Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not friendship. For nothing is so appropriate to friendship as to dwell with one's friend, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5). Now charity is of man towards God and the angels, "whose dwelling is not with men" (Dan. 2:11). Therefore charity is not friendship.

Objection 2: Further, there is no friendship without return of love (Ethic. viii, 2). But charity extends even to one's enemies, according to Mt. 5:44: "Love your enemies." Therefore charity is not friendship.

Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) there are three kinds of friendship, directed respectively towards the delightful, the useful, or the virtuous. Now charity is not the friendship for the useful or delightful; for Jerome says in his letter to Paulinus which is to be found at the beginning of the Bible: "True friendship cemented by Christ, is where men are drawn together, not by household interests, not by mere bodily presence, not by crafty and cajoling flattery, but by the fear of God, and the study of the Divine Scriptures." No more is it friendship for the virtuous, since by charity we love even sinners, whereas friendship based on the virtuous is only for virtuous men (Ethic. viii). Therefore charity is not friendship.

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 15:15): "I will not now call you servants . . . but My friends." Now this was said to them by reason of nothing else than charity. Therefore charity is friendship.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 2,3) not every love has the character of friendship, but that love which is together with benevolence, when, to wit, we love someone so as to wish good to him. If, however, we do not wish good to what we love, but wish its good for ourselves, (thus we are said to love wine, or a horse, or the like), it is love not of friendship, but of a kind of concupiscence. For it would be absurd to speak of having friendship for wine or for a horse.

Yet neither does well-wishing suffice for friendship, for a certain mutual love is requisite, since friendship is between friend and friend: and this well-wishing is founded on some kind of communication.

Accordingly, since there is a communication between man and God, inasmuch as He communicates His happiness to us, some kind of friendship must needs be based on this same communication, of which it is written (1 Cor. 1:9): "God is faithful: by Whom you are called unto the fellowship of His Son." The love which is based on this communication, is charity: wherefore it is evident that charity is the friendship of man for God.

Reply to Objection 1: Man's life is twofold. There is his outward life in respect of his sensitive and corporeal nature: and with regard to this life there is no communication or fellowship between us and God or the angels. The other is man's spiritual life in respect of his mind, and with regard to this life there is fellowship between us and both God and the angels, imperfectly indeed in this present state of life, wherefore it is written (Phil. 3:20): "Our conversation is in heaven." But this "conversation" will be perfected in heaven, when "His servants shall serve Him, and they shall see His face" (Apoc. 22:3,4). Therefore charity is imperfect here, but will be perfected in heaven.

Reply to Objection 2: Friendship extends to a person in two ways: first in respect of himself, and in this way friendship never extends but to one's friends: secondly, it extends to someone in respect of another, as, when a man has friendship for a certain person, for his sake he loves all belonging to him, be they children, servants, or connected with him in any way. Indeed so much do we love our friends, that for their sake we love all who belong to them, even if they hurt or hate us; so that, in this way, the friendship of charity extends even to our enemies, whom we love out of charity in relation to God, to Whom the friendship of charity is chiefly directed.

Reply to Objection 3: The friendship that is based on the virtuous is directed to none but a virtuous man as the principal person, but for his sake we love those who belong to him, even though they be not virtuous: in this way charity, which above all is friendship based on the virtuous, extends to sinners, whom, out of charity, we love for God's sake.

Articulus 1

Argumentum 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas non sit amicitia.

Nihil enim est ita proprium amicitiae sicut convivere amico; ut philosophus dicit, in VIII ethic..

Sed caritas est hominis ad deum et ad Angelos, quorum non est cum hominibus conversatio, ut dicitur Dan. II.

Ergo caritas non est amicitia.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, amicitia non est sine reamatione, ut dicitur in VIII ethic..

Sed caritas habetur etiam ad inimicos, secundum illud Matth. V, diligite inimicos vestros.

Ergo caritas non est amicitia.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, amicitiae tres sunt species, secundum philosophum, in VIII ethic., scilicet amicitia delectabilis, utilis et honesti.

Sed caritas non est amicitia utilis aut delectabilis, dicit enim Hieronymus, in Epist. Ad Paulinum, quae ponitur in principio bibliae, illa est vera necessitudo, et christi glutino copulata, quam non utilitas rei familiaris, non praesentia tantum corporum, non subdola et palpans adulatio, sed dei timor et divinarum Scripturarum studia conciliant.

Similiter etiam non est amicitia honesti, quia caritate diligimus etiam peccatores; amicitia vero honesti non est nisi ad virtuosos, ut dicitur in VIII ethic..

Ergo caritas non est amicitia.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod Ioan. XV dicitur, iam non dicam vos servos, sed amicos meos.

Sed hoc non dicebatur eis nisi ratione caritatis.

Ergo caritas est amicitia.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, in VIII ethic., non quilibet amor habet rationem amicitiae, sed amor qui est cum benevolentia, quando scilicet sic amamus aliquem ut ei bonum velimus. Si autem rebus amatis non bonum velimus, sed ipsum eorum bonum velimus nobis, sicut dicimur amare vinum aut equum aut aliquid huiusmodi, non est amor amicitiae, sed cuiusdam concupiscentiae, ridiculum enim est dicere quod aliquis habeat amicitiam ad vinum vel ad equum. Sed nec benevolentia sufficit ad rationem amicitiae, sed requiritur quaedam mutua amatio, quia amicus est amico amicus. Talis autem mutua benevolentia fundatur super aliqua communicatione.

Cum igitur sit aliqua communicatio hominis ad deum secundum quod nobis suam beatitudinem communicat, super hac communicatione oportet aliquam amicitiam fundari.

De qua quidem communicatione dicitur I ad Cor. I, fidelis deus, per quem vocati estis in societatem filii eius.

Amor autem super hac communicatione fundatus est caritas. Unde manifestum est quod caritas amicitia quaedam est hominis ad deum.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod duplex est hominis vita. Una quidem exterior secundum naturam sensibilem et corporalem, et secundum hanc vitam non est nobis communicatio vel conversatio cum deo et Angelis. Alia autem est vita hominis spiritualis secundum mentem. Et secundum hanc vitam est nobis conversatio et cum deo et cum Angelis. In praesenti quidem statu imperfecte, unde dicitur philipp. III, nostra conversatio in caelis est.

Sed ista conversatio perficietur in patria, quando servi eius servient deo et videbunt faciem eius, ut dicitur Apoc. Ult..

Et ideo hic est caritas imperfecta, sed perficietur in patria.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod amicitia se extendit ad aliquem dupliciter. Uno modo, respectu sui ipsius, et sic amicitia nunquam est nisi ad amicum. Alio modo se extendit ad aliquem respectu alterius personae, sicut, si aliquis habet amicitiam ad aliquem hominem, ratione eius diligit omnes ad illum hominem pertinentes, sive filios sive servos sive qualitercumque ei attinentes.

Et tanta potest esse dilectio amici quod propter amicum amantur hi qui ad ipsum pertinent etiam si nos offendant vel odiant.

Et hoc modo amicitia caritatis se extendit etiam ad inimicos, quos diligimus ex caritate in ordine ad deum, ad quem principaliter habetur amicitia caritatis.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod amicitia honesti non habetur nisi ad virtuosum sicut ad principalem personam, sed eius intuitu diliguntur ad eum attinentes etiam si non sint virtuosi. Et hoc modo caritas, quae maxime est amicitia honesti, se extendit ad peccatores, quos ex caritate diligimus propter deum.