Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not greater in one than in another. For grace is caused in us by the Divine love, as stated above (Question 110, Article 1). Now it is written (Wis. 6:8): "He made the little and the great and He hath equally care of all." Therefore all obtain grace from Him equally.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is the greatest possible, cannot be more or less. But grace is the greatest possible, since it joins us with our last end. Therefore there is no greater or less in it. Hence it is not greater in one than in another.

Objection 3: Further, grace is the soul's life, as stated above (Question 110, Article 1, ad 2). But there is no greater or less in life. Hence, neither is there in grace.

On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 4:7): "But to every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ." Now what is given in measure, is not given to all equally. Hence all have not an equal grace.

I answer that, As stated above (Question 52, Articles 1,2; Question 56, Articles 1,2), habits can have a double magnitude: one, as regards the end or object, as when a virtue is said to be more noble through being ordained to a greater good; the other on the part of the subject, which more or less participates in the habit inhering to it.

Now as regards the first magnitude, sanctifying grace cannot be greater or less, since, of its nature, grace joins man to the Highest Good, which is God. But as regards the subject, grace can receive more or less, inasmuch as one may be more perfectly enlightened by grace than another. And a certain reason for this is on the part of him who prepares himself for grace; since he who is better prepared for grace, receives more grace. Yet it is not here that we must seek the first cause of this diversity, since man prepares himself, only inasmuch as his free-will is prepared by God. Hence the first cause of this diversity is to be sought on the part of the God, Who dispenses His gifts of grace variously, in order that the beauty and perfection of the Church may result from these various degree; even as He instituted the various conditions of things, that the universe might be perfect. Hence after the Apostle had said (Eph. 4:7): "To every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ," having enumerated the various graces, he adds (Eph. 4:12): "For the perfecting of the saints . . . for the edifying of the body of Christ."

Reply to Objection 1: The Divine care may be looked at in two ways: first, as regards the Divine act, which is simple and uniform; and thus His care looks equally to all, since by one simple act He administers great things and little. But, "secondly," it may be considered in those things which come to be considered by the Divine care; and thus, inequality is found, inasmuch as God by His care provides greater gifts to some, and lesser gifts for others.

Reply to Objection 2: This objection is based on the first kind of magnitude of grace; since grace cannot be greater by ordaining to a greater good, but inasmuch as it more or less ordains to a greater or less participation of the same good. For there may be diversity of intensity and remissness, both in grace and in final glory as regards the subjects' participation.

Reply to Objection 3: Natural life pertains to man's substance, and hence cannot be more or less; but man partakes of the life of grace accidentally, and hence man may possess it more or less.

Articulus 4

Argumentum 1

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod gratia non sit maior in uno quam in alio.

Gratia enim causatur in nobis ex dilectione divina, ut dictum est.

Sed Sap. VI dicitur, pusillum et magnum ipse fecit, et aequaliter est illi cura de omnibus.

Ergo omnes aequaliter gratiam ab eo consequuntur.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, ea quae in summo dicuntur, non recipiunt magis et minus. Sed gratia in summo dicitur, quia coniungit ultimo fini.

Ergo non recipit magis et minus.

Non ergo est maior in uno quam in alio.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, gratia est vita animae, ut supra dictum est.

Sed vivere non dicitur secundum magis et minus.

Ergo etiam neque gratia.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod dicitur ad Ephes. IV, unicuique data est gratia secundum mensuram donationis christi.

Quod autem mensurate datur, non omnibus aequaliter datur.

Ergo non omnes aequalem gratiam habent.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus duplicem magnitudinem habere potest, unam ex parte finis vel obiecti, secundum quod dicitur una virtus alia nobilior inquantum ad maius bonum ordinatur; aliam vero ex parte subiecti, quod magis vel minus participat habitum inhaerentem. Secundum igitur primam magnitudinem, gratia gratum faciens non potest esse maior et minor, quia gratia secundum sui rationem coniungit hominem summo bono, quod est deus. Sed ex parte subiecti, gratia potest suscipere magis vel minus, prout scilicet unus perfectius illustratur a lumine gratiae quam alius. Cuius diversitatis ratio quidem est aliqua ex parte praeparantis se ad gratiam, qui enim se magis ad gratiam praeparat, pleniorem gratiam accipit. Sed ex hac parte non potest accipi prima ratio huius diversitatis, quia praeparatio ad gratiam non est hominis nisi inquantum liberum arbitrium eius praeparatur a deo. Unde prima causa huius diversitatis accipienda est ex parte ipsius dei, qui diversimode suae gratiae dona dispensat, ad hoc quod ex diversis gradibus pulchritudo et perfectio ecclesiae consurgat, sicut etiam diversos gradus rerum instituit ut esset universum perfectum.

Unde apostolus, ad Ephes. IV, postquam dixerat, unicuique data est gratia secundum mensuram donationis christi, enumeratis diversis gratiis, subiungit, ad consummationem sanctorum, in aedificationem corporis christi.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod cura divina dupliciter considerari potest. Uno modo, quantum ad ipsum divinum actum, qui est simplex et uniformis. Et secundum hoc, aequaliter se habet eius cura ad omnes, quia scilicet uno actu et simplici et maiora et minora dispensat. Alio modo potest considerari ex parte eorum quae in creaturis ex divina cura proveniunt.

Et secundum hoc invenitur inaequalitas, inquantum scilicet deus sua cura quibusdam maiora, quibusdam minora providet dona.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit secundum primum modum magnitudinis gratiae. Non enim potest gratia secundum hoc maior esse, quod ad maius bonum ordinet, sed ex eo quod magis vel minus ordinat ad idem bonum magis vel minus participandum. Potest enim esse diversitas intensionis et remissionis secundum participationem subiecti, et in ipsa gratia et in finali gloria.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod vita naturalis pertinet ad substantiam hominis, et ideo non recipit magis et minus.

Sed vitam gratiae participat homo accidentaliter, et ideo eam potest homo magis vel minus habere.