Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not more grievous to sin through certain malice than through passion. Because ignorance excuses from sin either altogether or in part. Now ignorance is greater in one who sins through certain malice, than in one who sins through passion; since he that sins through certain malice suffers from the worst form of ignorance, which according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) is ignorance of principle, for he has a false estimation of the end, which is the principle in matters of action. Therefore there is more excuse for one who sins through certain malice, than for one who sins through passion.

Objection 2: Further, the more a man is impelled to sin, the less grievous his sin, as is clear with regard to a man who is thrown headlong into sin by a more impetuous passion. Now he that sins through certain malice, is impelled by habit, the impulse of which is stronger than that of passion. Therefore to sin through habit is less grievous than to sin through passion.

Objection 3: Further, to sin through certain malice is to sin through choosing evil. Now he that sins through passion, also chooses evil. Therefore he does not sin less than the man who sins through certain malice.

On the contrary, A sin that is committed on purpose, for this very reason deserves heavier punishment, according to Job 34:26: "He hath struck them as being wicked, in open sight, who, as it were, on purpose, have revolted from Him." Now punishment is not increased except for a graver fault. Therefore a sin is aggravated through being done on purpose, i.e. through certain malice.

I answer that, A sin committed through malice is more grievous than a sin committed through passion, for three reasons. First, because, as sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, it follows that, other things being equal, a sin is all the more grievous, according as the movement of the sin belongs more to the will. Now when a sin is committed through malice, the movement of sin belongs more to the will, which is then moved to evil of its own accord, than when a sin is committed through passion, when the will is impelled to sin by something extrinsic, as it were. Wherefore a sin is aggravated by the very fact that it is committed through certain malice, and so much the more, as the malice is greater; whereas it is diminished by being committed through passion, and so much the more, as the passion is stronger. Secondly, because the passion which incites the will to sin, soon passes away, so that man repents of his sin, and soon returns to his good intentions; whereas the habit, through which a man sins, is a permanent quality, so that he who sins through malice, abides longer in his sin. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) compares the intemperate man, who sins through malice, to a sick man who suffers from a chronic disease, while he compares the incontinent man, who sins through passion, to one who suffers intermittently. Thirdly, because he who sins through certain malice is ill-disposed in respect of the end itself, which is the principle in matters of action; and so the defect is more dangerous than in the case of the man who sins through passion, whose purpose tends to a good end, although this purpose is interrupted on account of the passion, for the time being. Now the worst of all defects is defect of principle. Therefore it is evident that a sin committed through malice is more grievous than one committed through passion.

Reply to Objection 1: Ignorance of choice, to which the objection refers, neither excuses nor diminishes a sin, as stated above (Question 76, Article 4). Therefore neither does a greater ignorance of the kind make a sin to be less grave.

Reply to Objection 2: The impulse due to passion, is, as it were, due to a defect which is outside the will: whereas, by a habit, the will is inclined from within. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 3: It is one thing to sin while choosing, and another to sin through choosing. For he that sins through passion, sins while choosing, but not through choosing, because his choosing is not for him the first principle of his sin; for he is induced through the passion, to choose what he would not choose, were it not for the passion. On the other hand, he that sins through certain malice, chooses evil of his own accord, in the way already explained (Articles 2,3), so that his choosing, of which he has full control, is the principle of his sin: and for this reason he is said to sin "through" choosing.

Articulus 4

Argumentum 1

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ille qui peccat ex certa malitia, non peccet gravius quam ille qui peccat ex passione.

Ignorantia enim excusat peccatum vel in toto vel in parte.

Sed maior est ignorantia in eo qui peccat ex certa malitia, quam in eo qui peccat ex passione, nam ille qui peccat ex certa malitia, patitur ignorantiam principii, quae est maxima, ut philosophus dicit, in VII ethic.; habet enim malam existimationem de fine, qui est principium in operativis.

Ergo magis excusatur a peccato qui peccat ex certa malitia, quam ille qui peccat ex passione.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, quanto aliquis habet maius impellens ad peccandum, tanto minus peccat, sicut patet de eo qui maiori impetu passionis deiicitur in peccatum. Sed ille qui peccat ex certa malitia, impellitur ab habitu, cuius est fortior impulsio quam passionis. Ergo ille qui peccat ex habitu, minus peccat quam ille qui peccat ex passione.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, peccare ex certa malitia est peccare ex electione mali.

Sed ille qui peccat ex passione, etiam eligit malum.

Ergo non minus peccat quam ille qui peccat ex certa malitia.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod peccatum quod ex industria committitur, ex hoc ipso graviorem poenam meretur, secundum illud iob XXXIV, quasi impios percussit eos in loco videntium, qui quasi de industria recesserunt ab eo.

Sed poena non augetur nisi propter gravitatem culpae.

Ergo peccatum ex hoc aggravatur, quod est ex industria, seu certa malitia.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod peccatum quod est ex certa malitia, est gravius peccato quod est ex passione, triplici ratione.

Primo quidem quia, cum peccatum principaliter in voluntate consistat, quanto motus peccati est magis proprius voluntati, tanto peccatum est gravius, ceteris paribus. Cum autem ex certa malitia peccatur, motus peccati est magis proprius voluntati, quae ex seipsa in malum movetur, quam quando ex passione peccatur, quasi ex quodam extrinseco impulsu ad peccandum. Unde peccatum ex hoc ipso quod est ex malitia, aggravatur, et tanto magis, quanto fuerit vehementior malitia.

Ex eo vero quod est ex passione, diminuitur, et tanto magis, quanto passio fuerit magis vehemens.

Secundo, quia passio quae inclinat voluntatem ad peccandum, cito transit, et sic homo cito redit ad bonum propositum, poenitens de peccato. Sed habitus, quo homo ex malitia peccat, est qualitas permanens, et ideo qui ex malitia peccat, diuturnius peccat.

Unde philosophus, in VII ethic., comparat intemperatum, qui peccat ex malitia, infirmo qui continue laborat; incontinentem autem, qui peccat ex passione, ei qui laborat interpolate.

Tertio, quia ille qui peccat ex certa malitia, est male dispositus quantum ad ipsum finem, qui est principium in operabilibus. Et sic eius defectus est periculosior quam eius qui ex passione peccat, cuius propositum tendit in bonum finem, licet hoc propositum interrumpatur ad horam propter passionem. Semper autem defectus principii est pessimus. Unde manifestum est quod gravius est peccatum quod est ex malitia, quam quod est ex passione.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ignorantia electionis, de qua obiectio procedit, neque excusat neque diminuit peccatum, ut supra dictum est.

Unde neque maior ignorantia talis facit esse minus peccatum.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod impulsio quae est ex passione, est quasi ex exteriori respectu voluntatis, sed per habitum inclinatur voluntas quasi ab interiori.

Unde non est similis ratio.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod aliud est peccare eligentem, et aliud peccare ex electione. Ille enim qui peccat ex passione, peccat quidem eligens, non tamen ex electione, quia electio non est in eo primum peccati principium, sed inducitur ex passione ad eligendum id quod extra passionem existens non eligeret. Sed ille qui peccat ex certa malitia, secundum se eligit malum, eo modo quo dictum est.

Et ideo electio in ipso est principium peccati; et propter hoc dicitur ex electione peccare.