Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow cannot be a useful good. For it is written (Ecclus. 30:25): "Sadness hath killed many, and there is no profit in it."

Objection 2: Further, choice is of that which is useful to an end. But sorrow is not an object of choice; in fact, "a thing without sorrow is to be chosen rather than the same thing with sorrow" (Topic. iii, 2). Therefore sorrow is not a useful good.

Objection 3: Further, "Everything is for the sake of its own operation," as stated in De Coel. ii, 3. But "sorrow hinders operation," as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore sorrow is not a useful good.

On the contrary, The wise man seeks only that which is useful. But according to Eccles. 7:5, "the heart of the wise is where there is mourning, and the heart of fools where there is mirth." Therefore sorrow is useful.

I answer that, A twofold movement of the appetite ensues from a present evil. One is that whereby the appetite is opposed to the present evil; and, in this respect, sorrow is of no use; because that which is present, cannot be not present. The other movement arises in the appetite to the effect of avoiding or expelling the saddening evil: and, in this respect, sorrow is of use, if it be for something which ought to be avoided. Because there are two reasons for which it may be right to avoid a thing. First, because it should be avoided in itself, on account of its being contrary to good; for instance, sin. Wherefore sorrow for sin is useful as inducing a man to avoid sin: hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:9): "I am glad: not because you were made sorrowful, but because you were made sorrowful unto penance." Secondly, a thing is to be avoided, not as though it were evil in itself, but because it is an occasion of evil; either through one's being attached to it, and loving it too much, or through one's being thrown headlong thereby into an evil, as is evident in the case of temporal goods. And, in this respect, sorrow for temporal goods may be useful; according to Eccles. 7:3: "It is better to go to the house of mourning, than to the house of feasting: for in that we are put in mind of the end of all."

Moreover, sorrow for that which ought to be avoided is always useful, since it adds another motive for avoiding it. Because the very evil is in itself a thing to be avoided: while everyone avoids sorrow for its own sake, just as everyone seeks the good, and pleasure in the good. Therefore just as pleasure in the good makes one seek the good more earnestly, so sorrow for evil makes one avoid evil more eagerly.

Reply to Objection 1: This passage is to be taken as referring to excessive sorrow, which consumes the soul: for such sorrow paralyzes the soul, and hinders it from shunning evil, as stated above (Question 37, Article 2).

Reply to Objection 2: Just as any object of choice becomes less eligible by reason of sorrow, so that which ought to be shunned is still more to be shunned by reason of sorrow: and, in this respect, sorrow is useful.

Reply to Objection 3: Sorrow caused by an action hinders that action: but sorrow for the cessation of an action, makes one do it more earnestly.

Articulus 3

Argumentum 1

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod tristitia non possit esse bonum utile.

Dicitur enim Eccli. XXX, multos occidit tristitia, et non est utilitas in illa.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, electio est de eo quod est utile ad finem aliquem.

Sed tristitia non est eligibilis, quinimmo idem sine tristitia, quam cum tristitia, est magis eligendum, ut dicitur in III topic..

Ergo tristitia non est bonum utile.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, omnis res est propter suam operationem, ut dicitur in II de coelo.

Sed tristitia impedit operationem, ut dicitur in X ethic..

Ergo tristitia non habet rationem boni utilis.

Sed Contra

Sed contra, sapiens non quaerit nisi utilia. Sed sicut dicitur Eccle. VII, cor sapientum ubi tristitia, et cor stultorum ubi laetitia.

Ergo tristitia est utilis.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod ex malo praesenti insurgit duplex appetitivus motus. Unus quidem est quo appetitus contrariatur malo praesenti. Et ex ista parte tristitia non habet utilitatem, quia id quod est praesens, non potest non esse praesens.

Secundus motus consurgit in appetitu ad fugiendum vel repellendum malum contristans. Et quantum ad hoc, tristitia habet utilitatem, si sit de aliquo quod est fugiendum. Est enim aliquid fugiendum dupliciter. Uno modo, propter seipsum, ex contrarietate quam habet ad bonum; sicut peccatum. Et ideo tristitia de peccato utilis est ad hoc quod homo fugiat peccatum, sicut apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. VII, gaudeo, non quia contristati estis, sed quia contristati estis ad poenitentiam.

Alio modo est aliquid fugiendum, non quia sit secundum se malum, sed quia est occasio mali; dum vel homo nimis inhaeret ei per amorem, vel etiam ex hoc praecipitatur in aliquod malum, sicut patet in bonis temporalibus. Et secundum hoc, tristitia de bonis temporalibus potest esse utilis, sicut dicitur Eccle. VII, melius est ire ad domum luctus quam ad domum convivii, in illa enim finis cunctorum admonetur hominum.

Ideo autem tristitia in omni fugiendo est utilis, quia geminatur fugiendi causa. Nam ipsum malum secundum se fugiendum est, ipsam autem tristitiam secundum se omnes fugiunt, sicut etiam bonum omnes appetunt, et delectationem de bono. Sicut ergo delectatio de bono facit ut bonum avidius quaeratur, ita tristitia de malo facit ut malum vehementius fugiatur.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa intelligitur de immoderata tristitia, quae animum absorbet.

Huiusmodi enim tristitia immobilitat animum, et impedit fugam mali, ut supra dictum est.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut quodlibet eligibile fit minus eligibile propter tristitiam, ita quodlibet fugiendum redditur magis fugiendum propter tristitiam.

Et quantum ad hoc, tristitia est utilis.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod tristitia de operatione aliqua, impedit operationem, sed tristitia de cessatione operationis, facit avidius operari.