Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not any theological virtues. For according to Phys. vii, text. 17, "virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best: and by perfect, I mean that which is disposed according to nature." But that which is Divine is above man's nature. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of a man.

Objection 2: Further, theological virtues are quasi-Divine virtues. But the Divine virtues are exemplars, as stated above (Question 61, Article 5), which are not in us but in God. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of man.

Objection 3: Further, the theological virtues are so called because they direct us to God, Who is the first beginning and last end of all things. But by the very nature of his reason and will, man is directed to his first beginning and last end. Therefore there is no need for any habits of theological virtue, to direct the reason and will to God.

On the contrary, The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. Now the Divine Law contains precepts about the acts of faith, hope, and charity: for it is written (Ecclus. 2:8, seqq.): "Ye that fear the Lord believe Him," and again, "hope in Him," and again, "love Him." Therefore faith, hope, and charity are virtues directing us to God. Therefore they are theological virtues.

I answer that, Man is perfected by virtue, for those actions whereby he is directed to happiness, as was explained above (Question 5, Article 7). Now man's happiness is twofold, as was also stated above (Question 5, Article 5). One is proportionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit, which man can obtain by means of his natural principles. The other is a happiness surpassing man's nature, and which man can obtain by the power of God alone, by a kind of participation of the Godhead, about which it is written (2 Pt. 1:4) that by Christ we are made "partakers of the Divine nature." And because such happiness surpasses the capacity of human nature, man's natural principles which enable him to act well according to his capacity, do not suffice to direct man to this same happiness. Hence it is necessary for man to receive from God some additional principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness, even as he is directed to his connatural end, by means of his natural principles, albeit not without Divine assistance. Such like principles are called "theological virtues": first, because their object is God, inasmuch as they direct us aright to God: secondly, because they are infused in us by God alone: thirdly, because these virtues are not made known to us, save by Divine revelation, contained in Holy Writ.

Reply to Objection 1: A certain nature may be ascribed to a certain thing in two ways. First, essentially: and thus these theological virtues surpass the nature of man. Secondly, by participation, as kindled wood partakes of the nature of fire: and thus, after a fashion, man becomes a partaker of the Divine Nature, as stated above: so that these virtues are proportionate to man in respect of the Nature of which he is made a partaker.

Reply to Objection 2: These virtues are called Divine, not as though God were virtuous by reason of them, but because of them God makes us virtuous, and directs us to Himself. Hence they are not exemplar but exemplate virtues.

Reply to Objection 3: The reason and will are naturally directed to God, inasmuch as He is the beginning and end of nature, but in proportion to nature. But the reason and will, according to their nature, are not sufficiently directed to Him in so far as He is the object of supernatural happiness.

Articulus 1

Argumentum 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sint aliquae virtutes theologicae.

Ut enim dicitur in VII physic., virtus est dispositio perfecti ad optimum, dico autem perfectum, quod est dispositum secundum naturam.

Sed id quod est divinum, est supra naturam hominis.

Ergo virtutes theologicae non sunt virtutes hominis.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, virtutes theologicae dicuntur quasi virtutes divinae.

Sed virtutes divinae sunt exemplares, ut dictum est, quae quidem non sunt in nobis, sed in deo.

Ergo virtutes theologicae non sunt virtutes hominis.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, virtutes theologicae dicuntur quibus ordinamur in deum, qui est primum principium et ultimus finis rerum.

Sed homo ex ipsa natura rationis et voluntatis, habet ordinem ad primum principium et ultimum finem. Non ergo requiruntur aliqui habitus virtutum theologicarum, quibus ratio et voluntas ordinetur in deum.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod praecepta legis sunt de actibus virtutum.

Sed de actibus fidei, spei et caritatis dantur praecepta in lege divina, dicitur enim Eccli. II, qui timetis deum, credite illi; item, sperate in illum; item, diligite illum.

Ergo fides, spes et caritas sunt virtutes in deum ordinantes.

Sunt ergo theologicae.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod per virtutem perficitur homo ad actus quibus in beatitudinem ordinatur, ut ex supradictis patet.

Est autem duplex hominis beatitudo sive felicitas, ut supra dictum est.

Una quidem proportionata humanae naturae, ad quam scilicet homo pervenire potest per principia suae naturae. Alia autem est beatitudo naturam hominis excedens, ad quam homo sola divina virtute pervenire potest, secundum quandam divinitatis participationem; secundum quod dicitur II Petr. I, quod per christum facti sumus consortes divinae naturae.

Et quia huiusmodi beatitudo proportionem humanae naturae excedit, principia naturalia hominis, ex quibus procedit ad bene agendum secundum suam proportionem, non sufficiunt ad ordinandum hominem in beatitudinem praedictam. Unde oportet quod superaddantur homini divinitus aliqua principia, per quae ita ordinetur ad beatitudinem supernaturalem, sicut per principia naturalia ordinatur ad finem connaturalem, non tamen absque adiutorio divino. Et huiusmodi principia virtutes dicuntur theologicae, tum quia habent deum pro obiecto, inquantum per eas recte ordinamur in deum; tum quia a solo deo nobis infunduntur; tum quia sola divina revelatione, in sacra Scriptura, huiusmodi virtutes traduntur.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliqua natura potest attribui alicui rei dupliciter. Uno modo, essentialiter, et sic huiusmodi virtutes theologicae excedunt hominis naturam.

Alio modo, participative, sicut lignum ignitum participat naturam ignis, et sic quodammodo fit homo particeps divinae naturae, ut dictum est.

Et sic istae virtutes conveniunt homini secundum naturam participatam.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod istae virtutes non dicuntur divinae, sicut quibus deus sit virtuosus, sed sicut quibus nos efficimur virtuosi a deo, et in ordine ad deum.

Unde non sunt exemplares, sed exemplatae.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod ad deum naturaliter ratio et voluntas ordinatur prout est naturae principium et finis, secundum tamen proportionem naturae. Sed ad ipsum secundum quod est obiectum beatitudinis supernaturalis, ratio et voluntas secundum suam naturam non ordinantur sufficienter.