Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that we cannot lose charity when once we have it. For if we lose it, this can only be through sin. Now he who has charity cannot sin, for it is written (1 Jn. 3:9): "Whosoever is born of God, committeth not sin; for His seed abideth in him, and he cannot sin, because he is born of God." But none save the children of God have charity, for it is this which distinguishes "the children of God from the children of perdition," as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 17). Therefore he that has charity cannot lose it.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 7) that "if love be not true, it should not be called love." Now, as he says again in a letter to Count Julian, "charity which can fail was never true." Therefore it was no charity at all. Therefore, when once we have charity, we cannot lose it.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (In Evang. xxx) that "God's love works great things where it is; if it ceases to work it is not charity." Now no man loses charity by doing great things. Therefore if charity be there, it cannot be lost.

Objection 4: Further, the free-will is not inclined to sin unless by some motive for sinning. Now charity excludes all motives for sinning, both self-love and cupidity, and all such things. Therefore charity cannot be lost.

On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 2:4): "I have somewhat against thee, because thou hast left thy first charity."

I answer that, The Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity, as shown above (Article 2; Questions 23,24). We can, accordingly, consider charity in three ways: first on the part of the Holy Ghost, Who moves the soul to love God, and in this respect charity is incompatible with sin through the power of the Holy Ghost, Who does unfailingly whatever He wills to do. Hence it is impossible for these two things to be true at the same time---that the Holy Ghost should will to move a certain man to an act of charity, and that this man, by sinning, should lose charity. For the gift of perseverance is reckoned among the blessings of God whereby "whoever is delivered, is most certainly delivered," as Augustine says in his book on the Predestination of the saints (De Dono Persev. xiv).

Secondly, charity may be considered as such, and thus it is incapable of anything that is against its nature. Wherefore charity cannot sin at all, even as neither can heat cool, nor unrighteousness do good, as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 24).

Thirdly, charity can be considered on the part of its subject, which is changeable on account of the free-will. Moreover charity may be compared with this subject, both from the general point of view of form in comparison with matter, and from the specific point of view of habit as compared with power. Now it is natural for a form to be in its subject in such a way that it can be lost, when it does not entirely fill the potentiality of matter: this is evident in the forms of things generated and corrupted, because the matter of such things receives one form in such a way, that it retains the potentiality to another form, as though its potentiality were not completely satisfied with the one form. Hence the one form may be lost by the other being received. On the other hand the form of a celestial body which entirely fills the potentiality of its matter, so that the latter does not retain the potentiality to another form, is in its subject inseparably. Accordingly the charity of the blessed, because it entirely fills the potentiality of the rational mind, since every actual movement of that mind is directed to God, is possessed by its subject inseparably: whereas the charity of the wayfarer does not so fill the potentiality of its subject, because the latter is not always actually directed to God: so that when it is not actually directed to God, something may occur whereby charity is lost.

It is proper to a habit to incline a power to act, and this belongs to a habit, in so far as it makes whatever is suitable to it, to seem good, and whatever is unsuitable, to seem evil. For as the taste judges of savors according to its disposition, even so does the human mind judge of things to be done, according to its habitual disposition. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5) that "such as a man is, so does the end appear to him." Accordingly charity is inseparable from its possessor, where that which pertains to charity cannot appear otherwise than good, and that is in heaven, where God is seen in His Essence, which is the very essence of goodness. Therefore the charity of heaven cannot be lost, whereas the charity of the way can, because in this state God is not seen in His Essence, which is the essence of goodness.

Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted speaks from the point of view of the power of the Holy Ghost, by Whose safeguarding, those whom He wills to move are rendered immune from sin, as much as He wills.

Reply to Objection 2: The charity which can fail by reason of itself is no true charity; for this would be the case, were its love given only for a time, and afterwards were to cease, which would be inconsistent with true love. If, however, charity be lost through the changeableness of the subject, and against the purpose of charity included in its act, this is not contrary to true charity.

Reply to Objection 3: The love of God ever works great things in its purpose, which is essential to charity; but it does not always work great things in its act, on account of the condition of its subject.

Reply to Objection 4: Charity by reason of its act excludes every motive for sinning. But it happens sometimes that charity is not acting actually, and then it is possible for a motive to intervene for sinning, and if we consent to this motive, we lose charity.

Articulus 11

Argumentum 1

Ad undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas semel habita non possit amitti. Si enim amittitur, non amittitur nisi propter peccatum. Sed ille qui habet caritatem non potest peccare.

Dicitur enim I Ioan. III, omnis enim qui natus est ex deo, peccatum non facit, quia semen ipsius in eo manet, et non potest peccare, quoniam ex deo natus est.

Caritatem autem non habent nisi filii dei, ipsa enim est quae distinguit inter filios regni et filios perditionis, ut Augustinus dicit, in XV de Trin..

Ergo ille qui habet caritatem non potest eam amittere.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in VIII de Trin., quod dilectio, si non est vera, dilectio dicenda non est.

Sed sicut ipse dicit in Epist. Ad Iulianum comitem, caritas quae deseri potest, nunquam vera fuit.

Ergo neque caritas fuit.

Si ergo caritas semel habeatur, nunquam amittitur.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, in homilia Pentecostes, quod amor dei magna operatur, si est, si desinit operari, caritas non est.

Sed nullus magna operando amittit caritatem.

Ergo, si caritas insit, amitti non potest.

Argumentum 4

Praeterea, liberum arbitrium non inclinatur ad peccatum nisi per aliquod motivum ad peccandum. Sed caritas excludit omnia motiva ad peccandum, et amorem sui, et cupiditatem, et quidquid aliud huiusmodi est. Ergo caritas amitti non potest.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod dicitur Apoc. II, habeo adversum te pauca, quod caritatem primam reliquisti.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod per caritatem spiritus sanctus in nobis habitat, ut ex supradictis patet.

Tripliciter ergo possumus considerare caritatem. Uno modo, ex parte spiritus sancti moventis animam ad diligendum deum. Et ex hac parte caritas impeccabilitatem habet ex virtute spiritus sancti, qui infallibiliter operatur quodcumque voluerit. Unde impossibile est haec duo simul esse vera, quod spiritus sanctus aliquem velit movere ad actum caritatis, et quod ipse caritatem amittat peccando, nam donum perseverantiae computatur inter beneficia dei quibus certissime liberantur quicumque liberantur, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de praed. Sanct..

Alio modo potest considerari caritas secundum propriam rationem.

Et sic caritas non potest nisi illud quod pertinet ad caritatis rationem. Unde caritas nullo modo potest peccare, sicut nec calor potest infrigidare; et sicut etiam iniustitia non potest bonum facere, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de serm. Dom. In monte.

Tertio modo potest considerari caritas ex parte subiecti, quod est vertibile secundum arbitrii libertatem. Potest autem attendi comparatio caritatis ad hoc subiectum et secundum universalem rationem qua comparatur forma ad materiam; et secundum specialem rationem qua comparatur habitus ad potentiam. Est autem de ratione formae quod sit in subiecto amissibiliter quando non replet totam potentialitatem materiae, sicut patet in formis generabilium et corruptibilium.

Quia materia horum sic recipit unam formam quod remanet in ea potentia ad aliam formam, quasi non repleta tota materiae potentialitate per unam formam; et ideo una forma potest amitti per acceptionem alterius. Sed forma corporis caelestis, quia replet totam materiae potentialitatem, ita quod non remanet in ea potentia ad aliam formam, inamissibiliter inest.

Sic igitur caritas patriae, quia replet totam potentialitatem rationalis mentis, inquantum scilicet omnis actualis motus eius fertur in deum, inamissibiliter habetur. Caritas autem viae non sic replet potentialitatem sui subiecti, quia non semper actu fertur in deum. Unde quando actu in deum non fertur, potest aliquid occurrere per quod caritas amittatur.

Habitui vero proprium est ut inclinet potentiam ad agendum quod convenit habitui inquantum facit id videri bonum quod ei convenit, malum autem quod ei repugnat. Sicut enim gustus diiudicat sapores secundum suam dispositionem, ita mens hominis diiudicat de aliquo faciendo secundum suam habitualem dispositionem, unde et philosophus dicit, in III ethic., quod qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei.

Ibi ergo caritas inamissibiliter habetur, ubi id quod convenit caritati non potest videri nisi bonum, scilicet in patria, ubi deus videtur per essentiam, quae est ipsa essentia bonitatis.

Et ideo caritas patriae amitti non potest. Caritas autem viae, in cuius statu non videtur ipsa dei essentia, quae est essentia bonitatis, potest amitti.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa loquitur secundum potestatem spiritus sancti, cuius conservatione a peccato immunes redduntur quos ipse movet quantum ipse voluerit.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod caritas quae deseri potest ex ipsa ratione caritatis, vera caritas non est. Hoc enim esset si hoc in suo amore haberet, quod ad tempus amaret et postea amare desineret quod non esset verae dilectionis. Sed si caritas amittatur ex mutabilitate subiecti, contra propositum caritatis, quod in suo actu includitur; hoc non repugnat veritati caritatis.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod amor dei semper magna operatur in proposito, quod pertinet ad rationem caritatis. Non tamen semper magna operatur in actu, propter conditionem subiecti.

Ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod caritas, secundum rationem sui actus, excludit omne motivum ad peccandum. Sed quandoque contingit quod caritas actu non agit. Et tunc potest intervenire aliquod motivum ad peccandum, cui si consentiatur, caritas amittitur.