Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that presumption is more opposed to fear than to hope. Because inordinate fear is opposed to right fear. Now presumption seems to pertain to inordinate fear, for it is written (Wis. 17:10): "A troubled conscience always presumes grievous things," and (Wis. 17:11) that "fear is a help to presumption ." Therefore presumption is opposed to fear rather than to hope.

Objection 2: Further, contraries are most distant from one another. Now presumption is more distant from fear than from hope, because presumption implies movement to something, just as hope does, whereas fear denotes movement from a thing. Therefore presumption is contrary to fear rather than to hope.

Objection 3: Further, presumption excludes fear altogether, whereas it does not exclude hope altogether, but only the rectitude of hope. Since therefore contraries destroy one another, it seems that presumption is contrary to fear rather than to hope.

On the contrary, When two vices are opposed to one another they are contrary to the same virtue, as timidity and audacity are opposed to fortitude. Now the sin of presumption is contrary to the sin of despair, which is directly opposed to hope. Therefore it seems that presumption also is more directly opposed to hope.

I answer that, As Augustine states (Contra Julian. iv, 3), "every virtue not only has a contrary vice manifestly distinct from it, as temerity is opposed to prudence, but also a sort of kindred vice, alike, not in truth but only in its deceitful appearance, as cunning is opposed to prudence." This agrees with the Philosopher who says (Ethic. ii, 8) that a virtue seems to have more in common with one of the contrary vices than with the other, as temperance with insensibility, and fortitude with audacity.

Accordingly presumption appears to be manifestly opposed to fear, especially servile fear, which looks at the punishment arising from God's justice, the remission of which presumption hopes for; yet by a kind of false likeness it is more opposed to hope, since it denotes an inordinate hope in God. And since things are more directly opposed when they belong to the same genus, than when they belong to different genera, it follows that presumption is more directly opposed to hope than to fear. For they both regard and rely on the same object, hope inordinately, presumption inordinately.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as hope is misused in speaking of evils, and properly applied in speaking of good, so is presumption: it is in this way that inordinate fear is called presumption.

Reply to Objection 2: Contraries are things that are most distant from one another within the same genus. Now presumption and hope denote a movement of the same genus, which can be either ordinate or inordinate. Hence presumption is more directly opposed to hope than to fear, since it is opposed to hope in respect of its specific difference, as an inordinate thing to an ordinate one, whereas it is opposed to fear, in respect of its generic difference, which is the movement of hope.

Reply to Objection 3: Presumption is opposed to fear by a generic contrariety, and to the virtue of hope by a specific contrariety. Hence presumption excludes fear altogether even generically, whereas it does not exclude hope except by reason of its difference, by excluding its ordinateness.

Articulus 3

Argumentum 1

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod praesumptio magis opponatur timori quam spei. Inordinatio enim timoris opponitur recto timori. Sed praesumptio videtur ad inordinationem timoris pertinere, dicitur enim Sap. XVII, semper praesumit saeva perturbata conscientia; et ibidem dicitur quod timor est praesumptionis adiutorium.

Ergo praesumptio opponitur timori magis quam spei.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, contraria sunt quae maxime distant. Sed praesumptio magis distat a timore quam a spe, quia praesumptio importat motum ad rem, sicut et spes; timor autem motum a re. Ergo praesumptio magis contrariatur timori quam spei.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, praesumptio totaliter excludit timorem, non autem totaliter excludit spem, sed solum rectitudinem spei. Cum ergo opposita sint quae se interimunt, videtur quod praesumptio magis opponatur timori quam spei.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod duo invicem opposita vitia contrariantur uni virtuti, sicut timiditas et audacia fortitudini. Sed peccatum praesumptionis contrariatur peccato desperationis, quod directe opponitur spei. Ergo videtur quod etiam praesumptio directius spei opponatur.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in IV contra iulian., omnibus virtutibus non solum sunt vitia manifesta discretione contraria, sicut prudentiae temeritas, verum etiam vicina quodammodo, nec veritate, sed quadam specie fallente similia, sicut prudentiae astutia.

Et hoc etiam philosophus dicit, in II ethic., quod virtus maiorem convenientiam videtur habere cum uno oppositorum vitiorum quam cum alio, sicut temperantia cum insensibilitate et fortitudo cum audacia.

Praesumptio igitur manifestam oppositionem videtur habere ad timorem, praecipue servilem, qui respicit poenam ex dei iustitia provenientem, cuius remissionem praesumptio sperat. Sed secundum quandam falsam similitudinem magis contrariatur spei, quia importat quandam inordinatam spem de deo. Et quia directius aliqua opponuntur quae sunt unius generis quam quae sunt generum diversorum (nam contraria sunt in eodem genere), ideo directius praesumptio opponitur spei quam timori, utrumque enim respicit idem obiectum cui innititur, sed spes ordinate, praesumptio inordinate.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sicut spes abusive dicitur de malo, proprie autem de bono, ita etiam praesumptio. Et secundum hunc modum inordinatio timoris praesumptio dicitur.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod contraria sunt quae maxime distant in eodem genere. Praesumptio autem et spes important motum eiusdem generis, qui potest esse vel ordinatus vel inordinatus. Et ideo praesumptio directius contrariatur spei quam timori, nam spei contrariatur ratione propriae differentiae, sicut inordinatum ordinato; timori autem contrariatur ratione differentiae sui generis, scilicet motus spei.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod quia praesumptio contrariatur timori contrarietate generis, virtuti autem spei contrarietate differentiae, ideo praesumptio excludit totaliter timorem etiam secundum genus, spem autem non excludit nisi ratione differentiae, excludendo eius ordinationem.