Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that a man may merit for himself the first grace, because, as Augustine says (Ep. clxxxvi), "faith merits justification." Now a man is justified by the first grace. Therefore a man may merit the first grace.

Objection 2: Further, God gives grace only to the worthy. Now, no one is said to be worthy of some good, unless he has merited it condignly. Therefore we may merit the first grace condignly.

Objection 3: Further, with men we may merit a gift already received. Thus if a man receives a horse from his master, he merits it by a good use of it in his master's service. Now God is much more bountiful than man. Much more, therefore, may a man, by subsequent works, merit the first grace already received from God.

On the contrary, The nature of grace is repugnant to reward of works, according to Rm. 4:4: "Now to him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned according to grace but according to debt." Now a man merits what is reckoned to him according to debt, as the reward of his works. Hence a man may not merit the first grace.

I answer that, The gift of grace may be considered in two ways: first in the nature of a gratuitous gift, and thus it is manifest that all merit is repugnant to grace, since as the Apostle says (Rm. 11:6), "if by grace, it is not now by works." Secondly, it may be considered as regards the nature of the thing given, and thus, also, it cannot come under the merit of him who has not grace, both because it exceeds the proportion of nature, and because previous to grace a man in the state of sin has an obstacle to his meriting grace, viz. sin. But when anyone has grace, the grace already possessed cannot come under merit, since reward is the term of the work, but grace is the principle of all our good works, as stated above (Question 109). But of anyone merits a further gratuitous gift by virtue of the preceding grace, it would not be the first grace. Hence it is manifest that no one can merit for himself the first grace.

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Retract. i, 23), he was deceived on this point for a time, believing the beginning of faith to be from us, and its consummation to be granted us by God; and this he here retracts. And seemingly it is in this sense that he speaks of faith as meriting justification. But if we suppose, as indeed it is a truth of faith, that the beginning of faith is in us from God, the first act must flow from grace; and thus it cannot be meritorious of the first grace. Therefore man is justified by faith, not as though man, by believing, were to merit justification, but that, he believes, whilst he is being justified; inasmuch as a movement of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly, as stated above (Question 113, Article 4).

Reply to Objection 2: God gives grace to none but to the worthy, not that they were previously worthy, but that by His grace He makes them worthy, Who alone "can make him clean that is conceived of unclean seed" (Job 14:4).

Reply to Objection 3: Man's every good work proceeds from the first grace as from its principle; but not from any gift of man. Consequently, there is no comparison between gifts of grace and gifts of men.

Articulus 5

Argumentum 1

Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo possit sibi mereri primam gratiam.

Quia ut Augustinus dicit, fides meretur iustificationem.

Iustificatur autem homo per primam gratiam.

Ergo homo potest sibi mereri primam gratiam.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, deus non dat gratiam nisi dignis. Sed non dicitur aliquis dignus aliquo dono, nisi qui ipsum promeruit ex condigno.

Ergo aliquis ex condigno potest mereri primam gratiam.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, apud homines aliquis potest promereri donum iam acceptum, sicut qui accepit equum a domino, meretur ipsum bene utendo eo in servitio domini. Sed deus est liberalior quam homo.

Ergo multo magis primam gratiam iam susceptam potest homo promereri a deo per subsequentia opera.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod ratio gratiae repugnat mercedi operum; secundum illud Rom. IV, ei qui operatur, merces non imputatur secundum gratiam, sed secundum debitum.

Sed illud meretur homo quod imputatur quasi merces operis eius.

Ergo primam gratiam non potest homo mereri.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod donum gratiae considerari potest dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum rationem gratuiti doni. Et sic manifestum est quod omne meritum repugnat gratiae, quia ut ad Rom. XI apostolus dicit, si ex operibus, iam non ex gratia.

Alio modo potest considerari secundum naturam ipsius rei quae donatur. Et sic etiam non potest cadere sub merito non habentis gratiam, tum quia excedit proportionem naturae; tum etiam quia ante gratiam, in statu peccati, homo habet impedimentum promerendi gratiam, scilicet ipsum peccatum. Postquam autem iam aliquis habet gratiam, non potest gratia iam habita sub merito cadere, quia merces est terminus operis, gratia vero est principium cuiuslibet boni operis in nobis, ut supra dictum est.

Si vero aliud donum gratuitum aliquis mereatur virtute gratiae praecedentis, iam non erit prima. Unde manifestum est quod nullus potest sibi mereri primam gratiam.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro retract., ipse aliquando in hoc fuit deceptus, quod credidit initium fidei esse ex nobis, sed consummationem nobis dari ex deo, quod ipse ibidem retractat.

Et ad hunc sensum videtur pertinere quod fides iustificationem mereatur.

Sed si supponamus, sicut fidei veritas habet, quod initium fidei sit in nobis a deo; iam etiam ipse actus fidei consequitur primam gratiam, et ita non potest esse meritorius primae gratiae.

Per fidem igitur iustificatur homo, non quasi homo credendo mereatur iustificationem, sed quia, dum iustificatur, credit; eo quod motus fidei requiritur ad iustificationem impii,

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod deus non dat gratiam nisi dignis.

Non tamen ita quod prius digni fuerint, sed quia ipse per gratiam eos facit dignos, qui solus potest facere mundum de immundo conceptum semine.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod omne bonum opus hominis procedit a prima gratia sicut a principio. Non autem procedit a quocumque humano dono. Et ideo non est similis ratio de dono gratiae et de dono humano.