Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that every virtue is a moral virtue. Because moral virtue is so called from the Latin "mos," i.e. custom. Now, we can accustom ourselves to the acts of all the virtues. Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that moral virtue is "a habit of choosing the rational mean." But every virtue is a habit of choosing: since the acts of any virtue can be done from choice. And, moreover, every virtue consists in following the rational mean in some way, as we shall explain further on (Question 64, Articles 1,2,3). Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue.

Objection 3: Further, Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "virtue is a habit like a second nature, in accord with reason." But since every human virtue is directed to man's good, it must be in accord with reason: since man's good "consists in that which agrees with his reason," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13): "When we speak of a man's morals, we do not say that he is wise or intelligent, but that he is gentle or sober." Accordingly, then, wisdom and understanding are not moral virtues: and yet they are virtues, as stated above (Question 57, Article 2). Therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue.

I answer that, In order to answer this question clearly, we must consider the meaning of the Latin word "mos"; for thus we shall be able to discover what a "moral" virtue is. Now "mos" has a twofold meaning. For sometimes it means custom, in which sense we read (Acts 15:1): "Except you be circumcised after the manner (morem) of Moses, you cannot be saved." Sometimes it means a natural or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action, in which sense the word is applied to dumb animals. Thus we read (2 Macc. 1:2) that "rushing violently upon the enemy, like lions , they slew them": and the word is used in the same sense in Ps. 67:7, where we read: "Who maketh men of one manner to dwell in a house." For both these significations there is but one word in Latin; but in the Greek there is a distinct word for each, for the word "ethos" is written sometimes with a long, and sometimes a short "e".

Now "moral" virtue is so called from "mos" in the sense of a natural or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action. And the other meaning of "mos," i.e. "custom," is akin to this: because custom becomes a second nature, and produces an inclination similar to a natural one. But it is evident that inclination to an action belongs properly to the appetitive power, whose function it is to move all the powers to their acts, as explained above (Question 9, Article 1). Therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue, but only those that are in the appetitive faculty.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes "mos" in the sense of "custom."

Reply to Objection 2: Every act of virtue can be done from choice: but no virtue makes us choose aright, save that which is in the appetitive part of the soul: for it has been stated above that choice is an act of the appetitive faculty (Question 13, Article 1). Wherefore a habit of choosing, i.e. a habit which is the principle whereby we choose, is that habit alone which perfects the appetitive faculty: although the acts of other habits also may be a matter of choice.

Reply to Objection 3: "Nature is the principle of movement" (Phys. ii, text. 3). Now to move the faculties to act is the proper function of the appetitive power. Consequently to become as a second nature by consenting to the reason, is proper to those virtues which are in the appetitive faculty.

Articulus 1

Argumentum 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis virtus sit moralis.

Virtus enim moralis dicitur a more, idest consuetudine.

Sed omnium virtutum actus consuescere possumus.

Ergo omnis virtus est moralis.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in II ethic., quod virtus moralis est habitus electivus in medietate rationis consistens.

Sed omnis virtus videtur esse habitus electivus, quia actus cuiuslibet virtutis possumus ex electione facere. Omnis etiam virtus aliqualiter in medio rationis consistit, ut infra patebit.

Ergo omnis virtus est moralis.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, tullius dicit, in sua rhetorica, quod virtus est habitus in modum naturae, rationi consentaneus.

Sed cum omnis virtus humana ordinetur ad bonum hominis, oportet quod sit consentanea rationi, cum bonum hominis sit secundum rationem esse, ut dionysius dicit.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in I ethic., dicentes de moribus, non dicimus quoniam sapiens vel intelligens; sed quoniam mitis vel sobrius.

Sic igitur sapientia et intellectus non sunt morales.

Quae tamen sunt virtutes, sicut supra dictum est.

Non ergo omnis virtus est moralis.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod ad huius evidentiam, considerare oportet quid sit mos, sic enim scire poterimus quid sit moralis virtus.

Mos autem duo significat. Quandoque enim significat consuetudinem, sicut dicitur Act. XV, nisi circumcidamini secundum morem Moysi, non poteritis salvi fieri.

Quandoque vero significat inclinationem quandam naturalem, vel quasi naturalem, ad aliquid agendum, unde etiam et brutorum animalium dicuntur aliqui mores; unde dicitur II machab. XI, quod leonum more irruentes in hostes, prostraverunt eos.

Et sic accipitur mos in Psalmo LXVII, ubi dicitur, qui habitare facit unius moris in domo.

Et hae quidem duae significationes in nullo distinguuntur, apud Latinos, quantum ad vocem. In Graeco autem distinguuntur, nam ethos, quod apud nos morem significat, quandoque habet primam longam, et scribitur per eta, Graecam litteram; quandoque habet primam correptam, et scribitur per epsilon.

Dicitur autem virtus moralis a more, secundum quod mos significat quandam inclinationem naturalem, vel quasi naturalem, ad aliquid agendum. Et huic significationi moris propinqua est alia significatio, qua significat consuetudinem, nam consuetudo quodammodo vertitur in naturam, et facit inclinationem similem naturali. Manifestum est autem quod inclinatio ad actum proprie convenit appetitivae virtuti, cuius est movere omnes potentias ad agendum, ut ex supradictis patet.

Et ideo non omnis virtus dicitur moralis, sed solum illa quae est in VI appetitiva.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de more, secundum quod significat consuetudinem.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod omnis actus virtutis potest ex electione agi, sed electionem rectam agit sola virtus quae est in appetitiva parte animae, dictum est enim supra quod eligere est actus appetitivae partis.

Unde habitus electivus, qui scilicet est electionis principium, est solum ille qui perficit vim appetitivam, quamvis etiam aliorum habituum actus sub electione cadere possint.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod natura est principium motus, sicut dicitur in II physic..

Movere autem ad agendum proprium est appetitivae partis. Et ideo assimilari naturae in consentiendo rationi, est proprium virtutum quae sunt in VI appetitiva.