Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not a gift of the Holy Ghost. For no gift of the Holy Ghost is opposed to a virtue, which is also from the Holy Ghost; else the Holy Ghost would be in opposition to Himself. Now fear is opposed to hope, which is a virtue. Therefore fear is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.

Objection 2: Further, it is proper to a theological virtue to have God for its object. But fear has God for its object, in so far as God is feared. Therefore fear is not a gift, but a theological virtue.

Objection 3: Further, fear arises from love. But love is reckoned a theological virtue. Therefore fear also is a theological virtue, being connected with the same matter, as it were.

Objection 4: Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "fear is bestowed as a remedy against pride." But the virtue of humility is opposed to pride. Therefore again, fear is a kind of virtue.

Objection 5: Further, the gifts are more perfect than the virtues, since they are bestowed in support of the virtues as Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49). Now hope is more perfect than fear, since hope regards good, while fear regards evil. Since, then, hope is a virtue, it should not be said that fear is a gift.

On the contrary, The fear of the Lord is numbered among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost (Is. 11:3).

I answer that, Fear is of several kinds, as stated above (Article 2). Now it is not "human fear," according to Augustine (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. xviii), "that is a gift of God"---for it was by this fear that Peter denied Christ---but that fear of which it was said (Mt. 10:28): "Fear Him that can destroy both soul and body into hell."

Again servile fear is not to be reckoned among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, though it is from Him, because according to Augustine (De Nat. et Grat. lvii) it is compatible with the will to sin: whereas the gifts of the Holy Ghost are incompatible with the will to sin, as they are inseparable from charity, as stated above (1.2, Question 68, Article 5).

It follows, therefore, that the fear of God, which is numbered among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, is filial or chaste fear. For it was stated above (1.2, Question 68, Articles 1,3) that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are certain habitual perfections of the soul's powers, whereby these are rendered amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost, just as, by the moral virtues, the appetitive powers are rendered amenable to the motion of reason. Now for a thing to be amenable to the motion of a certain mover, the first condition required is that it be a non-resistant subject of that mover, because resistance of the movable subject to the mover hinders the movement. This is what filial or chaste fear does, since thereby we revere God and avoid separating ourselves from Him. Hence, according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) filial fear holds the first place, as it were, among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, in the ascending order, and the last place, in the descending order.

Reply to Objection 1: Filial fear is not opposed to the virtue of hope: since thereby we fear, not that we may fail of what we hope to obtain by God's help, but lest we withdraw ourselves from this help. Wherefore filial fear and hope cling together, and perfect one another.

Reply to Objection 2: The proper and principal object of fear is the evil shunned, and in this way, as stated above (Article 1), God cannot be an object of fear. Yet He is, in this way, the object of hope and the other theological virtues, since, by the virtue of hope, we trust in God's help, not only to obtain any other goods, but, chiefly, to obtain God Himself, as the principal good. The same evidently applies to the other theological virtues.

Reply to Objection 3: From the fact that love is the origin of fear, it does not follow that the fear of God is not a distinct habit from charity which is the love of God, since love is the origin of all the emotions, and yet we are perfected by different habits in respect of different emotions. Yet love is more of a virtue than fear is, because love regards good, to which virtue is principally directed by reason of its own nature, as was shown above (1.2, Question 55, Articles 3,4); for which reason hope is also reckoned as a virtue; whereas fear principally regards evil, the avoidance of which it denotes, wherefore it is something less than a theological virtue.

Reply to Objection 4: According to Ecclus. 10:14, "the beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God," that is to refuse submission to God, and this is opposed to filial fear, which reveres God. Thus fear cuts off the source of pride for which reason it is bestowed as a remedy against pride. Yet it does not follow that it is the same as the virtue of humility, but that it is its origin. For the gifts of the Holy Ghost are the origin of the intellectual and moral virtues, as stated above (1.2, Question 68, Article 4), while the theological virtues are the origin of the gifts, as stated above (1.2, Question 69, Article 4, ad 3).

This suffices for the Reply to the Fifth Objection.

Articulus 9

Argumentum 1

Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor non sit donum spiritus sancti. Nullum enim donum spiritus sancti opponitur virtuti, quae etiam est a spiritu sancto, alioquin spiritus sanctus esset sibi contrarius. Sed timor opponitur spei, quae est virtus. Ergo timor non est donum spiritus sancti.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, virtutis theologicae proprium est quod deum habeat pro obiecto. Sed timor habet deum pro obiecto, inquantum deus timetur. Ergo timor non est donum, sed virtus theologica.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, timor ex amore consequitur. Sed amor ponitur quaedam virtus theologica. Ergo etiam timor est virtus theologica, quasi ad idem pertinens.

Argumentum 4

Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, II Moral., quod timor datur contra superbiam.

Sed superbiae opponitur virtus humilitatis.

Ergo etiam timor sub virtute comprehenditur.

Argumentum 5

Praeterea, dona sunt perfectiora virtutibus, dantur enim in adiutorium virtutum, ut Gregorius dicit, II Moral..

Sed spes est perfectior timore, quia spes respicit bonum, timor malum.

Cum ergo spes sit virtus, non debet dici quod timor sit donum.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod Isaiae XI timor domini enumeratur inter septem dona spiritus sancti.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod multiplex est timor, ut supra dictum est.

Timor autem humanus, ut dicit Augustinus, in libro de gratia et Lib. Arb., non est donum dei, hoc enim timore Petrus negavit christum, sed ille timor de quo dictum est, illum timete qui potest animam et corpus mittere in Gehennam.

Similiter etiam timor servilis non est numerandus inter septem dona spiritus sancti, licet sit a spiritu sancto. Quia, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Nat. Et gratia, potest habere annexam voluntatem peccandi, dona autem spiritus sancti non possunt esse cum voluntate peccandi, quia non sunt sine caritate, ut dictum est.

Unde relinquitur quod timor dei qui numeratur inter septem dona spiritus sancti est timor filialis sive castus.

Dictum est enim supra quod dona spiritus sancti sunt quaedam habituales perfectiones potentiarum animae quibus redduntur bene mobiles a spiritu sancto, sicut virtutibus moralibus potentiae appetitivae redduntur bene mobiles a ratione. Ad hoc autem quod aliquid sit bene mobile ab aliquo movente, primo requiritur ut sit ei subiectum, non repugnans, quia ex repugnantia mobilis ad movens impeditur motus. Hoc autem facit timor filialis vel castus, inquantum per ipsum deum reveremur, et refugimus nos ipsi subducere.

Et ideo timor filialis quasi primum locum tenet ascendendo inter dona spiritus sancti, ultimum autem descendendo; sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de serm. Dom. In monte.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod timor filialis non contrariatur virtuti spei. Non enim per timorem filialem timemus ne nobis deficiat quod speramus obtinere per auxilium divinum, sed timemus ab hoc auxilio nos subtrahere. Et ideo timor filialis et spes sibi invicem cohaerent et se invicem perficiunt.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod proprium et principale obiectum timoris est malum quod quis refugit. Et per hunc modum deus non potest esse obiectum timoris, sicut supra dictum est.

Est autem per hunc modum obiectum spei et aliarum virtutum theologicarum.

Quia per virtutem spei non solum innitimur divino auxilio ad adipiscendum quaecumque alia bona; sed principaliter ad adipiscendum ipsum deum, tanquam principale bonum.

Et idem patet in aliis virtutibus theologicis.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod ex hoc quod amor est principium timoris non sequitur quod timor dei non sit habitus distinctus a caritate, quae est amor dei, quia amor est principium omnium affectionum, et tamen in diversis habitibus perficimur circa diversas affectiones. Ideo tamen amor magis habet rationem virtutis quam timor, quia amor respicit bonum, ad quod principaliter virtus ordinatur secundum propriam rationem, ut ex supradictis patet.

Et propter hoc etiam spes ponitur virtus.

Timor autem principaliter respicit malum, cuius fugam importat.

Unde est aliquid minus virtute theologica.

Ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut dicitur Eccli. X, initium superbiae hominis apostatare a deo, hoc est nolle subdi deo, quod opponitur timori filiali, qui deum reveretur. Et sic timor excludit principium superbiae, propter quod datur contra superbiam. Nec tamen sequitur quod sit idem cum virtute humilitatis, sed quod sit principium eius, dona enim spiritus sancti sunt principia virtutum intellectualium et Moralium, ut supra dictum est.

Sed virtutes theologicae sunt principia donorum, ut supra habitum est.

Ad 5

Unde patet responsio ad quintum.