Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into operating and cooperating grace. For grace is an accident, as stated above (Question 110, Article 2). Now no accident can act upon its subject. Therefore no grace can be called operating.

Objection 2: Further, if grace operates anything in us it assuredly brings about justification. But not only grace works this. For Augustine says, on Jn. 14:12, "the works that I do he also shall do," says (Serm. clxix): "He Who created thee without thyself, will not justify thee without thyself." Therefore no grace ought to be called simply operating.

Objection 3: Further, to cooperate seems to pertain to the inferior agent, and not to the principal agent. But grace works in us more than free-will, according to Rm. 9:16: "It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy." Therefore no grace ought to be called cooperating.

Objection 4: Further, division ought to rest on opposition. But to operate and to cooperate are not opposed; for one and the same thing can both operate and cooperate. Therefore grace is not fittingly divided into operating and cooperating.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Gratia et Lib. Arbit. xvii): "God by cooperating with us, perfects what He began by operating in us, since He who perfects by cooperation with such as are willing, beings by operating that they may will." But the operations of God whereby He moves us to good pertain to grace. Therefore grace is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating.

I answer that, As stated above (Question 110, Article 2) grace may be taken in two ways; first, as a Divine help, whereby God moves us to will and to act; secondly, as a habitual gift divinely bestowed on us.

Now in both these ways grace is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating. For the operation of an effect is not attributed to the thing moved but to the mover. Hence in that effect in which our mind is moved and does not move, but in which God is the sole mover, the operation is attributed to God, and it is with reference to this that we speak of "operating grace." But in that effect in which our mind both moves and is moved, the operation is not only attributed to God, but also to the soul; and it is with reference to this that we speak of "cooperating grace." Now there is a double act in us. First, there is the interior act of the will, and with regard to this act the will is a thing moved, and God is the mover; and especially when the will, which hitherto willed evil, begins to will good. And hence, inasmuch as God moves the human mind to this act, we speak of operating grace. But there is another, exterior act; and since it is commanded by the will, as was shown above (Question 17, Article 9) the operation of this act is attributed to the will. And because God assists us in this act, both by strengthening our will interiorly so as to attain to the act, and by granting outwardly the capability of operating, it is with respect to this that we speak of cooperating grace. Hence after the aforesaid words Augustine subjoins: "He operates that we may will; and when we will, He cooperates that we may perfect." And thus if grace is taken for God's gratuitous motion whereby He moves us to meritorious good, it is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating grace.

But if grace is taken for the habitual gift, then again there is a double effect of grace, even as of every other form; the first of which is "being," and the second, "operation"; thus the work of heat is to make its subject hot, and to give heat outwardly. And thus habitual grace, inasmuch as it heals and justifies the soul, or makes it pleasing to God, is called operating grace; but inasmuch as it is the principle of meritorious works, which spring from the free-will, it is called cooperating grace.

Reply to Objection 1: Inasmuch as grace is a certain accidental quality, it does not act upon the soul efficiently, but formally, as whiteness makes a surface white.

Reply to Objection 2: God does not justify us without ourselves, because whilst we are being justified we consent to God's justification by a movement of our free-will. Nevertheless this movement is not the cause of grace, but the effect; hence the whole operation pertains to grace.

Reply to Objection 3: One thing is said to cooperate with another not merely when it is a secondary agent under a principal agent, but when it helps to the end intended. Now man is helped by God to will the good, through the means of operating grace. And hence, the end being already intended, grace cooperates with us.

Reply to Objection 4: Operating and cooperating grace are the same grace; but are distinguished by their different effects, as is plain from what has been said.

Articulus 2

Argumentum 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod gratia inconvenienter dividatur per operantem et cooperantem.

Gratia enim accidens quoddam est, ut supra dictum est.

Sed accidens non potest agere in subiectum.

Ergo nulla gratia debet dici operans.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, si gratia aliquid operetur in nobis, maxime operatur iustificationem. Sed hoc non sola gratia operatur in nobis, dicit enim Augustinus, super illud Ioan. XIV, opera quae ego facio, et ipse faciet, qui creavit te sine te, non iustificabit te sine te.

Ergo nulla gratia debet dici simpliciter operans.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, cooperari alicui videtur pertinere ad inferius agens, non autem ad principalius. Sed gratia principalius operatur in nobis quam liberum arbitrium; secundum illud Rom. IX, non est volentis neque currentis, sed miserentis dei.

Ergo gratia non debet dici cooperans.

Argumentum 4

Praeterea, divisio debet dari per opposita. Sed operari et cooperari non sunt opposita, idem enim potest operari et cooperari. Ergo inconvenienter dividitur gratia per operantem et cooperantem.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de grat. Et Lib. Arb., cooperando deus in nobis perficit quod operando incipit, quia ipse ut velimus operatur incipiens, qui volentibus cooperatur perficiens.

Sed operationes dei quibus movet nos ad bonum, ad gratiam pertinent. Ergo convenienter gratia dividitur per operantem et cooperantem.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, gratia dupliciter potest intelligi, uno modo, divinum auxilium quo nos movet ad bene volendum et agendum; alio modo, habituale donum nobis divinitus inditum. Utroque autem modo gratia dicta convenienter dividitur per operantem et cooperantem. Operatio enim alicuius effectus non attribuitur mobili, sed moventi. In illo ergo effectu in quo mens nostra est mota et non movens, solus autem deus movens, operatio deo attribuitur, et secundum hoc dicitur gratia operans.

In illo autem effectu in quo mens nostra et movet et movetur, operatio non solum attribuitur deo, sed etiam animae, et secundum hoc dicitur gratia cooperans.

Est autem in nobis duplex actus. Primus quidem, interior voluntatis. Et quantum ad istum actum, voluntas se habet ut mota, deus autem ut movens, et praesertim cum voluntas incipit bonum velle quae prius malum volebat.

Et ideo secundum quod deus movet humanam mentem ad hunc actum, dicitur gratia operans. Alius autem actus est exterior; qui cum a voluntate imperetur, ut supra habitum est, consequens est ut ad hunc actum operatio attribuatur voluntati.

Et quia etiam ad hunc actum deus nos adiuvat, et interius confirmando voluntatem ut ad actum perveniat, et exterius facultatem operandi praebendo; respectu huius actus dicitur gratia cooperans.

Unde post praemissa verba subdit Augustinus, ut autem velimus operatur, cum autem volumus, ut perficiamus nobis cooperatur.

Sic igitur si gratia accipiatur pro gratuita dei motione qua movet nos ad bonum meritorium, convenienter dividitur gratia per operantem et cooperantem. Si vero accipiatur gratia pro habituali dono, sic etiam duplex est gratiae effectus, sicut et cuiuslibet alterius formae, quorum primus est esse, secundus est operatio; sicut caloris operatio est facere calidum, et exterior calefactio. Sic igitur habitualis gratia, inquantum animam sanat vel iustificat, sive gratam deo facit, dicitur gratia operans, inquantum vero est principium operis meritorii, quod etiam ex libero arbitrio procedit, dicitur cooperans.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, secundum quod gratia est quaedam qualitas accidentalis, non agit in animam effective; sed formaliter, sicut albedo dicitur facere albam superficiem.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod deus non sine nobis nos iustificat, quia per motum liberi arbitrii, dum iustificamur, dei iustitiae consentimus.

Ille tamen motus non est causa gratiae, sed effectus.

Unde tota operatio pertinet ad gratiam.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod cooperari dicitur aliquis alicui non solum sicut secundarium agens principali agenti, sed sicut adiuvans ad praesuppositum finem. Homo autem per gratiam operantem adiuvatur a deo ut bonum velit.

Et ideo, praesupposito iam fine, consequens est ut gratia nobis cooperetur.

Ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod gratia operans et cooperans est eadem gratia, sed distinguitur secundum diversos effectus, ut ex dictis patet.