Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that unwonted and sudden things are not especially feared. Because, as hope is about good things, so fear is about evil things. But experience conduces to the increase of hope in good things. Therefore it also adds to fear in evil things.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those are feared most, not who are quick-tempered, but who are gentle and cunning." Now it is clear that those who are quick-tempered are more subject to sudden emotions. Therefore sudden things are less to be feared.

Objection 3: Further, we think less about things that happen suddenly. But the more we think about a thing, the more we fear it; hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "some appear to be courageous through ignorance, but as soon as they discover that the case is different from what they expected, they run away." Therefore sudden things are feared less.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6): "Fear is startled at things unwonted and sudden, which endanger things beloved, and takes forethought for their safety."

I answer that, As stated about (Article 3; Question 41, Article 2), the object of fear is an imminent evil, which can be repelled, but with difficulty. Now this is due to one of two causes: to the greatness of the evil, or to the weakness of him that fears; while unwontedness and suddenness conduce to both of these causes. First, it helps an imminent evil to seem greater. Because all material things, whether good or evil, the more we consider them, the smaller they seem. Consequently, just as sorrow for a present evil is mitigated in course of time, as Cicero states (De Quaest. Tusc. iii, 30); so, too, fear of a future evil is diminished by thinking about it beforehand. Secondly, unwontedness and suddenness increase the weakness of him that fears, in so far as they deprive him of the remedies with which he might otherwise provide himself to forestall the coming evil, were it not for the evil taking him by surprise.

Reply to Objection 1: The object of hope is a good that is possible to obtain. Consequently whatever increases a man's power, is of a nature to increase hope, and, for the same reason, to diminish fear, since fear is about an evil which cannot be easily repelled. Since, therefore, experience increases a man's power of action, therefore, as it increases hope, so does it diminish fear.

Reply to Objection 2: Those who are quick-tempered do not hide their anger; wherefore the harm they do others is not so sudden, as not to be foreseen. On the other hand, those who are gentle or cunning hide their anger; wherefore the harm which may be impending from them, cannot be foreseen, but takes one by surprise. For this reason the Philosopher says that such men are feared more than others.

Reply to Objection 3: Bodily good or evil, considered in itself, seems greater at first. The reason for this is that a thing is more obvious when seen in juxtaposition with its contrary. Hence, when a man passes unexpectedly from penury to wealth, he thinks more of his wealth on account of his previous poverty: while, on the other hand, the rich man who suddenly becomes poor, finds poverty all the more disagreeable. For this reason sudden evil is feared more, because it seems more to be evil. However, it may happen through some accident that the greatness of some evil is hidden; for instance if the foe hides himself in ambush: and then it is true that evil inspires greater fear through being much thought about.

Articulus 5

Argumentum 1

Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod insolita et repentina non sint magis terribilia. Sicut enim spes est de bono, ita timor est de malo. Sed experientia facit ad augmentum spei in bonis. Ergo etiam facit ad augmentum timoris in malis.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in II rhetoric., quod magis timentur non qui acutae sunt irae, sed mites et astuti.

Constat autem quod illi qui acutae irae sunt, magis habent subitos motus. Ergo ea quae sunt subita, sunt minus terribilia.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, quae sunt subita, minus considerari possunt.

Sed tanto aliqua magis timentur, quanto magis considerantur, unde philosophus dicit, in III ethic., quod aliqui videntur fortes propter ignorantiam, qui, si cognoverint quod aliud sit quam suspicantur, fugiunt.

Ergo repentina minus timentur.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in II confess., timor insolita et repentina exhorrescit, rebus quae amantur adversantia, dum praecavet securitati.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, obiectum timoris est malum imminens quod non de facili repelli potest. Hoc autem ex duobus contingit, scilicet ex magnitudine mali, et ex debilitate timentis. Ad utrumque autem horum operatur quod aliquid sit insolitum et repentinum.

Primo quidem, facit ad hoc quod malum imminens maius appareat.

Omnia enim corporalia, et bona et mala, quanto magis considerantur, minora apparent. Et ideo, sicut propter diuturnitatem dolor praesentis mali mitigatur, ut patet per tullium in III de tusculanis quaest.; ita etiam ex praemeditatione minuitur timor futuri mali. Secundo, aliquid esse insolitum et repentinum facit ad debilitatem timentis, inquantum subtrahit remedia quae homo potest praeparare ad repellendum futurum malum, quae esse non possunt quando ex improviso malum occurrit.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectum spei est bonum quod quis potest adipisci. Et ideo ea quae augmentant potestatem hominis, nata sunt augere spem, et eadem ratione, diminuere timorem, quia timor est de malo cui non de facili potest resisti. Quia igitur experientia facit hominem magis potentem ad operandum, ideo, sicut auget spem, ita diminuit timorem.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod illi qui habent iram acutam, non occultant eam, et ideo nocumenta ab eis illata non ita sunt repentina, quin praevideantur. Sed homines mites et astuti occultant iram, et ideo nocumentum quod ab eis imminet, non potest praevideri, sed ex improviso advenit.

Et propter hoc philosophus dicit quod tales magis timentur.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod, per se loquendo, bona vel mala corporalia in principio maiora apparent. Cuius ratio est, quia unumquodque magis apparet, contrario iuxta se posito. Unde cum aliquis statim a paupertate ad divitias transit, propter paupertatem praeexistentem divitias magis aestimat, et e contrario divites statim ad paupertatem devenientes, eam magis horrent. Et propter hoc, malum repentinum magis timetur, quia magis videtur esse malum. Sed potest propter aliquod accidens contingere quod magnitudo alicuius mali lateat, puta cum hostes se insidiose occultant. Et tunc verum est quod malum ex diligenti consideratione fit terribilius.