Contra Celsum ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΝ ΕΠΙΓΕΓΡΑΜΜΕΝΟΝ ΚΕΛΣΟΥ ΑΛΗΘΗ ΛΟΓΟΝ ΩΡΙΓΕΝΟΥΣ ΤΟΜΟΙ Ηʹ
ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΝ ΕΠΙΓΕΓΡΑΜΜΕΝΟΝ ΚΕΛΣΟΥ ΑΛΗΘΗ ΛΟΓΟΝ ΩΡΙΓΕΝΟΥΣ ΤΟΜΟΣ ΠΡΩΤΟΣ
ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΝ ΕΠΙΓΕΓΡΑΜΜΕΝΟΝ ΚΕΛΣΟΥ ΑΛΗΘΗ ΛΟΓΟΝ ΩΡΙΓΕΝΟΥΣ ΤΟΜΟΣ ∆ΕΥΤΕΡΟΣ
ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΝ ΕΠΙΓΕΓΡΑΜΜΕΝΟΝ ΚΕΛΣΟΥ ΑΛΗΘΗ ΛΟΓΟΝ ΩΡΙΓΕΝΟΥΣ ΤΟΜΟΣ ΤΡΙΤΟΣ
ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΝ ΕΠΙΓΕΓΡΑΜΜΕΝΟΝ ΚΕΛΣΟΥ ΑΛΗΘΗ ΛΟΓΟΝ ΩΡΙΓΕΝΟΥΣ ΤΟΜΟΣ ΤΕΤΑΡΤΟΣ
ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΝ ΕΠΙΓΕΓΡΑΜΜΕΝΟΝ ΚΕΛΣΟΥ ΑΛΗΘΗ ΛΟΓΟΝ ΩΡΙΓΕΝΟΥΣ ΤΟΜΟΣ ΠΕΜΠΤΟΣ
ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΝ ΕΠΙΓΕΓΡΑΜΜΕΝΟΝ ΚΕΛΣΟΥ ΑΛΗΘΗ ΛΟΓΟΝ ΩΡΙΓΕΝΟΥΣ ΤΟΜΟΣ ΕΚΤΟΣ
ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΝ ΕΠΙΓΕΓΡΑΜΜΕΝΟΝ ΚΕΛΣΟΥ ΑΛΗΘΗ ΛΟΓΟΝ ΩΡΙΓΕΝΟΥΣ ΤΟΜΟΣ ΕΒ∆ΟΜΟΣ
ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΝ ΕΠΙΓΕΓΡΑΜΜΕΝΟΝ ΚΕΛΣΟΥ ΑΛΗΘΗ ΛΟΓΟΝ ΩΡΙΓΕΝΟΥΣ ΤΟΜΟΣ ΟΓ∆ΟΟΣ
Chapter LVIII.
Let us now consider what follows. “They have also,” says he, “a precept to this effect, that we ought not to avenge ourselves on one who injures us, or, as he expresses it, ‘Whosoever shall strike thee on the one cheek, turn to him the other also.’ This is an ancient saying, which had been admirably expressed long before, and which they have only reported in a coarser way. For Plato introduces Socrates conversing with Crito as follows: ‘Must we never do injustice to any?’ ‘Certainly not.’ ‘And since we must never do injustice, must we not return injustice for an injustice that has been done to us, as most people think?’ ‘It seems to me that we should not.’ ‘But tell me, Crito, may we do evil to any one or not?’ ‘Certainly not, O Socrates.’ ‘Well, is it just, as is commonly said, for one who has suffered wrong to do wrong in return, or is it unjust?’ ‘It is unjust. Yes; for to do harm to a man is the same as to do him injustice.’ ‘You speak truly. We must then not do injustice in return for injustice, nor must we do evil to any one, whatever evil we may have suffered from him.’ Thus Plato speaks; and he adds, ‘Consider, then, whether you are at one with me, and whether, starting from this principle, we may not come to the conclusion that it is never right to do injustice, even in return for an injustice which has been received; or whether, on the other hand, you differ from me, and do not admit the principle from which we started. That has always been my opinion, and is so still.’1750 Plato’s Crito, p. 49. Such are the sentiments of Plato, and indeed they were held by divine men before his time. But let this suffice as one example of the way in which this and other truths have been borrowed and corrupted. Any one who wishes can easily by searching find more of them.”
Μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ ἴδωμεν καὶ τὴν ἑξῆς αὐτοῦ λέξιν οὕτως ἔχουσαν· Ἔστιν αὐτοῖς καὶ τοιόνδε παράγγελμα, τὸν ὑβρίζοντα μὴ ἀμύνεσθαι· κἂν τύπτῃ, φησί, τὴν ἑτέραν γνάθον, σὺ δὲ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πάρεχε· Ἀρχαῖον καὶ τοῦτο, εὖ μάλα πρόσθεν εἰρημένον, ἀγροικότερον δ' αὐτὸ ἀπεμνη μόνευσαν. Ἐπεὶ καὶ Πλάτωνι πεποίηται Σωκράτης Κρίτωνι διαλεγόμενος τάδε· "Οὐδαμῶς ἄρα δεῖ ἀδικεῖν. Οὐ δῆτα. Οὐδ' ἀδικούμενον ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται, ἐπειδή γε οὐδαμῶς δεῖ ἀδικεῖν. Οὐ φαίνεται. Τί δὲ δή; Κακουργεῖν δεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων, ἢ οὔ; Οὐ δεῖ δή που, ὦ Σώκρα τες. Τί δέ; Ἀντικακουργεῖν καὶ κακῶς πάσχοντα, ὡς οἱ πολλοί φασι, δίκαιον ἢ οὐ δίκαιον; Οὐδαμῶς. Τὸ γάρ που κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲν διαφέρει. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Οὔτε ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν δεῖ οὐδὲ κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδ' ἂν ὁτιοῦν πάσχῃ παρ' αὐτῶν." Ταῦτά φησιν ὁ Πλάτων καὶ αὖθις τάδε· "Σκόπει οὖν δὴ καὶ σὺ εὖ μάλα, πότερον κοινωνεῖς καὶ συνδοκεῖ σοι, καὶ ἀρχόμεθα ἐντεῦθεν βουλευόμενοι, ὡς οὐδέποτε ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος οὔτε τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὔτε τοῦ ἀνταδικεῖν οὔτε κακῶς πάσχοντα ἀμύνεσθαι ἀντιδρῶντα κακῶς· ἢ ἀφίστασαι καὶ οὐ κοινωνεῖς τῆς ἀρχῆς; Ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάλαι οὕτως καὶ νῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ." Πλάτωνι μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἤρεσεν, ἦν δὲ καὶ πρόσθεν ἔτι θείοις ἀνδράσι δεδογμένα. Ἀλλὰ τῶνδε μὲν πέρι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσα παραφθείρουσιν, ἀρκείτω τὰ εἰρημένα· καὶ ὅτῳ φίλον ἐπὶ πλεῖόν τι αὐτῶν ζητεῖν, εἴσεται.