Boherellus conjectures αὑτοῦ, and translates, “Propria ipse principia, quæ sunt Epicuri, subruens.” while our Paul declares, that “of Him, and through Him, and to Him are all things,”1543 Rom. xi. 36. showing that He is the beginning of the substance of all things by the words “of Him,” and the bond of their subsistence by the expression “through Him,” and their final end by the terms “to Him.” Of a truth, God is of nothing. But when Celsus adds, that “He is not to be reached by word,”1544 οὐδὲ λογῷ ἐφικτός. I make a distinction, and say that if he means the word that is in us—whether the word conceived in the mind, or the word that is uttered1545 εἴτε ἐνδιαθέτῳ εἴτε καὶ προφορικῷ.—I, too, admit that God is not to be reached by word. If, however, we attend to the passage, “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God,”1546 John i. 1. we are of opinion that God is to be reached by this Word, and is comprehended not by Him only, but by any one whatever to whom He may reveal the Father; and thus we shall prove the falsity of the assertion of Celsus, when he says, “Neither is God to be reached by word.” The statement, moreover, that “He cannot be expressed by name,” requires to be taken with a distinction. If he means, indeed, that there is no word or sign1547 οὐδὲν τῶν ἐν λέξεσι καὶ σημαινομένοις. that can represent the attributes of God, the statement is true, since there are many qualities which cannot be indicated by words. Who, for example, could describe in words the difference betwixt the quality of sweetness in a palm and that in a fig? And who could distinguish and set forth in words the peculiar qualities of each individual thing? It is no wonder, then, if in this way God cannot be described by name. But if you take the phrase to mean that it is possible to represent by words something of God’s attributes, in order to lead the hearer by the hand,1548 χειραγωγῆσαι. as it were, and so enable him to comprehend something of God, so far as attainable by human nature, then there is no absurdity in saying that “He can be described by name.” And we make a similar distinction with regard to the expression, “for He has undergone no suffering that can be conveyed by words.” It is true that the Deity is beyond all suffering. And so much on this point.
Ὁ μὲν οὖν Κέλσος περὶ θεοῦ φησιν ὅτι ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὰ πάντα, ἀπολύσας οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως τὰ πάντα αὐτοῦ· ὁ δ' ἡμέ τερος Παῦλος "Ἐξ αὐτοῦ" λέγει "καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα", παριστὰς τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς τῶν πάντων ὑποστάσεως ἐν τῷ "ἐξ αὐτοῦ" καὶ τὴν συνοχὴν ἐν τῷ "δι' αὐτοῦ" καὶ τὸ τέλος ἐν τῷ "εἰς αὐτόν". Ἀληθῶς δὲ ἐξ οὐδενὸς ὁ θεός. Ἐπεὶ δέ φησιν ὅτι οὐδὲ λόγῳ ἐφικτός, διαστέλλομαι τὸ σημαινόμενον καί φημι· εἰ μὲν λόγῳ τῷ ἐν ἡμῖν, εἴτε ἐνδιαθέτῳ εἴτε καὶ προφορικῷ, καὶ ἡμεῖς φήσομεν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐφικτὸς τῷ λόγῳ ὁ θεός· εἰ δὲ νοήσαντες τὸ "Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος" ἀποφαινόμεθα ὅτι τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ἐφικτός ἐστιν ὁ θεός, οὐ μόνῳ αὐτῷ καταλαμβα νόμενος ἀλλὰ καὶ ᾧ ἂν αὐτὸς ἀποκαλύψῃ τὸν πατέρα, ψευδοποιήσομεν τὴν Κέλσου λέξιν φάσκοντος· οὐδὲ λόγῳ ἐφικτός ἐστιν ὁ θεός. Καὶ τὸ οὐκ ὀνομαστὸς δὲ διαστολῆς δεῖται. Εἰ μὲν γάρ, ὅτι οὐδὲν τῶν ἐν λέξεσι καὶ σημαινομένοις δύναται παραστῆσαι τὰς ἰδιότητας τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ λεγόμενον, εἴ γε καὶ πολλαὶ ποιότητες οὐκ εἰσὶν ὀνομασταί. Τίς γὰρ δύναται ὀνόμασι διαφορὰν δοῦναι ποιότητος γλυκύτητος φοίνικος καὶ γλυκύτητος ἰσχάδος; Τίς δὲ ὀνόματι δύναται διαστείλασθαι καὶ παραστῆσαι τὴν ἑκάστου ἰδίαν ποιότητα; Οὐδὲν οὖν θαυμαστόν, εἰ οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως ὀνομαστὸς ὁ θεός. Εἰ δὲ τὸ ὀνομαστὸν λαμβάνεις καθὸ οἷόν τε ἐστὶν ὀνόμασι παραστῆσαί τι τῶν περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ χειραγωγῆσαι τὸν ἀκροατὴν καὶ ποιῆσαι νοῆσαι περὶ θεοῦ κατὰ τὸ ἐφικτὸν τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει τινὰ τῶν περὶ αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον λέγειν αὐτὸν ὀνομαστόν. Οὕτω δὲ διαστελούμεθα καὶ τὸ οὐδὲν γὰρ πέπονθεν ὀνόματι καταληπτόν. Ἀληθὲς δὲ καὶ τὸ ἔξω παντὸς πάθους εἶναι τὸν θεόν. Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ταύτῃ.