Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that a man in grace cannot merit eternal life condignly, for the Apostle says (Rm. 8:18): "The sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us." But of all meritorious works, the sufferings of the saints would seem the most meritorious. Therefore no works of men are meritorious of eternal life condignly.

Objection 2: Further, on Rm. 6:23, "The grace of God, life everlasting," a gloss says: "He might have truly said: 'The wages of justice, life everlasting'; but He preferred to say 'The grace of God, life everlasting,' that we may know that God leads us to life everlasting of His own mercy and not by our merits." Now when anyone merits something condignly he receives it not from mercy, but from merit. Hence it would seem that a man with grace cannot merit life everlasting condignly.

Objection 3: Further, merit that equals the reward, would seem to be condign. Now no act of the present life can equal everlasting life, which surpasses our knowledge and our desire, and moreover, surpasses the charity or love of the wayfarer, even as it exceeds nature. Therefore with grace a man cannot merit eternal life condignly.

On the contrary, What is granted in accordance with a fair judgment, would seem a condign reward. But life everlasting is granted by God, in accordance with the judgment of justice, according to 2 Tim. 4:8: "As to the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me in that day." Therefore man merits everlasting life condignly.

I answer that, Man's meritorious work may be considered in two ways: first, as it proceeds from free-will; secondly, as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Ghost. If it is considered as regards the substance of the work, and inasmuch as it springs from the free-will, there can be no condignity because of the very great inequality. But there is congruity, on account of an equality of proportion: for it would seem congruous that, if a man does what he can, God should reward him according to the excellence of his power.

If, however, we speak of a meritorious work, inasmuch as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Ghost moving us to life everlasting, it is meritorious of life everlasting condignly. For thus the value of its merit depends upon the power of the Holy Ghost moving us to life everlasting according to Jn. 4:14: "Shall become in him a fount of water springing up into life everlasting." And the worth of the work depends on the dignity of grace, whereby a man, being made a partaker of the Divine Nature, is adopted as a son of God, to whom the inheritance is due by right of adoption, according to Rm. 8:17: "If sons, heirs also."

Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle is speaking of the substance of these sufferings.

Reply to Objection 2: This saying is to be understood of the first cause of our reaching everlasting life, viz. God's mercy. But our merit is a subsequent cause.

Reply to Objection 3: The grace of the Holy Ghost which we have at present, although unequal to glory in act, is equal to it virtually as the seed of a tree, wherein the whole tree is virtually. So likewise by grace of the Holy Ghost dwells in man; and He is a sufficient cause of life everlasting; hence, 2 Cor. 1:22, He is called the "pledge" of our inheritance.

Articulus 3

Argumentum 1

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo in gratia constitutus non possit mereri vitam aeternam ex condigno.

Dicit enim apostolus, ad Rom. VIII, non sunt condignae passiones huius temporis ad futuram gloriam quae revelabitur in nobis.

Sed inter alia opera meritoria maxime videntur esse meritoriae sanctorum passiones. Ergo nulla opera hominum sunt meritoria vitae aeternae ex condigno.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, super illud Rom. VI, gratia dei vita aeterna, dicit Glossa, posset recte dicere, stipendium iustitiae vita aeterna, sed maluit dicere, gratia dei vita aeterna, ut intelligeremus deum ad aeternam vitam pro sua miseratione nos perducere, non meritis nostris.

Sed id quod ex condigno quis meretur, non ex miseratione, sed ex merito accipit. Ergo videtur quod homo non possit per gratiam mereri vitam aeternam ex condigno.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, illud meritum videtur esse condignum quod aequatur mercedi. Sed nullus actus praesentis vitae potest aequari vitae aeternae, quae cognitionem et desiderium nostrum excedit. Excedit etiam caritatem vel dilectionem viae, sicut et excedit naturam. Ergo homo non potest per gratiam mereri vitam aeternam ex condigno.

Sed Contra

Sed contra, id quod redditur secundum iustum iudicium, videtur esse merces condigna. Sed vita aeterna redditur a deo secundum iudicium iustitiae; secundum illud II ad Tim. IV, in reliquo reposita est mihi corona iustitiae, quam reddet mihi dominus in illa die, iustus iudex.

Ergo homo meretur vitam aeternam ex condigno.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod opus meritorium hominis dupliciter considerari potest, uno modo, secundum quod procedit ex libero arbitrio; alio modo, secundum quod procedit ex gratia spiritus sancti. Si consideretur secundum substantiam operis, et secundum quod procedit ex libero arbitrio, sic non potest ibi esse condignitas, propter maximam inaequalitatem. Sed est ibi congruitas, propter quandam aequalitatem proportionis, videtur enim congruum ut homini operanti secundum suam virtutem, deus recompenset secundum excellentiam suae virtutis. Si autem loquamur de opere meritorio secundum quod procedit ex gratia spiritus sancti, sic est meritorium vitae aeternae ex condigno.

Sic enim valor meriti attenditur secundum virtutem spiritus sancti moventis nos in vitam aeternam; secundum illud Ioan. IV, fiet in eo fons aquae salientis in vitam aeternam.

Attenditur etiam pretium operis secundum dignitatem gratiae, per quam homo, consors factus divinae naturae, adoptatur in filium dei, cui debetur hereditas ex ipso iure adoptionis, secundum illud Rom. VIII, si filii, et heredes.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod apostolus loquitur de passionibus sanctorum secundum eorum substantiam.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum Glossae intelligendum est quantum ad primam causam perveniendi ad vitam aeternam, quae est miseratio dei. Meritum autem nostrum est causa subsequens.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod gratia spiritus sancti quam in praesenti habemus, etsi non sit aequalis gloriae in actu, est tamen aequalis in virtute, sicut et semen arborum, in quo est virtus ad totam arborem. Et similiter per gratiam inhabitat hominem spiritus sanctus, qui est sufficiens causa vitae aeternae, unde et dicitur esse pignus hereditatis nostrae, II ad Cor. I.