Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues. For the theological virtues, if they be in a human soul, must needs perfect it, either as to the intellective, or as to the appetitive part. Now the virtues which perfect the intellective part are called intellectual; and the virtues which perfect the appetitive part, are called moral. Therefore, the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues.

Objection 2: Further, the theological virtues are those which direct us to God. Now, among the intellectual virtues there is one which directs us to God: this is wisdom, which is about Divine things, since it considers the highest cause. Therefore the theological virtues are not distinct from the intellectual virtues.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv) shows how the four cardinal virtues are the "order of love." Now love is charity, which is a theological virtue. Therefore the moral virtues are not distinct from the theological.

On the contrary, That which is above man's nature is distinct from that which is according to his nature. But the theological virtues are above man's nature; while the intellectual and moral virtues are in proportion to his nature, as clearly shown above (Question 58, Article 3). Therefore they are distinct from one another.

I answer that, As stated above (Question 54, Article 2, ad 1), habits are specifically distinct from one another in respect of the formal difference of their objects. Now the object of the theological virtues is God Himself, Who is the last end of all, as surpassing the knowledge of our reason. On the other hand, the object of the intellectual and moral virtues is something comprehensible to human reason. Wherefore the theological virtues are specifically distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues.

Reply to Objection 1: The intellectual and moral virtues perfect man's intellect and appetite according to the capacity of human nature; the theological virtues, supernaturally.

Reply to Objection 2: The wisdom which the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3,7) reckons as an intellectual virtue, considers Divine things so far as they are open to the research of human reason. Theological virtue, on the other hand, is about those same things so far as they surpass human reason.

Reply to Objection 3: Though charity is love, yet love is not always charity. When, then, it is stated that every virtue is the order of love, this can be understood either of love in the general sense, or of the love of charity. If it be understood of love, commonly so called, then each virtue is stated to be the order of love, in so far as each cardinal virtue requires ordinate emotions; and love is the root and cause of every emotion, as stated above (Question 27, Article 4; Question 28, Article 6, ad 2; Question 41, Article 2, ad 1). If, however, it be understood of the love of charity, it does not mean that every other virtue is charity essentially: but that all other virtues depend on charity in some way, as we shall show further on (Question 65, Articles 2,5; 2.2, Question 23, Article 7).

Articulus 2

Argumentum 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes theologicae non distinguantur a moralibus et intellectualibus.

Virtutes enim theologicae, si sunt in anima humana, oportet quod perficiant ipsam vel secundum partem intellectivam vel secundum partem appetitivam. Sed virtutes quae perficiunt partem intellectivam, dicuntur intellectuales, virtutes autem quae perficiunt partem appetitivam, sunt morales. Ergo virtutes theologicae non distinguuntur a virtutibus moralibus et intellectualibus.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, virtutes theologicae dicuntur quae ordinant nos ad deum. Sed inter intellectuales virtutes est aliqua quae ordinat nos ad deum, scilicet sapientia, quae est de divinis, utpote causam altissimam considerans. Ergo virtutes theologicae ab intellectualibus virtutibus non distinguuntur.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, Augustinus, in libro de moribus eccles., manifestat in quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus quod sunt ordo amoris.

Sed amor est caritas, quae ponitur virtus theologica.

Ergo virtutes morales non distinguuntur a theologicis.

Sed Contra

Sed contra, id quod est supra naturam hominis, distinguitur ab eo quod est secundum naturam hominis. Sed virtutes theologicae sunt super naturam hominis, cui secundum naturam conveniunt virtutes intellectuales et morales, ut ex supradictis patet.

Ergo distinguuntur ab invicem.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus specie distinguuntur secundum formalem differentiam obiectorum. Obiectum autem theologicarum virtutum est ipse deus, qui est ultimus rerum finis, prout nostrae rationis cognitionem excedit. Obiectum autem virtutum intellectualium et Moralium est aliquid quod humana ratione comprehendi potest. Unde virtutes theologicae specie distinguuntur a moralibus et intellectualibus.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtutes intellectuales et morales perficiunt intellectum et appetitum hominis secundum proportionem naturae humanae, sed theologicae supernaturaliter.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod sapientia quae a philosopho ponitur intellectualis virtus, considerat divina secundum quod sunt investigabilia ratione humana. Sed theologica virtus est circa ea secundum quod rationem humanam excedunt.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet caritas sit amor, non tamen omnis amor est caritas. Cum ergo dicitur quod omnis virtus est ordo amoris, potest intelligi vel de amore communiter dicto; vel de amore caritatis. Si de amore communiter dicto, sic dicitur quaelibet virtus esse ordo amoris, inquantum ad quamlibet cardinalium virtutum requiritur ordinata affectio, omnis autem affectionis radix et principium est amor, ut supra dictum est.

Si autem intelligatur de amore caritatis, non datur per hoc intelligi quod quaelibet alia virtus essentialiter sit caritas, sed quod omnes aliae virtutes aliqualiter a caritate dependeant, ut infra patebit.