Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that for the remission of guilt, which is the justification of the ungodly, no infusion of grace is required. For anyone may be moved from one contrary without being led to the other, if the contraries are not immediate. Now the state of guilt and the state of grace are not immediate contraries; for there is the middle state of innocence wherein a man has neither grace nor guilt. Hence a man may be pardoned his guilt without his being brought to a state of grace.

Objection 2: Further, the remission of guilt consists in the Divine imputation, according to Ps. 31:2: "Blessed is the man to whom the Lord hath not imputed sin." Now the infusion of grace puts something into our soul, as stated above (Question 110, Article 1). Hence the infusion of grace is not required for the remission of guilt.

Objection 3: Further, no one can be subject to two contraries at once. Now some sins are contraries, as wastefulness and miserliness. Hence whoever is subject to the sin of wastefulness is not simultaneously subject to the sin of miserliness, yet it may happen that he has been subject to it hitherto. Hence by sinning with the vice of wastefulness he is freed from the sin of miserliness. And thus a sin is remitted without grace.

On the contrary, It is written (Rm. 3:24): "Justified freely by His grace."

I answer that, by sinning a man offends God as stated above (Question 71, Article 5). Now an offense is remitted to anyone, only when the soul of the offender is at peace with the offended. Hence sin is remitted to us, when God is at peace with us, and this peace consists in the love whereby God loves us. Now God's love, considered on the part of the Divine act, is eternal and unchangeable; whereas, as regards the effect it imprints on us, it is sometimes interrupted, inasmuch as we sometimes fall short of it and once more require it. Now the effect of the Divine love in us, which is taken away by sin, is grace, whereby a man is made worthy of eternal life, from which sin shuts him out. Hence we could not conceive the remission of guilt, without the infusion of grace.

Reply to Objection 1: More is required for an offender to pardon an offense, than for one who has committed no offense, not to be hated. For it may happen amongst men that one man neither hates nor loves another. But if the other offends him, then the forgiveness of the offense can only spring from a special goodwill. Now God's goodwill is said to be restored to man by the gift of grace; and hence although a man before sinning may be without grace and without guilt, yet that he is without guilt after sinning can only be because he has grace.

Reply to Objection 2: As God's love consists not merely in the act of the Divine will but also implies a certain effect of grace, as stated above (Question 110, Article 1), so likewise, when God does not impute sin to a man, there is implied a certain effect in him to whom the sin is not imputed; for it proceeds from the Divine love, that sin is not imputed to a man by God.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i, 26), if to leave off sinning was the same as to have no sin, it would be enough if Scripture warned us thus: "'My son, hast thou sinned? do so no more?' Now this is not enough, but it is added: 'But for thy former sins also pray that they may be forgiven thee.'" For the act of sin passes, but the guilt remains, as stated above (Question 87, Article 6). Hence when anyone passes from the sin of one vice to the sin of a contrary vice, he ceases to have the act of the former sin, but he does not cease to have the guilt, hence he may have the guilt of both sins at once. For sins are not contrary to each other on the part of their turning from God, wherein sin has its guilt.

Articulus 2

Argumentum 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad remissionem culpae, quae est iustificatio impii, non requiratur gratiae infusio.

Potest enim aliquis removeri ab uno contrario sine hoc quod perducatur ad alterum, si contraria sint mediata. Sed status culpae et status gratiae sunt contraria mediata, est enim medius status innocentiae, in quo homo nec gratiam habet nec culpam.

Ergo potest alicui remitti culpa sine hoc quod perducatur ad gratiam.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, remissio culpae consistit in reputatione divina; secundum illud Psalmi XXXI, beatus vir cui non imputavit dominus peccatum.

Sed infusio gratiae ponit etiam aliquid in nobis, ut supra habitum est.

Ergo infusio gratiae non requiritur ad remissionem culpae.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, nullus subiicitur simul duobus contrariis. Sed quaedam peccata sunt contraria, sicut prodigalitas et illiberalitas. Ergo qui subiicitur peccato prodigalitatis, non simul subiicitur peccato illiberalitatis. Potest tamen contingere quod prius ei subiiciebatur. Ergo peccando vitio prodigalitatis, liberatur a peccato illiberalitatis.

Et sic remittitur aliquod peccatum sine gratia.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom. III, iustificati gratis per gratiam ipsius.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod homo peccando deum offendit, sicut ex supradictis patet.

Offensa autem non remittitur alicui nisi per hoc quod animus offensi pacatur offendenti.

Et ideo secundum hoc peccatum nobis remitti dicitur, quod deus nobis pacatur. Quae quidem pax consistit in dilectione qua deus nos diligit. Dilectio autem dei, quantum est ex parte actus divini, est aeterna et immutabilis, sed quantum ad effectum quem nobis imprimit, quandoque interrumpitur, prout scilicet ab ipso quandoque deficimus et quandoque iterum recuperamus. Effectus autem divinae dilectionis in nobis qui per peccatum tollitur, est gratia, qua homo fit dignus vita aeterna, a qua peccatum mortale excludit. Et ideo non posset intelligi remissio culpae, nisi adesset infusio gratiae.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod plus requiritur ad hoc quod offendenti remittatur offensa, quam ad hoc quod simpliciter aliquis non offendens non habeatur odio. Potest enim apud homines contingere quod unus homo aliquem alium nec diligat nec odiat; sed si eum offendat, quod ei dimittat offensam, hoc non potest contingere absque speciali benevolentia.

Benevolentia autem dei ad hominem reparari dicitur per donum gratiae. Et ideo licet, antequam homo peccet, potuerit esse sine gratia et sine culpa; tamen post peccatum, non potest esse sine culpa nisi gratiam habeat.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dilectio dei non solum consistit in actu voluntatis divinae, sed etiam importat quendam gratiae effectum, ut supra dictum est; ita etiam et hoc quod est deum non imputare peccatum homini, importat quendam effectum in ipso cuius peccatum non imputatur.

Quod enim alicui non imputetur peccatum a deo, ex divina dilectione procedit.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de nuptiis et concup., si a peccato desistere, hoc esset non habere peccatum, sufficeret ut hoc moneret Scriptura, fili, peccasti, non adiicias iterum.

Non autem sufficit, sed additur, et de pristinis deprecare, ut tibi remittantur.

Transit enim peccatum actu, et remanet reatu, ut supra dictum est.

Et ideo cum aliquis a peccato unius vitii transit in peccatum contrarii vitii, desinit quidem habere actum praeteriti, sed non desinit habere reatum, unde simul habet reatum utriusque peccati. Non enim peccata sunt sibi contraria ex parte aversionis a deo, ex qua parte peccatum reatum habet.