Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot be loved immediately in this life. For the "unknown cannot be loved" as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1). Now we do not know God immediately in this life, since "we see now through a glass, in a dark manner" (1 Cor. 13:12). Neither, therefore, do we love Him immediately.

Objection 2: Further, he who cannot do what is less, cannot do what is more. Now it is more to love God than to know Him, since "he who is joined" to God by love, is "one spirit with Him" (1 Cor. 6:17). But man cannot know God immediately. Therefore much less can he love Him immediately.

Objection 3: Further, man is severed from God by sin, according to Is. 59:2: "Your iniquities have divided between you and your God." Now sin is in the will rather than in the intellect. Therefore man is less able to love God immediately than to know Him immediately.

On the contrary, Knowledge of God, through being mediate, is said to be "enigmatic," and "falls away" in heaven, as stated in 1 Cor. 13:12. But charity "does not fall away" as stated in the same passage (1 Cor. 13:12). Therefore the charity of the way adheres to God immediately.

I answer that, As stated above (1, Question 82, Article 3; Question 84, Article 7), the act of a cognitive power is completed by the thing known being in the knower, whereas the act of an appetitive power consists in the appetite being inclined towards the thing in itself. Hence it follows that the movement of the appetitive power is towards things in respect of their own condition, whereas the act of a cognitive power follows the mode of the knower.

Now in itself the very order of things is such, that God is knowable and lovable for Himself, since He is essentially truth and goodness itself, whereby other things are known and loved: but with regard to us, since our knowledge is derived through the senses, those things are knowable first which are nearer to our senses, and the last term of knowledge is that which is most remote from our senses.

Accordingly, we must assert that to love which is an act of the appetitive power, even in this state of life, tends to God first, and flows on from Him to other things, and in this sense charity loves God immediately, and other things through God. On the other hand, with regard to knowledge, it is the reverse, since we know God through other things, either as a cause through its effects, or by way of pre-eminence or negation as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. i; cf. 1, Question 12, Article 12).

Reply to Objection 1: Although the unknown cannot be loved, it does not follow that the order of knowledge is the same as the order of love, since love is the term of knowledge, and consequently, love can begin at once where knowledge ends, namely in the thing itself which is known through another thing.

Reply to Objection 2: Since to love God is something greater than to know Him, especially in this state of life, it follows that love of God presupposes knowledge of God. And because this knowledge does not rest in creatures, but, through them, tends to something else, love begins there, and thence goes on to other things by a circular movement so to speak; for knowledge begins from creatures, tends to God, and love begins with God as the last end, and passes on to creatures.

Reply to Objection 3: Aversion from God, which is brought about by sin, is removed by charity, but not by knowledge alone: hence charity, by loving God, unites the soul immediately to Him with a chain of spiritual union.

Articulus 4

Argumentum 1

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod deus in hac vita non possit immediate amari.

Incognita enim amari non possunt; ut Augustinus dicit, X de Trin..

Sed deum non cognoscimus immediate in hac vita, quia videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, ut dicitur I ad Cor. XIII.

Ergo neque etiam eum immediate amamus.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, qui non potest quod minus est non potest quod maius est. Sed maius est amare deum quam cognoscere ipsum, qui enim adhaeret deo per amorem unus spiritus cum illo fit, ut dicitur I ad Cor. VI.

Sed homo non potest deum cognoscere immediate.

Ergo multo minus amare.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, homo a deo disiungitur per peccatum, secundum illud Isaiae LIX, peccata vestra diviserunt inter vos et deum vestrum.

Sed peccatum magis est in voluntate quam in intellectu.

Ergo minus potest homo deum diligere immediate quam immediate eum cognoscere.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod cognitio dei, quia est mediata, dicitur aenigmatica, et evacuatur in patria, ut patet I ad Cor. XIII.

Sed caritas non evacuatur, ut dicitur I ad Cor. XIII.

Ergo caritas viae immediate deo adhaeret.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, actus cognitivae virtutis perficitur per hoc quod cognitum est in cognoscente, actus autem virtutis appetitivae perficitur per hoc quod appetitus inclinatur in rem ipsam. Et ideo oportet quod motus appetitivae virtutis sit in res secundum conditionem ipsarum rerum, actus autem cognitivae virtutis est secundum modum cognoscentis. Est autem ipse ordo rerum talis secundum se quod deus est propter seipsum cognoscibilis et diligibilis, utpote essentialiter existens ipsa veritas et bonitas, per quam alia et cognoscuntur et amantur. Sed quoad nos, quia nostra cognitio a sensu ortum habet, prius sunt cognoscibilia quae sunt sensui propinquiora; et ultimus terminus cognitionis est in eo quod est maxime a sensu remotum. Secundum hoc ergo dicendum est quod dilectio, quae est appetitivae virtutis actus, etiam in statu viae tendit in deum primo, et ex ipso derivatur ad alia, et secundum hoc caritas deum immediate diligit, alia vero mediante deo. In cognitione vero est e converso, quia scilicet per alia deum cognoscimus, sicut causam per effectus, vel per modum eminentiae aut negationis ut patet per dionysium, in libro de div. Nom..

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quamvis incognita amari non possint, tamen non oportet quod sit idem ordo cognitionis et dilectionis.

Nam dilectio est cognitionis terminus. Et ideo ubi desinit cognitio, scilicet in ipsa re quae per aliam cognoscitur, ibi statim dilectio incipere potest.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod quia dilectio dei est maius aliquid quam eius cognitio, maxime secundum statum viae, ideo praesupponit ipsam. Et quia cognitio non quiescit in rebus creatis, sed per eas in aliud tendit, in illo dilectio incipit, et per hoc ad alia derivatur, per modum cuiusdam circulationis, dum cognitio, a creaturis incipiens, tendit in deum; et dilectio, a deo incipiens sicut ab ultimo fine, ad creaturas derivatur.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod per caritatem tollitur aversio a deo quae est per peccatum; non autem per solam cognitionem. Et ideo caritas est quae, diligendo, animam immediate deo coniungit spiritualis vinculo unionis.