Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that the Apostle gives an unfitting definition of faith (Heb. 11:1) when he says: "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not." For no quality is a substance: whereas faith is a quality, since it is a theological virtue, as stated above (1.2, Question 62, Article 3). Therefore it is not a substance.

Objection 2: Further, different virtues have different objects. Now things to be hoped for are the object of hope. Therefore they should not be included in a definition of faith, as though they were its object.

Objection 3: Further, faith is perfected by charity rather than by hope, since charity is the form of faith, as we shall state further on (Article 3). Therefore the definition of faith should have included the thing to be loved rather than the thing to be hoped for.

Objection 4: Further, the same thing should not be placed in different genera. Now "substance" and "evidence" are different genera, and neither is subalternate to the other. Therefore it is unfitting to state that faith is both "substance" and "evidence."

Objection 5: Further, evidence manifests the truth of the matter for which it is adduced. Now a thing is said to be apparent when its truth is already manifest. Therefore it seems to imply a contradiction to speak of "evidence of things that appear not": and so faith is unfittingly defined.

On the contrary, The authority of the Apostle suffices.

I answer that, Though some say that the above words of the Apostle are not a definition of faith, yet if we consider the matter aright, this definition overlooks none of the points in reference to which faith can be defined, albeit the words themselves are not arranged in the form of a definition, just as the philosophers touch on the principles of the syllogism, without employing the syllogistic form.

In order to make this clear, we must observe that since habits are known by their acts, and acts by their objects, faith, being a habit, should be defined by its proper act in relation to its proper object. Now the act of faith is to believe, as stated above (Question 2, Articles 2,3), which is an act of the intellect determinate to one object of the will's command. Hence an act of faith is related both to the object of the will, i.e. to the good and the end, and to the object of the intellect, i.e. to the true. And since faith, through being a theological virtues, as stated above (1.2, Question 62, Article 2), has one same thing for object and end, its object and end must, of necessity, be in proportion to one another. Now it has been already stated (Question 1, Articles 1,4) that the object of faith is the First Truth, as unseen, and whatever we hold on account thereof: so that it must needs be under the aspect of something unseen that the First Truth is the end of the act of faith, which aspect is that of a thing hoped for, according to the Apostle (Rm. 8:25): "We hope for that which we see not": because to see the truth is to possess it. Now one hopes not for what one has already, but for what one has not, as stated above (1.2, Question 67, Article 4). Accordingly the relation of the act of faith to its end which is the object of the will, is indicated by the words: "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for." For we are wont to call by the name of substance, the first beginning of a thing, especially when the whole subsequent thing is virtually contained in the first beginning; for instance, we might say that the first self-evident principles are the substance of science, because, to wit, these principles are in us the first beginnings of science, the whole of which is itself contained in them virtually. In this way then faith is said to be the "substance of things to be hoped for," for the reason that in us the first beginning of things to be hoped for is brought about by the assent of faith, which contains virtually all things to be hoped for. Because we hope to be made happy through seeing the unveiled truth to which our faith cleaves, as was made evident when we were speaking of happiness (1.2, Question 3, Article 8; 1.2, Question 4, Article 3).

The relationship of the act of faith to the object of the intellect, considered as the object of faith, is indicated by the words, "evidence of things that appear not," where "evidence" is taken for the result of evidence. For evidence induces the intellect to adhere to a truth, wherefore the firm adhesion of the intellect to the non-apparent truth of faith is called "evidence" here. Hence another reading has "conviction," because to wit, the intellect of the believer is convinced by Divine authority, so as to assent to what it sees not. Accordingly if anyone would reduce the foregoing words to the form of a definition, he may say that "faith is a habit of the mind, whereby eternal life is begun in us, making the intellect assent to what is non-apparent."

In this way faith is distinguished from all other things pertaining to the intellect. For when we describe it as "evidence," we distinguish it from opinion, suspicion, and doubt, which do not make the intellect adhere to anything firmly; when we go on to say, "of things that appear not," we distinguish it from science and understanding, the object of which is something apparent; and when we say that it is "the substance of things to be hoped for," we distinguish the virtue of faith from faith commonly so called, which has no reference to the beatitude we hope for.

Whatever other definitions are given of faith, are explanations of this one given by the Apostle. For when Augustine says (Tract. xl in Joan.: Questions. Evang. ii, qu. 39) that "faith is a virtue whereby we believe what we do not see," and when Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 11) that "faith is an assent without research," and when others say that "faith is that certainty of the mind about absent things which surpasses opinion but falls short of science," these all amount to the same as the Apostle's words: "Evidence of things that appear not"; and when Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "faith is the solid foundation of the believer, establishing him in the truth, and showing forth the truth in him," comes to the same as "substance of things to be hoped for."

Reply to Objection 1: "Substance" here does not stand for the supreme genus condivided with the other genera, but for that likeness to substance which is found in each genus, inasmuch as the first thing in a genus contains the others virtually and is said to be the substance thereof.

Reply to Objection 2: Since faith pertains to the intellect as commanded by the will, it must needs be directed, as to its end, to the objects of those virtues which perfect the will, among which is hope, as we shall prove further on (Question 18, Article 1). For this reason the definition of faith includes the object of hope.

Reply to Objection 3: Love may be of the seen and of the unseen, of the present and of the absent. Consequently a thing to be loved is not so adapted to faith, as a thing to be hoped for, since hope is always of the absent and the unseen.

Reply to Objection 4: "Substance" and "evidence" as included in the definition of faith, do not denote various genera of faith, nor different acts, but different relationships of one act to different objects, as is clear from what has been said.

Reply to Objection 5: Evidence taken from the proper principles of a thing, make it apparent, whereas evidence taken from Divine authority does not make a thing apparent in itself, and such is the evidence referred to in the definition of faith.

Articulus 1

Argumentum 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sit incompetens fidei definitio quam apostolus ponit, ad Heb. XI, dicens, est autem fides substantia sperandarum rerum, argumentum non apparentium.

Nulla enim qualitas est substantia. Sed fides est qualitas, cum sit virtus theologica, ut supra dictum est.

Ergo non est substantia.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, diversarum virtutum diversa sunt obiecta. Sed res speranda est obiectum spei. Non ergo debet poni in definitione fidei tanquam eius obiectum.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, fides magis perficitur per caritatem quam per spem, quia caritas est forma fidei, ut infra dicetur.

Magis ergo poni debuit in definitione fidei res diligenda quam res speranda.

Argumentum 4

Praeterea, idem non debet poni in diversis generibus.

Sed substantia et argumentum sunt diversa genera non subalternatim posita. Ergo inconvenienter fides dicitur esse substantia et argumentum.

Argumentum 5

Praeterea, per argumentum veritas manifestatur eius ad quod inducitur argumentum. Sed illud dicitur esse apparens cuius veritas est manifestata. Ergo videtur implicari oppositio in hoc quod dicitur inconvenienter ergo describitur fides.

Sed Contra

In contrarium sufficit auctoritas apostoli.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, licet quidam dicant praedicta apostoli verba non esse fidei definitionem, tamen, si quis recte consideret, omnia ex quibus fides potest definiri in praedicta descriptione tanguntur, licet verba non ordinentur sub forma definitionis, sicut etiam apud philosophos praetermissa syllogistica forma syllogismorum principia tanguntur.

Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod, cum habitus cognoscantur per actus et actus per obiecta, fides, cum sit habitus quidam, debet definiri per proprium actum in comparatione ad proprium obiectum. Actus autem fidei est credere, qui, sicut supra dictum est, actus est intellectus determinati ad unum ex imperio voluntatis. Sic ergo actus fidei habet ordinem et ad obiectum voluntatis, quod est bonum et finis; et ad obiectum intellectus, quod est verum. Et quia fides, cum sit virtus theologica, sicut supra dictum est, habet idem pro obiecto et fine, necesse est quod obiectum fidei et finis proportionaliter sibi correspondeant.

Dictum est autem supra quod veritas prima est obiectum fidei secundum quod ipsa est non visa et ea quibus propter ipsam inhaeretur. Et secundum hoc oportet quod ipsa veritas prima se habeat ad actum fidei per modum finis secundum rationem rei non visae. Quod pertinet ad rationem rei speratae, secundum illud apostoli, ad Rom. VIII, quod non videmus speramus, veritatem enim videre est ipsam habere; non autem sperat aliquis id quod iam habet, sed spes est de hoc quod non habetur, ut supra dictum est.

Sic igitur habitudo actus fidei ad finem, qui est obiectum voluntatis, significatur in hoc quod dicitur, fides est substantia rerum sperandarum.

Substantia enim solet dici prima inchoatio cuiuscumque rei, et maxime quando tota res sequens continetur virtute in primo principio, puta si dicamus quod prima principia indemonstrabilia sunt substantia scientiae, quia scilicet primum quod in nobis est de scientia sunt huiusmodi principia, et in eis virtute continetur tota scientia. Per hunc ergo modum dicitur fides esse substantia rerum sperandarum, quia scilicet prima inchoatio rerum sperandarum in nobis est per assensum fidei, quae virtute continet omnes res sperandas. In hoc enim speramus beatificari quod videbimus aperta visione veritatem cui per fidem adhaeremus, ut patet per ea quae supra de felicitate dicta sunt.

Habitudo autem actus fidei ad obiectum intellectus, secundum quod est obiectum fidei, designatur in hoc quod dicitur, argumentum non apparentium.

Et sumitur argumentum pro argumenti effectu, per argumentum enim intellectus inducitur ad adhaerendum alicui vero; unde ipsa firma adhaesio intellectus ad veritatem fidei non apparentem vocatur hic argumentum.

Unde alia littera habet convictio, quia scilicet per auctoritatem divinam intellectus credentis convincitur ad assentiendum his quae non videt. Si quis ergo in formam definitionis huiusmodi verba reducere velit, potest dicere quod fides est habitus mentis, qua inchoatur vita aeterna in nobis, faciens intellectum assentire non apparentibus.

Per hoc autem fides ab omnibus aliis distinguitur quae ad intellectum pertinent.

Per hoc enim quod dicitur argumentum, distinguitur fides ab opinione, suspicione et dubitatione, per quae non est prima adhaesio intellectus firma ad aliquid.

Per hoc autem quod dicitur non apparentium, distinguitur fides a scientia et intellectu, per quae aliquid fit apparens. Per hoc autem quod dicitur substantia sperandarum rerum, distinguitur virtus fidei a fide communiter sumpta, quae non ordinatur ad beatitudinem speratam. Omnes autem aliae definitiones quaecumque de fide dantur, explicationes sunt huius quam apostolus ponit.

Quod enim dicit Augustinus, fides est virtus qua creduntur quae non videntur; et quod dicit Damascenus, quod fides est non inquisitus consensus; et quod alii dicunt, quod fides est certitudo quaedam animi de absentibus supra opinionem et infra scientiam; idem est ei quod apostolus dicit, argumentum non apparentium.

Quod vero dionysius dicit, VII cap. De div. Nom., quod fides est manens credentium fundamentum, collocans eos in veritate et in ipsis veritatem, idem est ei quod dicitur, substantia sperandarum rerum.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod substantia non sumitur hic secundum quod est genus generalissimum contra alia genera divisum, sed secundum quod in quolibet genere invenitur quaedam similitudo substantiae, prout scilicet primum in quolibet genere, continens in se alia virtute, dicitur esse substantia illorum.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum fides pertineat ad intellectum secundum quod imperatur a voluntate, oportet quod ordinetur, sicut ad finem, ad obiecta illarum virtutum quibus perficitur voluntas.

Inter quas est spes, ut infra patebit.

Et ideo in definitione fidei ponitur obiectum spei.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod dilectio potest esse et visorum et non visorum, et praesentium et absentium. Et ideo res diligenda non ita proprie adaptatur fidei sicut res speranda, cum spes sit semper absentium et non visorum.

Ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod substantia et argumentum, secundum quod in definitione fidei ponuntur, non important diversa genera fidei neque diversos actus, sed diversas habitudines unius actus ad diversa obiecta, ut ex dictis patet.

Ad 5

Ad quintum dicendum quod argumentum quod sumitur ex propriis principiis rei facit rem esse apparentem. Sed argumentum quod sumitur ex auctoritate divina non facit rem in se esse apparentem. Et tale argumentum ponitur in definitione fidei.