Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to observe some mode in loving God. For the notion of good consists in mode, species and order, as Augustine states (De Nat. Boni iii, iv). Now the love of God is the best thing in man, according to Col. 3:14: "Above all . . . things, have charity." Therefore there ought to be a mode of the love of God.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. viii): "Prithee, tell me which is the mode of love. For I fear lest I burn with the desire and love of my Lord, more or less than I ought." But it would be useless to seek the mode of the Divine love, unless there were one. Therefore there is a mode of the love of God.

Objection 3: Further, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3), "the measure which nature appoints to a thing, is its mode." Now the measure of the human will, as also of external action, is the reason. Therefore just as it is necessary for the reason to appoint a mode to the exterior effect of charity, according to Rm. 12:1: "Your reasonable service," so also the interior love of God requires a mode.

On the contrary, Bernard says (De Dilig. Deum 1) that "God is the cause of our loving God; the measure is to love Him without measure."

I answer that, As appears from the words of Augustine quoted above mode signifies a determination of measure; which determination is to be found both in the measure and in the thing measured, but not in the same way. For it is found in the measure essentially, because a measure is of itself the determining and modifying rule of other things; whereas in the things measured, it is found relatively, that is in so far as they attain to the measure. Hence there can be nothing unmodified in the measure whereas the thing measured is unmodified if it fails to attain to the measure, whether by deficiency or by excess.

Now in all matters of appetite and action the measure is the end, because the proper reason for all that we desire or do should be taken from the end, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 9). Therefore the end has a mode by itself, while the means take their mode from being proportionate to the end. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 3), "in every art, the desire for the end is endless and unlimited," whereas there is a limit to the means: thus the physician does not put limits to health, but makes it as perfect as he possibly can; but he puts a limit to medicine, for he does not give as much medicine as he can, but according as health demands so that if he give too much or too little, the medicine would be immoderate.

Again, the end of all human actions and affections is the love of God, whereby principally we attain to our last end, as stated above (Question 23, Article 6), wherefore the mode in the love of God, must not be taken as in a thing measured where we find too much or too little, but as in the measure itself, where there cannot be excess, and where the more the rule is attained the better it is, so that the more we love God the better our love is.

Reply to Objection 1: That which is so by its essence takes precedence of that which is so through another, wherefore the goodness of the measure which has the mode essentially, takes precedence of the goodness of the thing measured, which has its mode through something else; and so too, charity, which has a mode as a measure has, stands before the other virtues, which have a mode through being measured .

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine adds in the same passage, "the measure of our love for God is to love Him with our whole heart," that is to love Him as much as He can be loved, and this belongs to the mode which is proper to the measure.

Reply to Objection 3: An affection, whose object is subject to reason's judgment, should be measured by reason. But the object of the Divine love which is God surpasses the judgment of reason, wherefore it is not measured by reason but transcends it. Nor is there parity between the interior act and external acts of charity. For the interior act of charity has the character of an end, since man's ultimate good consists in his soul cleaving to God, according to Ps. 72:28: "It is good for me to adhere to my God"; whereas the exterior acts are as means to the end, and so have to be measured both according to charity and according to reason.

Articulus 6

Argumentum 1

Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod divinae dilectionis sit aliquis modus habendus. Ratio enim boni consistit in modo, specie et ordine, ut patet per Augustinum, in libro de Nat. Boni.

Sed dilectio dei est optimum in homine, secundum illud ad Coloss. III, super omnia caritatem habete.

Ergo dilectio dei debet modum habere.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de morib. Eccles., dic mihi, quaeso te, quis sit diligendi modus. Vereor enim ne plus minusve quam oportet inflammer desiderio et amore domini mei frustra autem quaereret modum nisi esset aliquis divinae dilectionis modus. Ergo est aliquis modus divinae dilectionis.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit, IV super Gen. Ad litt., modus est quem unicuique propria mensura praefigit.

Sed mensura voluntatis humanae, sicut et actionis exterioris, est ratio. Ergo sicut in exteriori effectu caritatis oportet habere modum a ratione praestitum, secundum illud Rom. XII, rationabile obsequium vestrum; ita etiam ipsa interior dilectio dei debet modum habere.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod bernardus dicit, in libro de diligendo deum, quod causa diligendi deum deus est; modus, sine modo diligere.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut patet ex inducta auctoritate Augustini, modus importat quandam mensurae determinationem. Haec autem determinatio invenitur et in mensura et in mensurato, aliter tamen et aliter. In mensura enim invenitur essentialiter, quia mensura secundum seipsam est determinativa et modificativa aliorum, in mensuratis autem invenitur mensura secundum aliud, idest inquantum attingunt mensuram. Et ideo in mensura nihil potest accipi immodificatum, sed res mensurata est immodificata nisi mensuram attingat, sive deficiat sive excedat.

In omnibus autem appetibilibus et agibilibus mensura est finis, quia eorum quae appetimus et agimus oportet propriam rationem ex fine accipere, ut patet per philosophum, in II physic..

Et ideo finis secundum seipsum habet modum, ea vero quae sunt ad finem habent modum ex eo quod sunt fini proportionata.

Et ideo, sicut philosophus dicit, in I polit., appetitus finis in omnibus artibus est absque fine et termino, eorum autem quae sunt ad finem est aliquis terminus.

Non enim medicus imponit aliquem terminum sanitati, sed facit eam perfectam quantumcumque potest, sed medicinae imponit terminum; non enim dat tantum de medicina quantum potest, sed secundum proportionem ad sanitatem; quam quidem proportionem si medicina excederet, vel ab ea deficeret, esset immoderata.

Finis autem omnium actionum humanarum et affectionum est dei dilectio, per quam maxime attingimus ultimum finem, ut supra dictum est.

Et ideo in dilectione dei non potest accipi modus sicut in re mensurata, ut sit in ea accipere plus et minus, sed sicut invenitur modus in mensura, in qua non potest esse excessus, sed quanto plus attingitur regula, tanto melius est.

Et ita quanto plus deus diligitur, tanto est dilectio melior.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illud quod est per se potius est eo quod est per aliud. Et ideo bonitas mensurae, quae per se habet modum, potior est quam bonitas mensurati, quod habet modum per aliud. Et sic etiam caritas, quae habet modum sicut mensura, praeeminet aliis virtutibus, quae habent modum sicut mensuratae.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod Augustinus ibidem subiungit quod modus diligendi deum est ut ex toto corde diligatur, idest ut diligatur quantumcumque potest diligi.

Et hoc pertinet ad modum qui convenit mensurae.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod affectio illa cuius obiectum subiacet iudicio rationis, est ratione mensuranda. Sed obiectum divinae dilectionis, quod est deus, excedit iudicium rationis. Et ideo non mensuratur ratione, sed rationem excedit. Nec est simile de interiori actu caritatis et exterioribus actibus. Nam interior actus caritatis habet rationem finis, quia ultimum bonum hominis consistit in hoc quod anima deo inhaereat, secundum illud psalm., mihi adhaerere deo bonum est.

Exteriores autem actus sunt sicut ad finem. Et ideo sunt commensurandi et secundum caritatem et secundum rationem.