Chapter 4.—What the Christians Believe Regarding the Supreme Good and Evil, in Opposition to the Philosophers, Who Have Maintained that the Supreme Good is in Themselves.

If, then, we be asked what the city of God has to say upon these points, and, in the first place, what its opinion regarding the supreme good and evil is, it will reply that life eternal is the supreme good, death eternal the supreme evil, and that to obtain the one and escape the other we must live rightly.  And thus it is written, “The just lives by faith,”1236    Hab. ii. 4. for we do not as yet see our good, and must therefore live by faith; neither have we in ourselves power to live rightly, but can do so only if He who has given us faith to believe in His help do help us when we believe and pray.  As for those who have supposed that the sovereign good and evil are to be found in this life, and have placed it either in the soul or the body, or in both, or, to speak more explicitly, either in pleasure or in virtue, or in both; in repose or in virtue, or in both; in pleasure and repose, or in virtue, or in all combined; in the primary objects of nature, or in virtue, or in both,—all these have, with a marvelous shallowness, sought to find their blessedness in this life and in themselves.  Contempt has been poured upon such ideas by the Truth, saying by the prophet, “The Lord knoweth the thoughts of men” (or, as the Apostle Paul cites the passage, “The Lord knoweth the thoughts of the wise”) “that they are vain.”1237    Ps. xciv. 11, and 1 Cor. iii. 20.

For what flood of eloquence can suffice to detail the miseries of this life?  Cicero, in the Consolation on the death of his daughter, has spent all his ability in lamentation; but how inadequate was even his ability here?  For when, where, how, in this life can these primary objects of nature be possessed so that they may not be assailed by unforeseen accidents?  Is the body of the wise man exempt from any pain which may dispel pleasure, from any disquietude which may banish repose?  The amputation or decay of the members of the body puts an end to its integrity, deformity blights its beauty, weakness its health, lassitude its vigor, sleepiness or sluggishness its activity,—and which of these is it that may not assail the flesh of the wise man?  Comely and fitting attitudes and movements of the body are numbered among the prime natural blessings; but what if some sickness makes the members tremble? what if a man suffers from curvature of the spine to such an extent that his hands reach the ground, and he goes upon all-fours like a quadruped?  Does not this destroy all beauty and grace in the body, whether at rest or in motion?  What shall I say of the fundamental blessings of the soul, sense and intellect, of which the one is given for the perception, and the other for the comprehension of truth?  But what kind of sense is it that remains when a man becomes deaf and blind? where are reason and intellect when disease makes a man delirious?  We can scarcely, or not at all, refrain from tears, when we think of or see the actions and words of such frantic persons, and consider how different from and even opposed to their own sober judgment and ordinary conduct their present demeanor is.  And what shall I say of those who suffer from demoniacal possession?  Where is their own intelligence hidden and buried while the malignant spirit is using their body and soul according to his own will?  And who is quite sure that no such thing can happen to the wise man in this life?  Then, as to the perception of truth, what can we hope for even in this way while in the body, as we read in the true book of Wisdom, “The corruptible body weigheth down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle presseth down the mind that museth upon many things?”1238    Wisdom ix. 15.  And eagerness, or desire of action, if this is the right meaning to put upon the Greek ὁρμη, is also reckoned among the primary advantages of nature; and yet is it not this which produces those pitiable movements of the insane, and those actions which we shudder to see, when sense is deceived and reason deranged?

In fine, virtue itself, which is not among the primary objects of nature, but succeeds to them as the result of learning, though it holds the highest place among human good things, what is its occupation save to wage perpetual war with vices,—not those that are outside of us, but within; not other men’s, but our own,—a war which is waged especially by that virtue which the Greeks call σωφροσυνη, and we temperance,1239    Cicero, Tusc. Quæst. iii. 8. and which bridles carnal lusts, and prevents them from winning the consent of the spirit to wicked deeds?  For we must not fancy that there is no vice in us, when, as the apostle says, “The flesh lusteth against the spirit;”1240    Gal. v. 17. for to this vice there is a contrary virtue, when, as the same writer says, “The spirit lusteth against the flesh.”  “For these two,” he says, “are contrary one to the other, so that you cannot do the things which you would.”  But what is it we wish to do when we seek to attain the supreme good, unless that the flesh should cease to lust against the spirit, and that there be no vice in us against which the spirit may lust?  And as we cannot attain to this in the present life, however ardently we desire it, let us by God’s help accomplish at least this, to preserve the soul from succumbing and yielding to the flesh that lusts against it, and to refuse our consent to the perpetration of sin.  Far be it from us, then, to fancy that while we are still engaged in this intestine war, we have already found the happiness which we seek to reach by victory.  And who is there so wise that he has no conflict at all to maintain against his vices?

What shall I say of that virtue which is called prudence?  Is not all its vigilance spent in the discernment of good from evil things, so that no mistake may be admitted about what we should desire and what avoid?  And thus it is itself a proof that we are in the midst of evils, or that evils are in us; for it teaches us that it is an evil to consent to sin, and a good to refuse this consent.  And yet this evil, to which prudence teaches and temperance enables us not to consent, is removed from this life neither by prudence nor by temperance.  And justice, whose office it is to render to every man his due, whereby there is in man himself a certain just order of nature, so that the soul is subjected to God, and the flesh to the soul, and consequently both soul and flesh to God,—does not this virtue demonstrate that it is as yet rather laboring towards its end than resting in its finished work?  For the soul is so much the less subjected to God as it is less occupied with the thought of God; and the flesh is so much the less subjected to the spirit as it lusts more vehemently against the spirit.  So long, therefore, as we are beset by this weakness, this plague, this disease, how shall we dare to say that we are safe? and if not safe, then how can we be already enjoying our final beatitude?  Then that virtue which goes by the name of fortitude is the plainest proof of the ills of life, for it is these ills which it is compelled to bear patiently.  And this holds good, no matter though the ripest wisdom co-exists with it.  And I am at a loss to understand how the Stoic philosophers can presume to say that these are no ills, though at the same time they allow the wise man to commit suicide and pass out of this life if they become so grievous that he cannot or ought not to endure them.  But such is the stupid pride of these men who fancy that the supreme good can be found in this life, and that they can become happy by their own resources, that their wise man, or at least the man whom they fancifully depict as such, is always happy, even though he become blind, deaf, dumb, mutilated, racked with pains, or suffer any conceivable calamity such as may compel him to make away with himself; and they are not ashamed to call the life that is beset with these evils happy.  O happy life, which seeks the aid of death to end it?  If it is happy, let the wise man remain in it; but if these ills drive him out of it, in what sense is it happy?  Or how can they say that these are not evils which conquer the virtue of fortitude, and force it not only to yield, but so to rave that it in one breath calls life happy and recommends it to be given up?  For who is so blind as not to see that if it were happy it would not be fled from?  And if they say we should flee from it on account of the infirmities that beset it, why then do they not lower their pride and acknowledge that it is miserable?  Was it, I would ask, fortitude or weakness which prompted Cato to kill himself? for he would not have done so had he not been too weak to endure Cæsar’s victory.  Where, then, is his fortitude?  It has yielded, it has succumbed, it has been so thoroughly overcome as to abandon, forsake, flee this happy life.  Or was it no longer happy?  Then it was miserable.  How, then, were these not evils which made life miserable, and a thing to be escaped from?

And therefore those who admit that these are evils, as the Peripatetics do, and the Old Academy, the sect which Varro advocates, express a more intelligible doctrine; but theirs also is a surprising mistake, for they contend that this is a happy life which is beset by these evils, even though they be so great that he who endures them should commit suicide to escape them.  “Pains and anguish of body,” says Varro, “are evils, and so much the worse in proportion to their severity; and to escape them you must quit this life.”  What life, I pray?  This life, he says, which is oppressed by such evils.  Then it is happy in the midst of these very evils on account of which you say we must quit it?  Or do you call it happy because you are at liberty to escape these evils by death?  What, then, if by some secret judgment of God you were held fast and not permitted to die, nor suffered to live without these evils?  In that case, at least, you would say that such a life was miserable.  It is soon relinquished, no doubt but this does not make it not miserable; for were it eternal, you yourself would pronounce it miserable.  Its brevity, therefore, does not clear it of misery; neither ought it to be called happiness because it is a brief misery.  Certainly there is a mighty force in these evils which compel a man—according to them even a wise man—to cease to be a man that he may escape them, though they say, and say truly, that it is as it were the first and strongest demand of nature that a man cherish himself, and naturally therefore avoid death, and should so stand his own friend as to wish and vehemently aim at continuing to exist as a living creature, and subsisting in this union of soul and body.  There is a mighty force in these evils to overcome this natural instinct by which death is by every means and with all a man’s efforts avoided, and to overcome it so completely that what was avoided is desired, sought after, and if it cannot in any other way be obtained, is inflicted by the man on himself.  There is a mighty force in these evils which make fortitude a homicide,—if, indeed, that is to be called fortitude which is so thoroughly overcome by these evils, that it not only cannot preserve by patience the man whom it undertook to govern and defend, but is itself obliged to kill him.  The wise man, I admit, ought to bear death with patience, but when it is inflicted by another.  If, then, as these men maintain, he is obliged to inflict it on himself, certainly it must be owned that the ills which compel him to this are not only evils, but intolerable evils.  The life, then, which is either subject to accidents, or environed with evils so considerable and grievous, could never have been called happy, if the men who give it this name had condescended to yield to the truth, and to be conquered by valid arguments, when they inquired after the happy life, as they yield to unhappiness, and are overcome by overwhelming evils, when they put themselves to death, and if they had not fancied that the supreme good was to be found in this mortal life; for the very virtues of this life, which are certainly its best and most useful possessions, are all the more telling proofs of its miseries in proportion as they are helpful against the violence of its dangers, toils, and woes.  For if these are true virtues,—and such cannot exist save in those who have true piety,—they do not profess to be able to deliver the men who possess them from all miseries; for true virtues tell no such lies, but they profess that by the hope of the future world this life, which is miserably involved in the many and great evils of this world, is happy as it is also safe.  For if not yet safe, how could it be happy?  And therefore the Apostle Paul, speaking not of men without prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice, but of those whose lives were regulated by true piety, and whose virtues were therefore true, says, “For we are saved by hope:  now hope which is seen is not hope; for what a man seeth, why doth he yet hope for?  But if we hope for that we see not, then do we with patience wait for it.”1241    Rom. viii. 24. As, therefore, we are saved, so we are made happy by hope.  And as we do not as yet possess a present, but look for a future salvation, so is it with our happiness, and this “with patience;” for we are encompassed with evils, which we ought patiently to endure, until we come to the ineffable enjoyment of unmixed good; for there shall be no longer anything to endure.  Salvation, such as it shall be in the world to come, shall itself be our final happiness.  And this happiness these philosophers refuse to believe in, because they do not see it, and attempt to fabricate for themselves a happiness in this life, based upon a virtue which is as deceitful as it is proud.

CAPUT IV. De summo bono et summo malo quid Christiani sentiant contra philosophos, qui summum bonum in se sibi esse dixerunt.

1. Si ergo quaeratur a nobis, quid civitas Dei de his singulis interrogata respondeat, ac primum de finibus bonorum malorumque quid sentiat, respondebit aeternam vitam esse summum bonum, aeternam vero mortem summum malum: propter illam proinde adipiscendam, istamque vitandam, recte nobis esse vivendum. Propter quod scriptum est, Justus ex fide vivit (Habacuc II, 4; Galat. III, 11): quoniam neque bonum nostrum jam videmus, unde oportet ut credendo quaeramus; neque ipsum recte vivere nobis ex nobis est, nisi credentes adjuvet et orantes, qui et ipsam fidem dedit, qua nos ab illo adjuvandos esse credamus. Illi autem qui in ista vita fines bonorum et malorum esse putaverunt, sive in corpore, sive in animo, sive in utroque ponentes summum bonum; atque, ut id explicatius eloquar, sive in voluptate, sive in virtute, sive in utraque; sive in quiete, sive in virtute, sive in utraque; sive in voluptate simul et quiete, sive in virtute, sive in utrisque; sive in primis naturae, sive in virtute, sive in utrisque: hic beati esse, et a se ipsis beati fieri mira vanitate voluerunt. Irrisit hos Veritas per prophetam dicentem, Novit Dominus cogitationes hominum; vel, sicut hoc testimonium posuit apostolus Paulus, Dominus novit cogitationes sapientium, quoniam vanae sunt (Psal. XCIII, 11; I Cor. III, 20).

0628 2. Quis enim sufficit, quantovis eloquentiae flumine, vitae hujus miserias explicare? Quam lamentatus est Cicero in Consolatione de morte filiae, sicut potuit: sed quantum est quod potuit? Ea quippe quae dicuntur prima naturae, quando, ubi, quomodo tam bene se habere in hac vita possunt, ut non sub incertis casibus fluctuent? Quis enim dolor contrarius voluptati, quae inquietudo contraria quieti, in corpus cadere sapientis non potest? Membrorum certe amputatio vel debilitas hominis expugnat incolumitatem, deformitas pulchritudinem, imbecillitas sanitatem, vires lassitudo, mobilitatem torpor, aut tarditas: ecquid horum est, quod nequeat in carnem sapientis irruere? Status quoque corporis atque motus, cum decentes atque congruentes sunt, inter naturae prima numerantur: sed quid si aliqua mala valetudo membra tremore concutiat? quid si usque ad ponendas in terram manus dorsi spina curvetur, et hominem quodammodo quadrupedem faciat? nonne omnem statuendi corporis et movendi speciem decusque pervertet? Quid ipsius animi primigenia quae appellantur bona, ubi duo prima ponunt propter comprehensionem perceptionemque veritatis, sensum et intellectum? Sed qualis quantusque remanet sensus, si, ut alia taceam, fiat homo surdus et caecus? Ratio vero et intelligentia quo recedet, ubi sopietur, si aliquo morbo efficiatur insanus? Phrenetici multa absurda cum dicunt, vel faciunt, plerumque a bono suo proposito et moribus aliena, imo suo bono proposito moribusque contraria, sive illa cogitemus, sive videamus, si digne consideremus, lacrymas tenere vix possumus, aut forte nec possumus . Quid dicam de his, qui daemonum patiuntur incursus? ubi habent absconditam vel obrutam intelligentiam suam, quando secundum suam voluntatem et anima eorum et corpore malignus utitur spiritus? Et quis confidit hoc malum in hac vita evenire non posse sapienti? Deinde perceptio veritatis in hac carne qualis aut quanta est, quando, sicut legimus in veraci libro Sapientiae, Corpus corruptibile aggravat animam, et deprimit terrena inhabitatio sensum multa cogitantem (Sap. IX, 15)? Impetus porro vel actionis appetitus, si hoc modo recte latine appellatur ea quam Graeci vocant ὁρμήν, quia et ipsam primis naturae deputant bonis , nonne ipse est, quo geruntur etiam insanorum illi miserabiles motus, et facta quae horremus, quando pervertitur sensus ratioque sopitur?

3. Porro ipsa virtus, quae non est inter prima naturae, quoniam eis postea doctrina introducente supervenit, cum sibi bonorum culmen vindicet humanorum, quid hic agit nisi perpetua bella cum vitiis, nec exterioribus, sed interioribus; nec alienis, sed plane nostris et propriis; maxime illa, quae graece σωφροσύνη, latine temperantia nominatur, qua carnales frenantur libidines, ne in quaeque flagitia mentem 0629 consentientem trahant ? Neque enim nullum est vitium, cum, sicut dicit Apostolus, Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum: cui vitio contraria virtus est, cum, sicut idem dicit, Spiritus concupiscit adversus carnem. Haec enim, inquit, invicem adversantur; ut non ea quae vultis faciatis (Galat. V, 17). Quid autem facere volumus, cum perfici volumus finem summi boni, nisi ut caro adversus spiritum non concupiscat, nec sit in nobis hoc vitium, contra quod spiritus concupiscat? Quod in hac vita quamvis velimus, quoniam facere non valemus, id saltem in adjutorio Dei faciamus, ne carni concupiscenti adversus spiritum, spiritu succumbente cedamus, et ad perpetrandum peccatum nostra consensione pertrahamur. Absit ergo ut, quamdiu in hoc bello intestino sumus, jam nos beatitudinem, ad quam vincendo volumus pervenire, adeptos esse credamus. Et quis est usque adeo sapiens, ut contra libidines nullum habeat omnino conflictum?

4. Quid illa virtus, quae prudentia dicitur? nonne tota vigilantia sua bona discernit a malis, ut in illis appetendis istisque vitandis nullus error obrepat? Ac per hoc et ipsa nos in malis, vel mala in nobis esse testatur. Ipsa enim docet nos, malum esse ad peccandum consentire, bonumque esse ad peccandum non consentire libidini. Illud tamen malum, cui nos non consentire docet prudentia, facit temperantia, nec prudentia, nec temperantia tollit huic vitae. Quid justitia, cujus munus est sua cuique tribuere (unde fit in ipso homine quidam justus ordo naturae, ut anima subdatur Deo et animae caro, ac per hoc Deo et anima et caro), nonne demonstrat in eo se adhuc opere laborare potius, quam in hujus operis jam fine requiescere? Tanto quippe minus anima subditur Deo, quanto minus Deum in ipsis suis cogitationibus concipit; et tanto minus animae subditur caro, quanto magis adversus spiritum concupiscit. Quamdiu ergo nobis inest haec infirmitas, haec pestis, hic languor, quomodo nos jam salvos; et si nondum salvos, quomodo jam beatos illa finali beatitudine dicere audebimus? Jam vero illa virtus, cujus nomen est fortitudo, in quantacumque sapientia evidentissima testis est humanorum malorum, quae compellitur patientia tolerare. Quae mala Stoici philosophi miror qua fronte mala non esse contendant, quibus fatentur, si tanta fuerint, ut ea sapiens vel non possit, vel non debeat sustinere, cogi eum mortem sibimet inferre, atque ex hac vita emigrare . Tantus autem superbiae stupor est in his hominibus, hic se habere finem boni et a se ipsis fieri beatos putantibus; ut sapiens eorum, hoc est, qualem mirabili vanitate describunt, etiamsi excaecetur, obsurdescat, obmutescat, membris debilitetur, doloribus crucietur, et si quid aliud talium malorum dici aut cogitari potest, incidat in eum, quo sibi mortem cogatur inferre, 0630 hanc in his malis vitam constitutam, eos non pudeat beatam vocare. O vitam beatam, quae ut finiatur, mortis quaerit auxilium! Si beata est, maneatur in ea: si vero propter ista mala fugitur ab ea, quomodo est beata? Aut quomodo ista non sunt mala, quae vincunt fortitudinis bonum, eamdemque fortitudinem non solum sibi cedere, verum etiam delirare compellunt, ut eamdem vitam et dicat beatam, et persuadeat esse fugiendam? Quis usque adeo caecus est, ut non videat quod, si beata esset, fugienda non esset? Sed si propter infirmitatis pondus, qua premitur, hanc fugiendam fatentur; quid igitur causae est , cur non etiam miseram fracta superbiae cervice fateantur? Utrum, obsecro, Cato ille patientia, an potius impatientia se peremit? Non enim hoc fecisset, nisi victoriam Caesaris impatienter tulisset. Ubi est fortitudo? Nempe cessit, nempe succubuit, nempe usque adeo superata est, ut vitam beatam derelinqueret, desereret, fugeret. An non erat jam beata? Misera ergo erat. Quomodo igitur mala non erant quae vitam miseram fugiendamque faciebant?

5. Quapropter etiam ipsi, qui mala ista esse confessi sunt, sicut Peripatetici, sicut veteres Academici, quorum sectam Varro defendit, tolerabilius quidem lequuntur: sed eorum quoque mirus est error, quod in his malis, etsi tam gravia sint, ut morte fugienda sint, ab ipso sibimet illata, qui haec patitur, vitam beatam tamen esse contendunt. Mala sunt, inquit, tormenta atque cruciatus corporis; et tanto sunt pejora, quanto potuerint esse majora; quibus ut careas, ex hac vita fugiendum est. Qua vita, obsecro? Hac, inquit, quae tantis aggravatur malis. Certe ergo beata est in eisdem ipsis malis, propter quae dicis esse fugiendam? An ideo beatam dicis, quia licet tibi ab his malis morte discedere? Quid si ergo in eis aliquo judicio divino tenereris, nec permittereris mori, nec unquam sine illis esse sinereris ? Nempe tunc saltem miseram talem diceres vitam. Non igitur propterea misera non est, quia cito relinquitur: quandoquidem si sempiterna sit, etiam abs te ipso misera judicatur. Non itaque propterea, quoniam brevis est, nulla miseria debet videri; aut, quod est absurdius, quia brevis miseria est, ideo etiam beatitudo appellari. Magna vis est in eis malis, quae cogunt hominem, secundum ipsos etiam sapientem, sibimet auferre quod homo est: cum dicant, et verum dicant, hanc esse naturae primam quodammodo et maximam vocem, ut homo concilietur sibi, et propterea mortem naturaliter fugiat; ita sibi amicus, ut esse se animal, et in hac conjunctione corporis atque animae vivere velit, vehementerque appetat . Magna vis est in eis malis, quibus iste 0631 naturae vincitur sensus, quo mors omni modo omnibus viribus conatibusque vitatur; et ita vincitur, ut quae vitabatur, optetur, appetatur, et, si non potuerit aliunde contingere, ab ipso homine sibimet inferatur. Magna vis est in eis malis, quae fortitudinem faciunt homicidam: si tamen adhuc dicenda est fortitudo, quae ita his malis vincitur, ut hominem, quem, sicut virtus, regendum tuendumque suscepit, non modo non possit per patientiam custodire, sed ipsa insuper cogatur occidere. Debet quidem etiam mortem sapiens ferre patienter, sed quae accidit aliunde: secundum istos autem si eam sibi ipse inferre compellitur, profecto fatendum est eis, non solum mala, sed intolerabilia etiam mala esse, quae hoc eum perpetrare compellunt. Vita igitur, quae istorum tam magnorum tamque gravium malorum aut premitur oneribus, aut subjacet casibus, nullo modo beata diceretur, si homines qui hoc dicunt, sicut victi malis ingravescentibus, cum sibi ingerunt mortem, cedunt infelicitati, ita victi certis rationibus, cum quaerunt beatam vitam, dignarentur cedere veritati, et non sibi putarent in ista mortalitate fine summi boni esse gaudendum; ubi virtutes ipsae, quibus hic certe nihil melius atque utilius in homine reperitur, quanto majora sunt adjutoria contra vim periculorum, laborum, dolorum, tanto fideliora testimonia miseriarum. Si enim verae virtutes sunt, quae nisi in eis, quibus vera inest pietas, esse non possunt; non se profitentur hoc posse ut nullas miserias patiantur homines, in quibus sunt: neque enim mendaces sunt verae virtutes, ut hoc profiteantur; sed ut vita humana, quae tot et tantis hujus saeculi malis esse cogitur misera, spe futuri saeculi sit beata, sicut et salva. Quomodo enim beata est, quae nondum salva est? Unde et apostolus Paulus non de hominibus imprudentibus, impatientibus, intemperantibus et iniquis, sed de his qui secundum veram pietatem viverent, et ideo virtutes quas haberent, veras haberent, ait, Spe enim salvi facti sumus. Spes autem quae videtur, non est spes: quod enim quis videt, quid sperat? Si autem quod non videmus speramus, per patientiam exspectamus (Rom. VIII, 24 et 25). Sicut ergo spe salvi, ita spe beati facti sumus: et sicut salutem, ita beatitudinem, non jam tenemus praesentem, sed exspectamus futuram: et hoc per patientiam; quia in malis sumus, quae patienter tolerare debemus, donec ad illa veniamus bona ubi omnia erunt, quibus ineffabiliter delectemur; nihil erit autem, quod jam tolerare debeamus. Talis salus, quae in futuro erit saeculo, ipsa erit etiam finalis beatitudo. Quam beatitudinem isti philosophi, quoniam non videntes nolunt credere, hic sibi conantur falsissimam fabricare, quanto superbiore, tanto mendaciore virtute.