Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure. Because, just as whiteness and blackness are contrary species of color, so pleasure and sorrow are contrary species of the soul's passions. But whiteness and blackness are universally contrary to one another. Therefore pleasure and sorrow are so too.

Objection 2: Further, remedies are made of things contrary (to the evil). But every pleasure is a remedy for all manner of sorrow, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vii, 14). Therefore every pleasure is contrary to every sorrow.

Objection 3: Further, contraries are hindrances to one another. But every sorrow hinders any kind of pleasure: as is evident from Ethic. x, 5. Therefore every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure.

On the contrary, The same thing is not the cause of contraries. But joy for one thing, and sorrow for the opposite thing, proceed from the same habit: thus from charity it happens that we "rejoice with them that rejoice," and "weep with them that weep" (Rm. 12:15). Therefore not every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure.

I answer that, As stated in Metaph. x, 4 contrariety is a difference in respect of a form. Now a form may be generic or specific. Consequently things may be contraries in respect of a generic form, as virtue and vice; or in respect of a specific form, as justice and injustice.

Now we must observe that some things are specified by absolute forms, e.g. substances and qualities; whereas other things are specified in relation to something extrinsic, e.g. passions and movements, which derive their species from their terms or objects. Accordingly in those things that are specified by absolute forms, it happens that species contained under contrary genera are not contrary as to their specific nature: but it does not happen for them to have any affinity or fittingness to one another. For intemperance and justice, which are in the contrary genera of virtue and vice, are not contrary to one another in respect of their specific nature; and yet they have no affinity or fittingness to one another. On the other hand, in those things that are specified in relation to something extrinsic, it happens that species belonging to contrary genera, are not only not contrary to one another, but also that they have a certain mutual affinity or fittingness. The reason of this is that where there is one same relation to two contraries, there is contrariety; e.g. to approach to a white thing, and to approach to a black thing, are contraries; whereas contrary relations to contrary things, implies a certain likeness, e.g. to recede from something white, and to approach to something black. This is most evident in the case of contradiction, which is the principle of opposition: because opposition consists in affirming and denying the same thing, e.g. "white" and "non-white"; while there is fittingness and likeness in the affirmation of one contrary and the denial of the other, as, if I were to say "black" and "not white."

Now sorrow and pleasure, being passions, are specified by their objects. According to their respective genera, they are contrary to one another: since one is a kind of "pursuit," the other a kind of "avoidance," which "are to the appetite, what affirmation and denial are to the intellect" (Ethic. vi, 2). Consequently sorrow and pleasure in respect of the same object, are specifically contrary to one another: whereas sorrow and pleasure in respect of objects that are not contrary but disparate, are not specifically contrary to one another, but are also disparate; for instance, sorrow at the death of a friend, and pleasure in contemplation. If, however, those diverse objects be contrary to one another, then pleasure and sorrow are not only specifically contrary, but they also have a certain mutual fittingness and affinity: for instance to rejoice in good and to sorrow for evil.

Reply to Objection 1: Whiteness and blackness do not take their species from their relationship to something extrinsic, as pleasure and sorrow do: wherefore the comparison does not hold.

Reply to Objection 2: Genus is taken from matter, as is stated in Metaph. viii, 2; and in accidents the subject takes the place of matter. Now it has been said above that pleasure and sorrow are generically contrary to one another. Consequently in every sorrow the subject has a disposition contrary to the disposition of the subject of pleasure: because in every pleasure the appetite is viewed as accepting what it possesses, and in every sorrow, as avoiding it. And therefore on the part of the subject every pleasure is a remedy for any kind of sorrow, and every sorrow is a hindrance of all manner of pleasure: but chiefly when pleasure is opposed to sorrow specifically.

Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident. Or we may say that, although not every sorrow is specifically contrary to every pleasure, yet they are contrary to one another in regard to their effects: since one has the effect of strengthening the animal nature, while the other results in a kind of discomfort.

Articulus 4

Argumentum 1

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis tristitia omni delectationi contrarietur. Sicut enim albedo et nigredo sunt contrariae species coloris, ita delectatio et tristitia sunt contrariae species animae passionum. Sed albedo et nigredo universaliter sibi opponuntur. Ergo etiam delectatio et tristitia.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, medicinae per contraria fiunt. Sed quaelibet delectatio est medicina contra quamlibet tristitiam, ut patet per philosophum, in VII ethic..

Ergo quaelibet delectatio cuilibet tristitiae contrariatur.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, contraria sunt quae se invicem impediunt. Sed quaelibet tristitia impedit quamlibet delectationem, ut patet per illud quod dicitur X ethic..

Ergo quaelibet tristitia cuilibet delectationi contrariatur.

Sed Contra

Sed contra, contrariorum non est eadem causa. Sed ab eodem habitu procedit quod aliquis gaudeat de uno, et tristetur de opposito, ex caritate enim contingit gaudere cum gaudentibus, et flere cum flentibus, ut dicitur Rom. XII.

Ergo non omnis tristitia omni delectationi contrariatur.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in X metaphys., contrarietas est differentia secundum formam.

Forma autem est et generalis, et specialis. Unde contingit esse aliqua contraria secundum formam generis, sicut virtus et vitium; et secundum formam speciei, sicut iustitia et iniustitia. Est autem considerandum quod quaedam specificantur secundum formas absolutas, sicut substantiae et qualitates, quaedam vero specificantur per comparationem ad aliquid extra, sicut passiones et motus recipiunt speciem ex terminis sive ex obiectis. In his ergo quorum species considerantur secundum formas absolutas, contingit quidem species quae continentur sub contrariis generibus, non esse contrarias secundum rationem speciei, non tamen contingit quod habeant aliquam affinitatem vel convenientiam ad invicem. Intemperantia enim et iustitia, quae sunt in contrariis generibus, virtute scilicet et vitio, non contrariantur ad invicem secundum rationem propriae speciei, nec tamen habent aliquam affinitatem vel convenientiam ad invicem. Sed in illis quorum species sumuntur secundum habitudinem ad aliquid extrinsecum, contingit quod species contrariorum generum non solum non sunt contrariae ad invicem, sed etiam habent quandam convenientiam et affinitatem ad invicem, eo quod eodem modo se habere ad contraria, contrarietatem inducit, sicut accedere ad album et accedere ad nigrum habent rationem contrarietatis; sed contrario modo se habere ad contraria, habet rationem similitudinis, sicut recedere ab albo et accedere ad nigrum. Et hoc maxime apparet in contradictione, quae est principium oppositionis, nam in affirmatione et negatione eiusdem consistit oppositio, sicut album et non album; in affirmatione autem unius oppositorum et negatione alterius, attenditur convenientia et similitudo, ut si dicam nigrum et non album. Tristitia autem et delectatio, cum sint passiones, specificantur ex obiectis. Et quidem secundum genus suum, contrarietatem habent, nam unum pertinet ad prosecutionem, aliud vero ad fugam, quae se habent in appetitu sicut affirmatio et negatio in ratione, ut dicitur in VI ethic..

Et ideo tristia et delectatio quae sunt de eodem, habent oppositionem ad invicem secundum speciem. Tristitia vero et delectatio de diversis, si quidem illa diversa non sint opposita, sed disparata, non habent oppositionem ad invicem secundum rationem speciei, sed sunt etiam disparatae, sicut tristari de morte amici, et delectari in contemplatione. Si vero illa diversa sint contraria, tunc delectatio et tristitia non solum non habent contrarietatem secundum rationem speciei, sed etiam habent convenientiam et affinitatem, sicut gaudere de bono, et tristari de malo.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod albedo et nigredo non habent speciem ex habitudine ad aliquid exterius, sicut delectatio et tristitia. Unde non est eadem ratio.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod genus sumitur ex materia, ut patet in VIII metaphys..

In accidentibus autem loco materiae est subiectum.

Dictum est autem quod delectatio et tristitia contrariantur secundum genus. Et ideo in qualibet tristitia est contraria dispositio subiecti dispositioni quae est in qualibet delectatione, nam in qualibet delectatione appetitus se habet ut acceptans id quod habet; in qualibet autem tristitia se habet ut fugiens. Et ideo ex parte subiecti quaelibet delectatio est medicina contra quamlibet tristitiam, et quaelibet tristitia est impeditiva cuiuslibet delectationis, praecipue tamen quando delectatio tristitiae contrariatur etiam secundum speciem.

Ad 3

Unde patet solutio ad tertium. Vel aliter dicendum quod, etsi non omnis tristitia contrarietur omni delectationi secundum speciem, tamen quantum ad effectum contrariantur, nam ex uno confortatur natura animalis, ex alio vero quodammodo molestatur.