Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that the eternal law is not a sovereign type existing in God. For there is only one eternal law. But there are many types of things in the Divine mind; for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 46) that God "made each thing according to its type." Therefore the eternal law does not seem to be a type existing in the Divine mind.

Objection 2: Further, it is essential to a law that it be promulgated by word, as stated above (Question 90, Article 4). But Word is a Personal name in God, as stated in the 1, Question 34, Article 1: whereas type refers to the Essence. Therefore the eternal law is not the same as a Divine type.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxx): "We see a law above our minds, which is called truth." But the law which is above our minds is the eternal law. Therefore truth is the eternal law. But the idea of truth is not the same as the idea of a type. Therefore the eternal law is not the same as the sovereign type.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "the eternal law is the sovereign type, to which we must always conform."

I answer that, Just as in every artificer there pre-exists a type of the things that are made by his art, so too in every governor there must pre-exist the type of the order of those things that are to be done by those who are subject to his government. And just as the type of the things yet to be made by an art is called the art or exemplar of the products of that art, so too the type in him who governs the acts of his subjects, bears the character of a law, provided the other conditions be present which we have mentioned above (Question 90). Now God, by His wisdom, is the Creator of all things in relation to which He stands as the artificer to the products of his art, as stated in the 1, Question 14, Article 8. Moreover He governs all the acts and movements that are to be found in each single creature, as was also stated in the 1, Question 103, Article 5. Wherefore as the type of the Divine Wisdom, inasmuch as by It all things are created, has the character of art, exemplar or idea; so the type of Divine Wisdom, as moving all things to their due end, bears the character of law. Accordingly the eternal law is nothing else than the type of Divine Wisdom, as directing all actions and movements.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking in that passage of the ideal types which regard the proper nature of each single thing; and consequently in them there is a certain distinction and plurality, according to their different relations to things, as stated in the 1, Question 15, Article 2. But law is said to direct human acts by ordaining them to the common good, as stated above (Question 90, Article 2). And things, which are in themselves different, may be considered as one, according as they are ordained to one common thing. Wherefore the eternal law is one since it is the type of this order.

Reply to Objection 2: With regard to any sort of word, two points may be considered: viz. the word itself, and that which is expressed by the word. For the spoken word is something uttered by the mouth of man, and expresses that which is signified by the human word. The same applies to the human mental word, which is nothing else that something conceived by the mind, by which man expresses his thoughts mentally. So then in God the Word conceived by the intellect of the Father is the name of a Person: but all things that are in the Father's knowledge, whether they refer to the Essence or to the Persons, or to the works of God, are expressed by this Word, as Augustine declares (De Trin. xv, 14). And among other things expressed by this Word, the eternal law itself is expressed thereby. Nor does it follow that the eternal law is a Personal name in God: yet it is appropriated to the Son, on account of the kinship between type and word.

Reply to Objection 3: The types of the Divine intellect do not stand in the same relation to things, as the types of the human intellect. For the human intellect is measured by things, so that a human concept is not true by reason of itself, but by reason of its being consonant with things, since "an opinion is true or false according as it answers to the reality." But the Divine intellect is the measure of things: since each thing has so far truth in it, as it represents the Divine intellect, as was stated in the 1, Question 16, Article 1. Consequently the Divine intellect is true in itself; and its type is truth itself.

Articulus 1

Argumentum 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex aeterna non sit ratio summa in deo existens. Lex enim aeterna est una tantum.

Sed rationes rerum in mente divina sunt plures, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod deus singula fecit propriis rationibus.

Ergo lex aeterna non videtur esse idem quod ratio in mente divina existens.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, de ratione legis est quod verbo promulgetur, ut supra dictum est.

Sed verbum in divinis dicitur personaliter, ut in primo habitum est, ratio autem dicitur essentialiter.

Non igitur idem est lex aeterna quod ratio divina.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de vera relig., apparet supra mentem nostram legem esse, quae veritas dicitur.

Lex autem supra mentem nostram existens est lex aeterna.

Ergo veritas est lex aeterna. Sed non est eadem ratio veritatis et rationis. Ergo lex aeterna non est idem quod ratio summa.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. Arb., quod lex aeterna est summa ratio, cui semper obtemperandum est.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in quolibet artifice praeexistit ratio eorum quae constituuntur per artem, ita etiam in quolibet gubernante oportet quod praeexistat ratio ordinis eorum quae agenda sunt per eos qui gubernationi subduntur. Et sicut ratio rerum fiendarum per artem vocatur ars vel exemplar rerum artificiatarum, ita etiam ratio gubernantis actus subditorum, rationem legis obtinet, servatis aliis quae supra esse diximus de legis ratione.

Deus autem per suam sapientiam conditor est universarum rerum, ad quas comparatur sicut artifex ad artificiata, ut in primo habitum est.

Est etiam gubernator omnium actuum et motionum quae inveniuntur in singulis creaturis, ut etiam in primo habitum est.

Unde sicut ratio divinae sapientiae inquantum per eam cuncta sunt creata, rationem habet artis vel exemplaris vel ideae; ita ratio divinae sapientiae moventis omnia ad debitum finem, obtinet rationem legis. Et secundum hoc, lex aeterna nihil aliud est quam ratio divinae sapientiae, secundum quod est directiva omnium actuum et motionum.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur ibi de rationibus idealibus, quae respiciunt proprias naturas singularum rerum, et ideo in eis invenitur quaedam distinctio et pluralitas, secundum diversos respectus ad res, ut in primo habitum est.

Sed lex dicitur directiva actuum in ordine ad bonum commune, ut supra dictum est.

Ea autem quae sunt in seipsis diversa, considerantur ut unum, secundum quod ordinantur ad aliquod commune. Et ideo lex aeterna est una, quae est ratio huius ordinis.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod circa verbum quodcumque duo possunt considerari, scilicet ipsum verbum, et ea quae verbo exprimuntur. Verbum enim vocale est quiddam ab ore hominis prolatum; sed hoc verbo exprimuntur quae verbis humanis significantur. Et eadem ratio est de verbo hominis mentali, quod nihil est aliud quam quiddam mente conceptum, quo homo exprimit mentaliter ea de quibus cogitat. Sic igitur in divinis ipsum verbum, quod est conceptio paterni intellectus, personaliter dicitur, sed omnia quaecumque sunt in scientia patris, sive essentialia sive personalia, sive etiam dei opera exprimuntur hoc verbo, ut patet per Augustinum, in XV de Trin..

Et inter cetera quae hoc verbo exprimuntur, etiam ipsa lex aeterna verbo ipso exprimitur. Nec tamen propter hoc sequitur quod lex aeterna personaliter in divinis dicatur. Appropriatur tamen filio, propter convenientiam quam habet ratio ad verbum.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio intellectus divini aliter se habet ad res quam ratio intellectus humani.

Intellectus enim humanus est mensuratus a rebus, ut scilicet conceptus hominis non sit verus propter seipsum, sed dicitur verus ex hoc quod consonat rebus, ex hoc enim quod res est vel non est, opinio vera vel falsa est.

Intellectus vero divinus est mensura rerum, quia unaquaeque res intantum habet de veritate, inquantum imitatur intellectum divinum, ut in primo dictum est.

Et ideo intellectus divinus est verus secundum se. Unde ratio eius est ipsa veritas.