Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law was not good. For it is written (Ezech. 20:25): "I gave them statutes that were not good, and judgments in which they shall not live." But a law is not said to be good except on account of the goodness of the precepts that it contains. Therefore the Old Law was not good.

Objection 2: Further, it belongs to the goodness of a law that it conduce to the common welfare, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 3). But the Old Law was not salutary; rather was it deadly and hurtful. For the Apostle says (Rm. 7:8, seqq.): "Without the law sin was dead. And I lived some time without the law. But when the commandment came sin revived; and I died." Again he says (Rm. 5:20): "Law entered in that sin might abound." Therefore the Old Law was not good.

Objection 3: Further, it belongs to the goodness of the law that it should be possible to obey it, both according to nature, and according to human custom. But such the Old Law was not: since Peter said (Acts 15:10): "Why tempt you (God) to put a yoke on the necks of the disciples, which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?" Therefore it seems that the Old Law was not good.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 7:12): "Wherefore the law indeed is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good."

I answer that, Without any doubt, the Old Law was good. For just as a doctrine is shown to be good by the fact that it accords with right reason, so is a law proved to be good if it accords with reason. Now the Old Law was in accordance with reason. Because it repressed concupiscence which is in conflict with reason, as evidenced by the commandment, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods" (Ex. 20:17). Moreover the same law forbade all kinds of sin; and these too are contrary to reason. Consequently it is evident that it was a good law. The Apostle argues in the same way (Rm. 7): "I am delighted," says he (verse 22), "with the law of God, according to the inward man": and again (verse 16): "I consent to the law, that is good."

But it must be noted that the good has various degrees, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv): for there is a perfect good, and an imperfect good. In things ordained to an end, there is perfect goodness when a thing is such that it is sufficient in itself to conduce to the end: while there is imperfect goodness when a thing is of some assistance in attaining the end, but is not sufficient for the realization thereof. Thus a medicine is perfectly good, if it gives health to a man; but it is imperfect, if it helps to cure him, without being able to bring him back to health. Again it must be observed that the end of human law is different from the end of Divine law. For the end of human law is the temporal tranquillity of the state, which end law effects by directing external actions, as regards those evils which might disturb the peaceful condition of the state. On the other hand, the end of the Divine law is to bring man to that end which is everlasting happiness; which end is hindered by any sin, not only of external, but also of internal action. Consequently that which suffices for the perfection of human law, viz. the prohibition and punishment of sin, does not suffice for the perfection of the Divine law: but it is requisite that it should make man altogether fit to partake of everlasting happiness. Now this cannot be done save by the grace of the Holy Ghost, whereby "charity" which fulfilleth the law . . . "is spread abroad in our hearts" (Rm. 5:5): since "the grace of God is life everlasting" (Rm. 6:23). But the Old Law could not confer this grace, for this was reserved to Christ; because, as it is written (Jn. 1:17), the law was given "by Moses, grace and truth came by Jesus Christ." Consequently the Old Law was good indeed, but imperfect, according to Heb. 7:19: "The law brought nothing to perfection."

Reply to Objection 1: The Lord refers there to the ceremonial precepts; which are said not to be good, because they did not confer grace unto the remission of sins, although by fulfilling these precepts man confessed himself a sinner. Hence it is said pointedly, "and judgments in which they shall not live"; i.e. whereby they are unable to obtain life; and so the text goes on: "And I polluted them," i.e. showed them to be polluted, "in their own gifts, when they offered all that opened the womb, for their offenses."

Reply to Objection 2: The law is said to have been deadly, as being not the cause, but the occasion of death, on account of its imperfection: in so far as it did not confer grace enabling man to fulfil what is prescribed, and to avoid what it forbade. Hence this occasion was not given to men, but taken by them. Wherefore the Apostle says (Rm. 5:11): "Sin, taking occasion by the commandment, seduced me, and by it killed me." In the same sense when it is said that "the law entered in that sin might abound," the conjunction "that" must be taken as consecutive and not final: in so far as men, taking occasion from the law, sinned all the more, both because a sin became more grievous after law had forbidden it, and because concupiscence increased, since we desire a thing the more from its being forbidden.

Reply to Objection 3: The yoke of the law could not be borne without the help of grace, which the law did not confer: for it is written (Rm. 9:16): "It is not him that willeth, nor of him that runneth," viz. that he wills and runs in the commandments of God, "but of God that showeth mercy." Wherefore it is written (Ps. 118:32): "I have run the way of Thy commandments, when Thou didst enlarge my heart," i.e. by giving me grace and charity.

Articulus 1

Argumentum 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex vetus non fuerit bona.

Dicitur enim Ezech. XX dedi eis praecepta non bona, et iudicia in quibus non vivent.

Sed lex non dicitur bona nisi propter bonitatem praeceptorum quae continet. Ergo lex vetus non fuit bona.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, ad bonitatem legis pertinet ut communi saluti proficiat sicut Isidorus dicit.

Sed lex vetus non fuit salutifera, sed magis mortifera et nociva.

Dicit enim apostolus, Rom. VII, sine lege peccatum mortuum erat. Ego autem vivebam sine lege aliquando, sed cum venisset mandatum, peccatum revixit, ego autem mortuus sum; et Rom. V, lex subintravit ut abundaret delictum.

Ergo lex vetus non fuit bona.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, ad bonitatem legis pertinet quod sit possibilis ad observandum et secundum naturam, et secundum humanam consuetudinem. Sed hoc non habuit lex vetus, dicit enim Petrus, Act. XV, quid tentatis imponere iugum super cervicem discipulorum, quod neque nos, neque patres nostri, portare potuimus? ergo videtur quod lex vetus non fuerit bona.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. VII, itaque lex quidem sancta est, et mandatum sanctum et iustum et bonum.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod absque omni dubio lex vetus bona fuit.

Sicut enim doctrina ostenditur esse vera ex hoc quod consonat rationi rectae, ita etiam lex aliqua ostenditur esse bona ex eo quod consonat rationi.

Lex autem vetus rationi consonabat. Quia concupiscentiam reprimebat, quae rationi adversatur; ut patet in illo mandato, non concupisces rem proximi tui, quod ponitur Exod. XX.

Ipsa etiam omnia peccata prohibebat, quae sunt contra rationem.

Unde manifestum est quod bona erat. Et haec est ratio apostoli, Rom. VII, condelector, inquit, legi dei secundum interiorem hominem; et iterum, consentio legi, quoniam bona est.

Sed notandum est quod bonum diversos gradus habet, ut dionysius dicit, IV cap. De div. Nom., est enim aliquod bonum perfectum, et aliquod bonum imperfectum. Perfecta quidem bonitas est, in his quae ad finem ordinantur, quando aliquid est tale quod per se sufficiens est inducere ad finem, imperfectum autem bonum est quod operatur aliquid ad hoc quod perveniatur ad finem, non tamen sufficit ad hoc quod ad finem perducat.

Sicut medicina perfecte bona est quae hominem sanat, imperfecta autem est quae hominem adiuvat, sed tamen sanare non potest.

Est autem sciendum quod est alius finis legis humanae, et alius legis divinae. Legis enim humanae finis est temporalis tranquillitas civitatis, ad quem finem pervenit lex cohibendo exteriores actus, quantum ad illa mala quae possunt perturbare pacificum statum civitatis.

Finis autem legis divinae est perducere hominem ad finem felicitatis aeternae; qui quidem finis impeditur per quodcumque peccatum, et non solum per actus exteriores, sed etiam per interiores. Et ideo illud quod sufficit ad perfectionem legis humanae, ut scilicet peccata prohibeat et poenam apponat, non sufficit ad perfectionem legis divinae, sed oportet quod hominem totaliter faciat idoneum ad participationem felicitatis aeternae. Quod quidem fieri non potest nisi per gratiam spiritus sancti, per quam diffunditur caritas in cordibus nostris, quae legem adimplet, gratia enim dei vita aeterna, ut dicitur Rom. VI.

Hanc autem gratiam lex vetus conferre non potuit, reservabatur enim hoc christo, quia, ut dicitur Ioan. I, lex per Moysen data est; gratia et veritas per iesum christum facta est.

Et inde est quod lex vetus bona quidem est, sed imperfecta; secundum illud Heb. VII, nihil ad perfectum adduxit lex.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dominus loquitur ibi de praeceptis caeremonialibus; quae quidem dicuntur non bona, quia gratiam non conferebant, per quam homines a peccato mundarentur, cum tamen per huiusmodi se peccatores ostenderent.

Unde signanter dicitur, et iudicia in quibus non vivent, idest per quae vitam gratiae obtinere non possunt; et postea subditur, et pollui eos in muneribus suis, idest pollutos ostendi, cum offerrent omne quod aperit vulvam, propter delicta sua.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod lex dicitur occidisse, non quidem effective, sed occasionaliter, ex sua imperfectione, inquantum scilicet gratiam non conferebat, per quam homines implere possent quod mandabat, vel vitare quod vetabat.

Et sic occasio ista non erat data, sed sumpta ab hominibus.

Unde et apostolus ibidem dicit, occasione accepta peccatum per mandatum seduxit me, et per illud occidit.

Et ex hac etiam ratione dicitur quod lex subintravit ut abundaret delictum, ut ly ut teneatur consecutive, non causaliter, inquantum scilicet homines, accipientes occasionem a lege, abundantius peccaverunt; tum quia gravius fuit peccatum post legis prohibitionem; tum etiam quia concupiscentia crevit, magis enim concupiscimus quod nobis prohibetur.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod iugum legis servari non poterat sine gratia adiuvante, quam lex non dabat, dicitur enim Rom. IX, non est volentis neque currentis, scilicet velle et currere in praeceptis dei, sed miserentis dei.

Unde et in Psalmo CXVIII dicitur, viam mandatorum tuorum cucurri, cum dilatasti cor meum, scilicet per donum gratiae et caritatis.