Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not the greatest of the intellectual virtues. Because the commander is greater than the one commanded. Now prudence seems to command wisdom, for it is stated in Ethic. i, 2 that political science, which belongs to prudence (Ethic. vi, 8), "orders that sciences should be cultivated in states, and to which of these each individual should devote himself, and to what extent." Since, then, wisdom is one of the sciences, it seems that prudence is greater than wisdom.

Objection 2: Further, it belongs to the nature of virtue to direct man to happiness: because virtue is "the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best," as stated in Phys. vii, text. 17. Now prudence is "right reason about things to be done," whereby man is brought to happiness: whereas wisdom takes no notice of human acts, whereby man attains happiness. Therefore prudence is a greater virtue than wisdom.

Objection 3: Further, the more perfect knowledge is, the greater it seems to be. Now we can have more perfect knowledge of human affairs, which are the subject of science, than of Divine things, which are the object of wisdom, which is the distinction given by Augustine (De Trin. xii, 14): because Divine things are incomprehensible, according to Job 26:26: "Behold God is great, exceeding our knowledge." Therefore science is a greater virtue than wisdom.

Objection 4: Further, knowledge of principles is more excellent than knowledge of conclusions. But wisdom draws conclusions from indemonstrable principles which are the object of the virtue of understanding, even as other sciences do. Therefore understanding is a greater virtue than wisdom.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that wisdom is "the head" among "the intellectual virtues."

I answer that, As stated above (Article 3), the greatness of a virtue, as to its species, is taken from its object. Now the object of wisdom surpasses the objects of all the intellectual virtues: because wisdom considers the Supreme Cause, which is God, as stated at the beginning of the Metaphysics. And since it is by the cause that we judge of an effect, and by the higher cause that we judge of the lower effects; hence it is that wisdom exercises judgment over all the other intellectual virtues, directs them all, and is the architect of them all.

Reply to Objection 1: Since prudence is about human affairs, and wisdom about the Supreme Cause, it is impossible for prudence to be a greater virtue than wisdom, "unless," as stated in Ethic. vi, 7, "man were the greatest thing in the world." Wherefore we must say, as stated in the same book (Ethic. vi), that prudence does not command wisdom, but vice versa: because "the spiritual man judgeth all things; and he himself is judged by no man" (1 Cor. 2:15). For prudence has no business with supreme matters which are the object of wisdom: but its command covers things directed to wisdom, viz. how men are to obtain wisdom. Wherefore prudence, or political science, is, in this way, the servant of wisdom; for it leads to wisdom, preparing the way for her, as the doorkeeper for the king.

Reply to Objection 2: Prudence considers the means of acquiring happiness, but wisdom considers the very object of happiness, viz. the Supreme Intelligible. And if indeed the consideration of wisdom were perfect in respect of its object, there would be perfect happiness in the act of wisdom: but as, in this life, the act of wisdom is imperfect in respect of its principal object, which is God, it follows that the act of wisdom is a beginning or participation of future happiness, so that wisdom is nearer than prudence to happiness.

Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (De Anima i, text. 1), "one knowledge is preferable to another, either because it is about a higher object, or because it is more certain." Hence if the objects be equally good and sublime, that virtue will be greater which possesses more certain knowledge. But a virtue which is less certain about a higher and better object, is preferable to that which is more certain about an object of inferior degree. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Coelo ii, text. 60) that "it is a great thing to be able to know something about celestial beings, though it be based on weak and probable reasoning"; and again (De Part. Animal. i, 5) that "it is better to know a little about sublime things, than much about mean things." Accordingly wisdom, to which knowledge about God pertains, is beyond the reach of man, especially in this life, so as to be his possession: for this "belongs to God alone" (Metaph. i, 2): and yet this little knowledge about God which we can have through wisdom is preferable to all other knowledge.

Reply to Objection 4: The truth and knowledge of indemonstrable principles depends on the meaning of the terms: for as soon as we know what is a whole, and what is a part, we know at once that every whole is greater than its part. Now to know the meaning of being and non-being, of whole and part, and of other things consequent to being, which are the terms whereof indemonstrable principles are constituted, is the function of wisdom: since universal being is the proper effect of the Supreme Cause, which is God. And so wisdom makes use of indemonstrable principles which are the object of understanding, not only by drawing conclusions from them, as other sciences do, but also by passing its judgment on them, and by vindicating them against those who deny them. Hence it follows that wisdom is a greater virtue than understanding.

Articulus 5

Argumentum 1

Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sapientia non sit maxima inter virtutes intellectuales. Imperans enim maius est eo cui imperatur. Sed prudentia videtur imperare sapientiae, dicitur enim I ethic., quod quales disciplinarum debitum est esse in civitatibus, et quales unumquemque addiscere, et usquequo, haec praeordinat, scilicet politica, quae ad prudentiam pertinet, ut dicitur in VI ethic..

Cum igitur inter disciplinas etiam sapientia contineatur, videtur quod prudentia sit maior quam sapientia.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, de ratione virtutis est quod ordinet hominem ad felicitatem, est enim virtus dispositio perfecti ad optimum, ut dicitur in VII physic..

Sed prudentia est recta ratio agibilium, per quae homo ad felicitatem perducitur, sapientia autem non considerat humanos actus, quibus ad beatitudinem pervenitur.

Ergo prudentia est maior virtus quam sapientia.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, quanto cognitio est perfectior, tanto videtur esse maior. Sed perfectiorem cognitionem habere possumus de rebus humanis, de quibus est scientia, quam de rebus divinis, de quibus est sapientia, ut distinguit Augustinus in XII de Trin., quia divina incomprehensibilia sunt, secundum illud iob XXXVI, ecce deus magnus, vincens scientiam nostram.

Ergo scientia est maior virtus quam sapientia.

Argumentum 4

Praeterea, cognitio principiorum est dignior quam cognitio conclusionum. Sed sapientia concludit ex principiis indemonstrabilibus, quorum est intellectus; sicut et aliae scientiae. Ergo intellectus est maior virtus quam sapientia.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in VI ethic., quod sapientia est sicut caput inter virtutes intellectuales.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, magnitudo virtutis secundum suam speciem, consideratur ex obiecto.

Obiectum autem sapientiae praecellit inter obiecta omnium virtutum intellectualium, considerat enim causam altissimam, quae deus est, ut dicitur in principio metaphys..

Et quia per causam iudicatur de effectu, et per causam superiorem de causis inferioribus; inde est quod sapientia habet iudicium de omnibus aliis virtutibus intellectualibus; et eius est ordinare omnes; et ipsa est quasi architectonica respectu omnium.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum prudentia sit circa res humanas, sapientia vero circa causam altissimam; impossibile est quod prudentia sit maior virtus quam sapientia, nisi, ut dicitur in VI ethic., maximum eorum quae sunt in mundo, esset homo.

Unde dicendum est, sicut in eodem libro dicitur, quod prudentia non imperat ipsi sapientiae, sed potius e converso, quia spiritualis iudicat omnia, et ipse a nemine iudicatur, ut dicitur I ad Cor. II.

Non enim prudentia habet se intromittere de altissimis, quae considerat sapientia, sed imperat de his quae ordinantur ad sapientiam, scilicet quomodo homines debeant ad sapientiam pervenire. Unde in hoc est prudentia, seu politica, ministra sapientiae, introducit enim ad eam, praeparans ei viam, sicut ostiarius ad regem.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod prudentia considerat ea quibus pervenitur ad felicitatem, sed sapientia considerat ipsum obiectum felicitatis, quod est altissimum intelligibile. Et si quidem esset perfecta consideratio sapientiae respectu sui obiecti, esset perfecta felicitas in actu sapientiae. Sed quia actus sapientiae in hac vita est imperfectus respectu principalis obiecti, quod est deus; ideo actus sapientiae est quaedam inchoatio seu participatio futurae felicitatis.

Et sic propinquius se habet ad felicitatem quam prudentia.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in I de anima, una notitia praefertur alteri aut ex eo quod est nobiliorum, aut propter certitudinem.

Si igitur subiecta sint aequalia in bonitate et nobilitate, illa quae est certior, erit maior virtus. Sed illa quae est minus certa de altioribus et maioribus, praefertur ei quae est magis certa de inferioribus rebus.

Unde philosophus dicit, in II de caelo, quod magnum est de rebus caelestibus aliquid posse cognoscere etiam debili et topica ratione.

Et in I de partibus animal., dicit quod amabile est magis parvum aliquid cognoscere de rebus nobilioribus quam multa cognoscere de rebus ignobilioribus.

Sapientia igitur ad quam pertinet dei cognitio, homini, maxime in statu huius vitae, non potest perfecte advenire, ut sit quasi eius possessio; sed hoc solius dei est, ut dicitur in I metaphys..

Sed tamen illa modica cognitio quae per sapientiam de deo haberi potest, omni alii cognitioni praefertur.

Ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod veritas et cognitio principiorum indemonstrabilium dependet ex ratione terminorum, cognito enim quid est totum et quid pars, statim cognoscitur quod omne totum est maius sua parte. Cognoscere autem rationem entis et non entis, et totius et partis, et aliorum quae consequuntur ad ens, ex quibus sicut ex terminis constituuntur principia indemonstrabilia, pertinet ad sapientiam, quia ens commune est proprius effectus causae altissimae, scilicet dei. Et ideo sapientia non solum utitur principiis indemonstrabilibus, quorum est intellectus, concludendo ex eis, sicut aliae scientiae; sed etiam iudicando de eis, et disputando contra negantes. Unde sequitur quod sapientia sit maior virtus quam intellectus.