Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that man is not bound to believe anything explicitly. For no man is bound to do what is not in his power. Now it is not in man's power to believe a thing explicitly, for it is written (Rm. 10:14,15): "How shall they believe Him, of whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? And how shall they preach unless they be sent?" Therefore man is not bound to believe anything explicitly.

Objection 2: Further, just as we are directed to God by faith, so are we by charity. Now man is not bound to keep the precepts of charity, and it is enough if he be ready to fulfil them: as is evidenced by the precept of Our Lord (Mt. 5:39): "If one strike thee on one cheek, turn to him also the other"; and by others of the same kind, according to Augustine's exposition (De Serm. Dom. in Monte xix). Therefore neither is man bound to believe anything explicitly, and it is enough if he be ready to believe whatever God proposes to be believed.

Objection 3: Further, the good of faith consists in obedience, according to Rm. 1:5: "For obedience to the faith in all nations." Now the virtue of obedience does not require man to keep certain fixed precepts, but it is enough that his mind be ready to obey, according to Ps. 118:60: "I am ready and am not troubled; that I may keep Thy commandments." Therefore it seems enough for faith, too, that man should be ready to believe whatever God may propose, without his believing anything explicitly.

On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:6): "He that cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him."

I answer that, The precepts of the Law, which man is bound to fulfil, concern acts of virtue which are the means of attaining salvation. Now an act of virtue, as stated above (1.2, Question 60, Article 5) depends on the relation of the habit to its object. Again two things may be considered in the object of any virtue; namely, that which is the proper and direct object of that virtue, and that which is accidental and consequent to the object properly so called. Thus it belongs properly and directly to the object of fortitude, to face the dangers of death, and to charge at the foe with danger to oneself, for the sake of the common good: yet that, in a just war, a man be armed, or strike another with his sword, and so forth, is reduced to the object of fortitude, but indirectly.

Accordingly, just as a virtuous act is required for the fulfilment of a precept, so is it necessary that the virtuous act should terminate in its proper and direct object: but, on the other hand, the fulfilment of the precept does not require that a virtuous act should terminate in those things which have an accidental or secondary relation to the proper and direct object of that virtue, except in certain places and at certain times. We must, therefore, say that the direct object of faith is that whereby man is made one of the Blessed, as stated above (Question 1, Article 8): while the indirect and secondary object comprises all things delivered by God to us in Holy Writ, for instance that Abraham had two sons, that David was the son of Jesse, and so forth.

Therefore, as regards the primary points or articles of faith, man is bound to believe them, just as he is bound to have faith; but as to other points of faith, man is not bound to believe them explicitly, but only implicitly, or to be ready to believe them, in so far as he is prepared to believe whatever is contained in the Divine Scriptures. Then alone is he bound to believe such things explicitly, when it is clear to him that they are contained in the doctrine of faith.

Reply to Objection 1: If we understand those things alone to be in a man's power, which we can do without the help of grace, then we are bound to do many things which we cannot do without the aid of healing grace, such as to love God and our neighbor, and likewise to believe the articles of faith. But with the help of grace we can do this, for this help "to whomsoever it is given from above it is mercifully given; and from whom it is withheld it is justly withheld, as a punishment of a previous, or at least of original, sin," as Augustine states (De Corr. et Grat. v, vi ).

Reply to Objection 2: Man is bound to love definitely those lovable things which are properly and directly the objects of charity, namely, God and our neighbor. The objection refers to those precepts of charity which belong, as a consequence, to the objects of charity.

Reply to Objection 3: The virtue of obedience is seated, properly speaking, in the will; hence promptness of the will subject to authority, suffices for the act of obedience, because it is the proper and direct object of obedience. But this or that precept is accidental or consequent to that proper and direct object.

Articulus 5

Argumentum 1

Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non teneatur homo ad credendum aliquid explicite. Nullus enim tenetur ad id quod non est in eius potestate. Sed credere aliquid explicite non est in hominis potestate, dicitur enim Rom. X, quomodo credent ei quem non audierunt? quomodo audient sine praedicante? quomodo autem praedicabunt nisi mittantur? ergo credere aliquid explicite homo non tenetur.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, sicut per fidem ordinamur in deum, ita et per caritatem. Sed ad servandum praecepta caritatis homo non tenetur, sed sufficit sola praeparatio animi, sicut patet in illo praecepto domini quod ponitur Matth. V, si quis percusserit te in una maxilla, praebe ei et aliam, et in aliis consimilibus, ut Augustinus exponit, in libro de serm. Dom. In monte.

Ergo etiam non tenetur homo explicite aliquid credere, sed sufficit quod habeat animum paratum ad credendum ea quae a deo proponuntur.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, bonum fidei in quadam obedientia consistit, secundum illud Rom. I, ad obediendum fidei in omnibus gentibus.

Sed ad virtutem obedientiae non requiritur quod homo aliqua determinata praecepta observet, sed sufficit quod habeat promptum animum ad obediendum, secundum illud psalm., paratus sum, et non sum turbatus, ut custodiam mandata tua.

Ergo videtur quod etiam ad fidem sufficiat quod homo habeat promptum animum ad credendum ea quae ei divinitus proponi possent, absque hoc quod explicite aliquid credat.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod dicitur ad Heb. XI, accedentem ad deum oportet credere quia est, et quod inquirentibus se remunerator est.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod praecepta legis quae homo tenetur implere dantur de actibus virtutum qui sunt via perveniendi ad salutem. Actus autem virtutis, sicut supra dictum est, sumitur secundum habitudinem habitus ad obiectum. Sed in obiecto cuiuslibet virtutis duo possunt considerari, scilicet id quod est proprie et per se virtutis obiectum, quod necessarium est in omni actu virtutis; et iterum id quod per accidens sive consequenter se habet ad propriam rationem obiecti. Sicut ad obiectum fortitudinis proprie et per se pertinet sustinere pericula mortis et aggredi hostes cum periculo propter bonum commune, sed quod homo armetur vel ense percutiat in bello iusto, aut aliquid huiusmodi faciat, reducitur quidem ad obiectum fortitudinis, sed per accidens. Determinatio igitur virtuosi actus ad proprium et per se obiectum virtutis est sub necessitate praecepti, sicut et ipse virtutis actus. Sed determinatio actus virtuosi ad ea quae accidentaliter vel secundario se habent ad proprium et per se virtutis obiectum non cadit sub necessitate praecepti nisi pro loco et tempore.

Dicendum est ergo quod fidei obiectum per se est id per quod homo beatus efficitur, ut supra dictum est.

Per accidens autem vel secundario se habent ad obiectum fidei omnia quae in Scriptura divinitus tradita continentur, sicut quod Abraham habuit duos filios, quod David fuit filius Isai, et alia huiusmodi.

Quantum ergo ad prima credibilia, quae sunt articuli fidei, tenetur homo explicite credere, sicut et tenetur habere fidem.

Quantum autem ad alia credibilia, non tenetur homo explicite credere, sed solum implicite vel in praeparatione animi, inquantum paratus est credere quidquid in divina Scriptura continetur.

Sed tunc solum huiusmodi tenetur explicite credere quando hoc ei constiterit in doctrina fidei contineri.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, si in potestate hominis esse dicatur aliquid excluso auxilio gratiae, sic ad multa tenetur homo ad quae non potest sine gratia reparante, sicut ad diligendum deum et proximum; et similiter ad credendum articulos fidei. Sed tamen hoc potest homo cum auxilio gratiae. Quod quidem auxilium quibuscumque divinitus datur, misericorditer datur; quibus autem non datur, ex iustitia non datur, in poenam praecedentis peccati, saltem originalis peccati; ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Cor. Et gratia.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod homo tenetur ad determinate diligendum illa diligibilia quae sunt proprie et per se caritatis obiecta, scilicet deus et proximus. Sed obiectio procedit de illis praeceptis caritatis quae quasi consequenter pertinent ad obiectum caritatis.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod virtus obedientiae proprie in voluntate consistit. Et ideo ad actum obedientiae sufficit promptitudo voluntatis subiecta praecipienti, quae est proprium et per se obiectum obedientiae. Sed hoc praeceptum vel illud per accidens vel consequenter se habet ad proprium et per se obiectum obedientiae.