Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that virtue is not adequately divided into moral and intellectual. For prudence seems to be a mean between moral and intellectual virtue, since it is reckoned among the intellectual virtues (Ethic. vi, 3,5); and again is placed by all among the four cardinal virtues, which are moral virtues, as we shall show further on (Question 61, Article 1). Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral, as though there were no mean between them.

Objection 2: Further, contingency, perseverance, and patience are not reckoned to be intellectual virtues. Yet neither are they moral virtues; since they do not reduce the passions to a mean, and are consistent with an abundance of passion. Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral.

Objection 3: Further, faith, hope, and charity are virtues. Yet they are not intellectual virtues: for there are only five of these, viz. science, wisdom, understanding, prudence, and art, as stated above (Question 57, Articles 2,3,5). Neither are they moral virtues; since they are not about the passions, which are the chief concern of moral virtue. Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "virtue is twofold, intellectual and moral."

I answer that, Human virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good deeds. Now, in man there are but two principles of human actions, viz. the intellect or reason and the appetite: for these are the two principles of movement in man as stated in De Anima iii, text. 48. Consequently every human virtue must needs be a perfection of one of these principles. Accordingly if it perfects man's speculative or practical intellect in order that his deed may be good, it will be an intellectual virtue: whereas if it perfects his appetite, it will be a moral virtue. It follows therefore that every human virtue is either intellectual or moral.

Reply to Objection 1: Prudence is essentially an intellectual virtue. But considered on the part of its matter, it has something in common with the moral virtues: for it is right reason about things to be done, as stated above (Question 57, Article 4). It is in this sense that it is reckoned with the moral virtues.

Reply to Objection 2: Contingency and perseverance are not perfections of the sensitive appetite. This is clear from the fact that passions abound in the continent and persevering man, which would not be the case if his sensitive appetite were perfected by a habit making it conformable to reason. Contingency and perseverance are, however, perfections of the rational faculty, and withstand the passions lest reason be led astray. But they fall short of being virtues: since intellectual virtue, which makes reason to hold itself well in respect of moral matters, presupposes a right appetite of the end, so that it may hold itself aright in respect of principles, i.e. the ends, on which it builds its argument: and this is wanting in the continent and persevering man. Nor again can an action proceeding from two principles be perfect, unless each principle be perfected by the habit corresponding to that operation: thus, however perfect be the principal agent employing an instrument, it will produce an imperfect effect, if the instrument be not well disposed also. Hence if the sensitive faculty, which is moved by the rational faculty, is not perfect; however perfect the rational faculty may be, the resulting action will be imperfect: and consequently the principle of that action will not be a virtue. And for this reason, contingency, desisting from pleasures, and perseverance in the midst of pains, are not virtues, but something less than a virtue, as the Philosopher maintains (Ethic. vii, 1,9).

Reply to Objection 3: Faith, hope, and charity are superhuman virtues: for they are virtues of man as sharing in the grace of God.

Articulus 3

Argumentum 1

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus humana non sufficienter dividatur per virtutem moralem et intellectualem.

Prudentia enim videtur esse aliquid medium inter virtutem moralem et intellectualem, connumeratur enim virtutibus intellectualibus in VI ethic.; et etiam ab omnibus communiter connumeratur inter quatuor virtutes cardinales, quae sunt morales, ut infra patebit.

Non ergo sufficienter dividitur virtus per intellectualem et moralem, sicut per immediata.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, continentia et perseverantia, et etiam patientia, non computantur inter virtutes intellectuales. Nec etiam sunt virtutes morales, quia non tenent medium in passionibus, sed abundant in eis passiones. Non ergo sufficienter dividitur virtus per intellectuales et morales.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, fides, spes et caritas quaedam virtutes sunt. Non tamen sunt virtutes intellectuales, hae enim solum sunt quinque, scilicet scientia, sapientia, intellectus, prudentia et ars, ut dictum est.

Nec etiam sunt virtutes morales, quia non sunt circa passiones, circa quas maxime est moralis virtus. Ergo virtus non sufficienter dividitur per intellectuales et morales.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in II ethic., duplicem esse virtutem, hanc quidem intellectualem, illam autem moralem.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod virtus humana est quidam habitus perficiens hominem ad bene operandum. Principium autem humanorum actuum in homine non est nisi duplex, scilicet intellectus sive ratio, et appetitus, haec enim sunt duo moventia in homine, ut dicitur in III de anima.

Unde omnis virtus humana oportet quod sit perfectiva alicuius istorum principiorum.

Si quidem igitur sit perfectiva intellectus speculativi vel practici ad bonum hominis actum, erit virtus intellectualis, si autem sit perfectiva appetitivae partis, erit virtus moralis. Unde relinquitur quod omnis virtus humana vel est intellectualis vel moralis.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod prudentia, secundum essentiam suam, est intellectualis virtus. Sed secundum materiam, convenit cum virtutibus moralibus, est enim recta ratio agibilium, ut supra dictum est.

Et secundum hoc, virtutibus moralibus connumeratur.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod continentia et perseverantia non sunt perfectiones appetitivae virtutis sensitivae. Quod ex hoc patet, quod in continente et perseverante superabundant inordinatae passiones, quod non esset, si appetitus sensitivus esset perfectus aliquo habitu conformante ipsum rationi. Est autem continentia, seu perseverantia, perfectio rationalis partis, quae se tenet contra passiones ne deducatur. Deficit tamen a ratione virtutis, quia virtus intellectiva quae facit rationem se bene habere circa moralia, praesupponit appetitum rectum finis, ut recte se habeat circa principia, idest fines, ex quibus ratiocinatur; quod continenti et perseveranti deest. Neque etiam potest esse perfecta operatio quae a duabus potentiis procedit, nisi utraque potentia perficiatur per debitum habitum, sicut non sequitur perfecta actio alicuius agentis per instrumentum, si instrumentum non sit bene dispositum, quantumcumque principale agens sit perfectum. Unde si appetitus sensitivus, quem movet rationalis pars, non sit perfectus; quantumcumque rationalis pars sit perfecta, actio consequens non erit perfecta. Unde nec principium actionis erit virtus. Et propter hoc, continentia a delectationibus, et perseverantia a tristitiis, non sunt virtutes, sed aliquid minus virtute, ut philosophus dicit, in VII ethic..

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod fides, spes et caritas sunt supra virtutes humanas, sunt enim virtutes hominis prout est factus particeps divinae gratiae.