Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that fear does not remain in heaven. For it is written (Prov. 1:33): "He . . . shall enjoy abundance, without fear of evils," which is to be understood as referring to those who already enjoy wisdom in everlasting happiness. Now every fear is about some evil, since evil is the object of fear, as stated above (Articles 2,5; 1.2, Question 42, Article 1). Therefore there will be no fear in heaven.

Objection 2: Further, in heaven men will be conformed to God, according to 1 Jn. 3:2, "When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him." But God fears nothing. Therefore, in heaven, men will have no fear.

Objection 3: Further, hope is more perfect than fear, since hope regards good, and fear, evil. Now hope will not be in heaven. Therefore neither will there be fear in heaven.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 18:10): "The fear of the Lord is holy, enduring for ever and ever."

I answer that, Servile fear, or fear of punishment, will by no means be in heaven, since such a fear is excluded by the security which is essential to everlasting happiness, as stated above (1.2, Question 5, Article 4).

But regard to filial fear, as it increases with the increase of charity, so is it perfected when charity is made perfect; hence, in heaven, it will not have quite the same act as it has now.

In order to make this clear, we must observe that the proper object of fear is a possible evil, just as the proper object of hope is a possible good: and since the movement of fear is like one of avoidance, fear implies avoidance of a possible arduous evil, for little evils inspire no fear. Now as a thing's good consists in its staying in its own order, so a thing's evil consists in forsaking its order. Again, the order of a rational creature is that it should be under God and above other creatures. Hence, just as it is an evil for a rational creature to submit, by love, to a lower creature, so too is it an evil for it, if it submit not to God, by presumptuously revolt against Him or contemn Him. Now this evil is possible to a rational creature considered as to its nature on account of the natural flexibility of the free-will; whereas in the blessed, it becomes impossible, by reason of the perfection of glory. Therefore the avoidance of this evil that consists in non-subjection to God, and is possible to nature, but impossible in the state of bliss, will be in heaven; while in this life there is avoidance of this evil as of something altogether possible. Hence Gregory, expounding the words of Job (26:11), "The pillars of heaven tremble, and dread at His beck," says (Moral. xvii, 29): "The heavenly powers that gaze on Him without ceasing, tremble while contemplating: but their awe, lest it should be of a penal nature, is one not of fear but of wonder," because, to wit, they wonder at God's supereminence and incomprehensibility. Augustine also (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) in this sense, admits fear in heaven, although he leaves the question doubtful. "If," he says, "this chaste fear that endureth for ever and ever is to be in the future life, it will not be a fear that is afraid of an evil which might possibly occur, but a fear that holds fast to a good which we cannot lose. For when we love the good which we have acquired, with an unchangeable love, without doubt, if it is allowable to say so, our fear is sure of avoiding evil. Because chaste fear denotes a will that cannot consent to sin, and whereby we avoid sin without trembling lest, in our weakness, we fall, and possess ourselves in the tranquillity born of charity. Else, if no kind of fear is possible there, perhaps fear is said to endure for ever and ever, because that which fear will lead us to, will be everlasting."

Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted excludes from the blessed, the fear that denotes solicitude, and anxiety about evil, but not the fear which is accompanied by security.

Reply to Objection 2: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix) "the same things are both like and unlike God. They are like by reason of a variable imitation of the Inimitable"---that is, because, so far as they can, they imitate God Who cannot be imitated perfectly---"they are unlike because they are the effects of a Cause of Whom they fall short infinitely and immeasurably." Hence, if there be no fear in God (since there is none above Him to whom He may be subject) it does not follow that there is none in the blessed, whose happiness consists in perfect subjection to God.

Reply to Objection 3: Hope implies a certain defect, namely the futurity of happiness, which ceases when happiness is present: whereas fear implies a natural defect in a creature, in so far as it is infinitely distant from God, and this defect will remain even in heaven. Hence fear will not be cast out altogether.

Articulus 11

Argumentum 1

Ad undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor non remaneat in patria.

Dicitur enim Prov. I, abundantia perfruetur, timore malorum sublato, quod intelligitur de homine iam sapientia perfruente in beatitudine aeterna. Sed omnis timor est alicuius mali, quia malum est obiectum timoris, ut supra dictum est.

Ergo nullus timor erit in patria.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, homines in patria erunt deo conformes, secundum illud I Ioan. III, cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus.

Sed deus nihil timet.

Ergo homines in patria non habebunt aliquem timorem.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, spes est perfectior quam timor, quia spes est respectu boni, timor respectu mali. Sed spes non erit in patria.

Ergo nec timor erit in patria.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod dicitur in psalm., timor domini sanctus permanet in saeculum.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod timor servilis, sive timor poenae, nullo modo erit in patria, excluditur enim talis timor per securitatem aeternae beatitudinis, quae est de ipsius beatitudinis ratione, sicut supra dictum est.

Timor autem filialis, sicut augetur augmentata caritate, ita caritate perfecta perficietur. Unde non habebit in patria omnino eundem actum quem habet modo.

Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est quod proprium obiectum timoris est malum possibile, sicut proprium obiectum spei est bonum possibile. Et cum motus timoris sit quasi fugae, importat timor fugam mali ardui possibilis, parva enim mala timorem non inducunt.

Sicut autem bonum uniuscuiusque est ut in suo ordine consistat, ita malum uniuscuiusque est ut suum ordinem deserat. Ordo autem creaturae rationalis est ut sit sub deo et supra ceteras creaturas. Unde sicut malum creaturae rationalis est ut subdat se creaturae inferiori per amorem, ita etiam malum eius est si non deo se subiiciat, sed in ipsum praesumptuose insiliat vel contemnat. Hoc autem malum creaturae rationali secundum suam naturam consideratae possibile est, propter naturalem liberi arbitrii flexibilitatem, sed in beatis fit non possibile per gloriae perfectionem. Fuga igitur huius mali quod est deo non subiici, ut possibilis naturae, impossibilis autem beatitudini, erit in patria. In via autem est fuga huius mali ut omnino possibilis.

Et ideo Gregorius dicit, XVII Moral., exponens illud iob XXVI, columnae caeli contremiscunt et pavent ad nutum eius, ipsae, inquit, virtutes caelestium, quae hunc sine cessatione conspiciunt, in ipsa contemplatione contremiscunt. Sed idem tremor, ne eis poenalis sit, non timoris est sed admirationis, quia scilicet admirantur deum ut supra se existentem et eis incomprehensibilem.

Augustinus etiam, in XIV de CIV. Dei, hoc modo ponit timorem in patria, quamvis hoc sub dubio derelinquat.

Timor, inquit, ille castus permanens in saeculum saeculi, si erit in futuro saeculo, non erit timor exterrens a malo quod accidere potest; sed tenens in bono quod amitti non potest. Ubi enim boni adepti amor immutabilis est, profecto, si dici potest, mali cavendi timor securus est. Timoris quippe casti nomine ea voluntas significata est qua nos necesse erit nolle peccare, et non sollicitudine infirmitatis ne forte peccemus, sed tranquillitate caritatis cavere peccatum. Aut, si nullius omnino generis timor ibi esse poterit, ita fortasse timor in saeculum saeculi dictus est permanens, quia id permanebit quo timor ipse perducit.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in auctoritate praedicta excluditur a beatis timor sollicitudinem habens, de malo praecavens, non autem timor securus, ut Augustinus dicit.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dicit dionysius, IX cap. De div. Nom., eadem et similia sunt deo et dissimilia, hoc quidem secundum contingentem non imitabilis imitationem, idest inquantum secundum suum posse imitantur deum, qui non est perfecte imitabilis; hoc autem secundum hoc quod causata minus habent a causa, infinitis mensuris et incomparabilibus deficientia.

Unde non oportet quod, si deo non convenit timor, quia non habet superiorem cui subiiciatur, quod propter hoc non conveniat beatis, quorum beatitudo consistit in perfecta subiectione ad deum.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod spes importat quendam defectum, scilicet futuritionem beatitudinis, quae tollitur per eius praesentiam. Sed timor importat defectum naturalem creaturae, secundum quod in infinitum distat a deo, quod etiam in patria remanebit. Et ideo timor non evacuabitur totaliter.