Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that the love of charity stops at God and does not extend to our neighbor. For as we owe God love, so do we owe Him fear, according Dt. 10:12: "And now Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear . . . and love Him?" Now the fear with which we fear man, and which is called human fear, is distinct from the fear with which we fear God, and which is either servile or filial, as is evident from what has been stated above (Question 10, Article 2). Therefore also the love with which we love God, is distinct from the love with which we love our neighbor.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8) that "to be loved is to be honored." Now the honor due to God, which is known as "latria," is distinct from the honor due to a creature, and known as "dulia." Therefore again the love wherewith we love God, is distinct from that with which we love our neighbor.

Objection 3: Further, hope begets charity, as a gloss states on Mt. 1:2. Now hope is so due to God that it is reprehensible to hope in man, according to Jer. 17:5: "Cursed be the man that trusteth in man." Therefore charity is so due to God, as not to extend to our neighbor.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 4:21): "This commandment we have from God, that he, who loveth God, love also his brother."

I answer that, As stated above (Question 17, Article 6; Question 19, Article 3; 1.2, Question 54, Article 3) habits are not differentiated except their acts be of different species. For every act of the one species belongs to the same habit. Now since the species of an act is derived from its object, considered under its formal aspect, it follows of necessity that it is specifically the same act that tends to an aspect of the object, and that tends to the object under that aspect: thus it is specifically the same visual act whereby we see the light, and whereby we see the color under the aspect of light.

Now the aspect under which our neighbor is to be loved, is God, since what we ought to love in our neighbor is that he may be in God. Hence it is clear that it is specifically the same act whereby we love God, and whereby we love our neighbor. Consequently the habit of charity extends not only to the love of God, but also to the love of our neighbor.

Reply to Objection 1: We may fear our neighbor, even as we may love him, in two ways: first, on account of something that is proper to him, as when a man fears a tyrant on account of his cruelty, or loves him by reason of his own desire to get something from him. Such like human fear is distinct from the fear of God, and the same applies to love. Secondly, we fear a man, or love him on account of what he has of God; as when we fear the secular power by reason of its exercising the ministry of God for the punishment of evildoers, and love it for its justice: such like fear of man is not distinct from fear of God, as neither is such like love.

Reply to Objection 2: Love regards good in general, whereas honor regards the honored person's own good, for it is given to a person in recognition of his own virtue. Hence love is not differentiated specifically on account of the various degrees of goodness in various persons, so long as it is referred to one good common to all, whereas honor is distinguished according to the good belonging to individuals. Consequently we love all our neighbors with the same love of charity, in so far as they are referred to one good common to them all, which is God; whereas we give various honors to various people, according to each one's own virtue, and likewise to God we give the singular honor of latria on account of His singular virtue.

Reply to Objection 3: It is wrong to hope in man as though he were the principal author of salvation, but not, to hope in man as helping us ministerially under God. In like manner it would be wrong if a man loved his neighbor as though he were his last end, but not, if he loved him for God's sake; and this is what charity does.

Articulus 1

Argumentum 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod dilectio caritatis sistat in deo, et non se extendat ad proximum. Sicut enim deo debemus amorem, ita et timorem, secundum illud Deut. X, et nunc, Israel, quid dominus deus petit nisi ut timeas et diligas eum? sed alius est timor quo timetur homo, qui dicitur timor humanus; et alius timor quo timetur deus, qui est vel servilis vel filialis; ut ex supradictis patet.

Ergo etiam alius est amor caritatis, quo diligitur deus; et alius est amor quo diligitur proximus.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in VIII ethic., quod amari est honorari.

Sed alius est honor qui debetur deo, qui est honor latriae; et alius est honor qui debetur creaturae, qui est honor duliae.

Ergo etiam alius est amor quo diligitur deus, et quo diligitur proximus.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, spes generat caritatem; ut habetur in Glossa, Matth. I.

Sed spes ita habetur de deo quod reprehenduntur sperantes in homine, secundum illud Ierem. XVII, maledictus homo qui confidit in homine.

Ergo caritas ita debetur deo quod ad proximum non se extendat.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod dicitur I Ioan. IV, hoc mandatum habemus a deo, ut qui diligit deum, diligat et fratrem suum.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus non diversificantur nisi ex hoc quod variat speciem actus, omnes enim actus unius speciei ad eundem habitum pertinent.

Cum autem species actus ex obiecto sumatur secundum formalem rationem ipsius, necesse est quod idem specie sit actus qui fertur in rationem obiecti, et qui fertur in obiectum sub tali ratione, sicut est eadem specie visio qua videtur lumen, et qua videtur color secundum luminis rationem. Ratio autem diligendi proximum deus est, hoc enim debemus in proximo diligere, ut in deo sit. Unde manifestum est quod idem specie actus est quo diligitur deus, et quo diligitur proximus. Et propter hoc habitus caritatis non solum se extendit ad dilectionem dei, sed etiam ad dilectionem proximi.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod proximus potest timeri dupliciter, sicut et amari. Uno modo, propter id quod est sibi proprium, puta cum aliquis timet tyrannum propter eius crudelitatem, vel cum amat ipsum propter cupiditatem acquirendi aliquid ab eo.

Et talis timor humanus distinguitur a timore dei, et similiter amor. Alio modo timetur homo et amatur propter id quod est dei in ipso, sicut cum saecularis potestas timetur propter ministerium divinum quod habet ad vindictam malefactorum, et amatur propter iustitiam. Et talis timor hominis non distinguitur a timore dei, sicut nec amor.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod amor respicit bonum in communi, sed honor respicit proprium bonum honorati, defertur enim alicui in testimonium propriae virtutis. Et ideo amor non diversificatur specie propter diversam quantitatem bonitatis diversorum, dummodo referuntur ad aliquod unum bonum commune, sed honor diversificatur secundum propria bona singulorum. Unde eodem amore caritatis diligimus omnes proximos, inquantum referuntur ad unum bonum commune, quod est deus, sed diversos honores diversis deferimus, secundum propriam virtutem singulorum.

Et similiter deo singularem honorem latriae exhibemus, propter eius singularem virtutem.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod vituperantur qui sperant in homine sicut in principali auctore salutis, non autem qui sperant in homine sicut in adiuvante ministerialiter sub deo.

Et similiter reprehensibile esset si quis proximum diligeret tanquam principalem finem, non autem si quis proximum diligat propter deum, quod pertinet ad caritatem.