Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law contains others besides the moral, judicial, and ceremonial precepts. Because the judicial precepts belong to the act of justice, which is between man and man; while the ceremonial precepts belong to the act of religion, whereby God is worshipped. Now besides these there are many other virtues, viz. temperance, fortitude, liberality, and several others, as stated above (Question 60, Article 5). Therefore besides the aforesaid precepts, the Old Law should comprise others.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Dt. 11:1): "Love the Lord thy God, and observe His precepts and ceremonies, His judgments and commandments." Now precepts concern moral matters, as stated above (Article 4). Therefore besides the moral, judicial and ceremonial precepts, the Law contains others which are called "commandments."

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Dt. 6:17): "Keep the precepts of the Lord thy God, and the testimonies and ceremonies which I have commanded thee." Therefore in addition to the above, the Law comprises "testimonies."

Objection 4: Further, it is written (Ps. 118:93): "Thy justifications (i.e. "Thy Law," according to a gloss) I will never forget." Therefore in the Old Law there are not only moral, ceremonial and judicial precepts, but also others, called "justifications."

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:1): "These are the precepts and ceremonies and judgments which the Lord your God commanded . . . you." And these words are placed at the beginning of the Law. Therefore all the precepts of the Law are included under them.

I answer that, Some things are included in the Law by way of precept; other things, as being ordained to the fulfilment of the precepts. Now the precepts refer to things which have to be done: and to their fulfilment man is induced by two considerations, viz. the authority of the lawgiver, and the benefit derived from the fulfilment, which benefit consists in the attainment of some good, useful, pleasurable or virtuous, or in the avoidance of some contrary evil. Hence it was necessary that in the Old Law certain things should be set forth to indicate the authority of God the lawgiver: e.g. Dt. 6:4: "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord"; and Gn. 1:1: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth": and these are called "testimonies." Again it was necessary that in the Law certain rewards should be appointed for those who observe the Law, and punishments for those who transgress; as it may be seen in Dt. 28: "If thou wilt hear the voice of the Lord thy God . . . He will make thee higher than all the nations," etc.: and these are called "justifications," according as God punishes or rewards certain ones justly.

The things that have to be done do not come under the precept except in so far as they have the character of a duty. Now a duty is twofold: one according to the rule of reason; the other according to the rule of a law which prescribes that duty: thus the Philosopher distinguishes a twofold just---moral and legal (Ethic. v, 7).

Moral duty is twofold: because reason dictates that something must be done, either as being so necessary that without it the order of virtue would be destroyed; or as being useful for the better maintaining of the order of virtue. And in this sense some of the moral precepts are expressed by way of absolute command or prohibition, as "Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal": and these are properly called "precepts." Other things are prescribed or forbidden, not as an absolute duty, but as something better to be done. These may be called "commandments"; because they are expressed by way of inducement and persuasion: an example whereof is seen in Ex. 22:26: "If thou take of thy neighbor a garment in pledge, thou shalt give it him again before sunset"; and in other like cases. Wherefore Jerome (Praefat. in Comment. super Marc.) says that "justice is in the precepts, charity in the commandments." Duty as fixed by the Law, belongs to the judicial precepts, as regards human affairs; to the "ceremonial" precepts, as regards Divine matters.

Nevertheless those ordinances also which refer to punishments and rewards may be called "testimonies," in so far as they testify to the Divine justice. Again all the precepts of the Law may be styled "justifications," as being executions of legal justice. Furthermore the commandments may be distinguished from the precepts, so that those things be called "precepts" which God Himself prescribed; and those things "commandments" which He enjoined through others, as the very word seems to denote.

From this it is clear that all the precepts of the Law are either moral, ceremonial, or judicial; and that other ordinances have not the character of a precept, but are directed to the observance of the precepts, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 1: Justice alone, of all the virtues, implies the notion of duty. Consequently moral matters are determinable by law in so far as they belong to justice: of which virtue religion is a part, as Tully says (De Invent. ii). Wherefore the legal just cannot be anything foreign to the ceremonial and judicial precepts.

The Replies to the other Objections are clear from what has been said.

Articulus 5

Argumentum 1

Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliqua alia praecepta contineantur in lege veteri praeter moralia, iudicialia et caeremonialia.

Iudicialia enim praecepta pertinent ad actum iustitiae, quae est hominis ad hominem; caeremonialia vero pertinent ad actum religionis, qua deus colitur. Sed praeter has sunt multae aliae virtutes, scilicet temperantia, fortitudo, liberalitas, et aliae plures, ut supra dictum est.

Ergo praeter praedicta oportet plura alia in lege veteri contineri.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, Deut. XI dicitur, ama dominum deum tuum, et observa eius praecepta et caeremonias et iudicia atque mandata.

Sed praecepta pertinent ad moralia, ut dictum est.

Ergo praeter moralia, iudicialia et caeremonialia, adhuc alia continentur in lege, quae dicuntur mandata.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, Deut. VI dicitur, custodi praecepta domini dei tui, ac testimonia et caeremonias quas tibi praecepi.

Ergo praeter omnia praedicta adhuc in lege testimonia continentur.

Argumentum 4

Praeterea, in Psalmo CXVIII dicitur, in aeternum non obliviscar iustificationes tuas, Glossa, idest legem.

Ergo praecepta legis veteris non solum sunt moralia, caeremonialia et iudicialia, sed etiam iustificationes.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod dicitur Deut. VI, haec sunt praecepta et caeremoniae atque iudicia quae mandavit dominus deus vobis.

Et haec ponuntur in principio legis.

Ergo omnia praecepta legis sub his comprehenduntur.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod in lege ponuntur aliqua tanquam praecepta; aliqua vero tanquam ad praeceptorum adimpletionem ordinata. Praecepta quidem sunt de his quae sunt agenda.

Ad quorum impletionem ex duobus homo inducitur, scilicet ex auctoritate praecipientis; et ex utilitate impletionis, quae quidem est consecutio alicuius boni utilis, delectabilis vel honesti, aut fuga alicuius mali contrarii. Oportuit igitur in veteri lege proponi quaedam quae auctoritatem dei praecipientis indicarent, sicut illud Deut. VI, audi, Israel, dominus deus tuus deus unus est; et illud Gen. I, in principio creavit deus caelum et terram.

Et huiusmodi dicuntur testimonia. Oportuit etiam quod in lege proponerentur quaedam praemia observantium legem, et poenae transgredientium, ut patet Deut. XXVIII, si audieris vocem domini dei tui, faciet te excelsiorem cunctis gentibus, etc..

Et huiusmodi dicuntur iustificationes, secundum quod deus aliquos iuste punit vel praemiat.

Ipsa autem agenda sub praecepto non cadunt nisi inquantum habent aliquam debiti rationem. Est autem duplex debitum, unum quidem secundum regulam rationis, aliud autem secundum regulam legis determinantis; sicut philosophus, in V ethic., distinguit duplex iustum, scilicet morale et legale. Debitum autem morale est duplex, dictat enim ratio aliquid faciendum vel tanquam necessarium, sine quo non potest esse ordo virtutis; vel tanquam utile ad hoc quod ordo virtutis melius conservetur. Et secundum hoc, quaedam Moralium praecise praecipiuntur vel prohibentur in lege, sicut, non occides, non furtum facies.

Et haec proprie dicuntur praecepta.

Quaedam vero praecipiuntur vel prohibentur, non quasi praecise debita, sed propter melius. Et ista possunt dici mandata, quia quandam inductionem habent et persuasionem.

Sicut illud Exod. XXII, si pignus acceperis vestimentum a proximo tuo, ante solis occasum reddas ei; et aliqua similia.

Unde Hieronymus dicit quod in praeceptis est iustitia, in mandatis vero caritas.

Debitum autem ex determinatione legis, in rebus quidem humanis pertinet ad iudicialia; in rebus autem divinis, ad caeremonialia. Quamvis etiam ea quae pertinent ad poenam vel praemia, dici possint testimonia, inquantum sunt protestationes quaedam divinae iustitiae. Omnia vero praecepta legis possunt dici iustificationes, inquantum sunt quaedam executiones legalis iustitiae. Possunt etiam aliter mandata a praeceptis distingui, ut praecepta dicantur quae deus per seipsum iussit; mandata autem, quae per alios mandavit, ut ipsum nomen sonare videtur.

Ex quibus omnibus apparet quod omnia legis praecepta continentur sub moralibus, caeremonialibus et iudicialibus, alia vero non habent rationem praeceptorum, sed ordinantur ad praeceptorum observationem, ut dictum est.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sola iustitia, inter alias virtutes, importat rationem debiti. Et ideo moralia intantum sunt lege determinabilia, inquantum pertinent ad iustitiam, cuius etiam quaedam pars est religio, ut tullius dicit.

Unde iustum legale non potest esse aliquod praeter caeremonialia et iudicialia praecepta.

Ad 2

Ad alia patet responsio per ea quae dicta sunt.