Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that it is more meritorious to love one's neighbor than to love God. For the more meritorious thing would seem to be what the Apostle preferred. Now the Apostle preferred the love of our neighbor to the love of God, according to Rm. 9:3: "I wished myself to be an anathema from Christ for my brethren." Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's neighbor than to love God.

Objection 2: Further, in a certain sense it seems to be less meritorious to love one's friend, as stated above (Article 7). Now God is our chief friend, since "He hath first loved us" (1 Jn. 4:10). Therefore it seems less meritorious to love God.

Objection 3: Further, whatever is more difficult seems to be more virtuous and meritorious since "virtue is about that which is difficult and good" (Ethic. ii, 3). Now it is easier to love God than to love one's neighbor, both because all things love God naturally, and because there is nothing unlovable in God, and this cannot be said of one's neighbor. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's neighbor than to love God.

On the contrary, That on account of which a thing is such, is yet more so. Now the love of one's neighbor is not meritorious, except by reason of his being loved for God's sake. Therefore the love of God is more meritorious than the love of our neighbor.

I answer that, This comparison may be taken in two ways. First, by considering both loves separately: and then, without doubt, the love of God is the more meritorious, because a reward is due to it for its own sake, since the ultimate reward is the enjoyment of God, to Whom the movement of the Divine love tends: hence a reward is promised to him that loves God (Jn. 14:21): "He that loveth Me, shall be loved of My Father, and I will . . . manifest Myself to him." Secondly, the comparison may be understood to be between the love of God alone on the one side, and the love of one's neighbor for God's sake, on the other. In this way love of our neighbor includes love of God, while love of God does not include love of our neighbor. Hence the comparison will be between perfect love of God, extending also to our neighbor, and inadequate and imperfect love of God, for "this commandment we have from God, that he, who loveth God, love also his brother" (1 Jn. 4:21).

Reply to Objection 1: According to one gloss, the Apostle did not desire this, viz. to be severed from Christ for his brethren, when he was in a state of grace, but had formerly desired it when he was in a state of unbelief, so that we should not imitate him in this respect.

We may also reply, with Chrysostom (De Compunct. i, 8) that this does not prove the Apostle to have loved his neighbor more than God, but that he loved God more than himself. For he wished to be deprived for a time of the Divine fruition which pertains to love of one self, in order that God might be honored in his neighbor, which pertains to the love of God.

Reply to Objection 2: A man's love for his friends is sometimes less meritorious in so far as he loves them for their sake, so as to fall short of the true reason for the friendship of charity, which is God. Hence that God be loved for His own sake does not diminish the merit, but is the entire reason for merit.

Reply to Objection 3: The "good" has, more than the "difficult," to do with the reason of merit and virtue. Therefore it does not follow that whatever is more difficult is more meritorious, but only what is more difficult, and at the same time better.

Articulus 8

Argumentum 1

Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod magis sit meritorium diligere proximum quam diligere deum. Illud enim videtur esse magis meritorium quod apostolus magis elegit. Sed apostolus praeelegit dilectionem proximi dilectioni dei, secundum illud ad Rom. IX, optabam anathema esse a christo pro fratribus meis.

Ergo magis est meritorium diligere proximum quam diligere deum.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, minus videtur esse meritorium aliquo modo diligere amicum, ut dictum est.

Sed deus maxime est amicus, qui prior dilexit nos, ut dicitur I Ioan. IV.

Ergo diligere eum videtur esse minus meritorium.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, illud quod est difficilius videtur esse virtuosius et magis meritorium, quia virtus est circa difficile et bonum, ut dicitur in II ethic..

Sed facilius est diligere deum quam proximum, tum quia naturaliter omnia deum diligunt; tum quia in deo nihil occurrit quod non sit diligendum, quod circa proximum non contingit. Ergo magis est meritorium diligere proximum quam diligere deum.

Sed Contra

Sed contra, propter quod unumquodque, illud magis. Sed dilectio proximi non est meritoria nisi propter hoc quod proximus diligitur propter deum. Ergo dilectio dei est magis meritoria quam dilectio proximi.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod comparatio ista potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, ut seorsum consideretur utraque dilectio.

Et tunc non est dubium quod dilectio dei est magis meritoria, debetur enim ei merces propter seipsam, quia ultima merces est frui deo, in quem tendit divinae dilectionis motus.

Unde et diligenti deum merces promittitur, Ioan. XIV, si quis diligit me, diligetur a patre meo, et manifestabo ei meipsum.

Alio modo potest attendi ista comparatio ut dilectio dei accipiatur secundum quod solus diligitur; dilectio autem proximi accipiatur secundum quod proximus diligitur propter deum.

Et sic dilectio proximi includet dilectionem dei, sed dilectio dei non includet dilectionem proximi. Unde erit comparatio dilectionis dei perfectae, quae extendit se etiam ad proximum, ad dilectionem dei insufficientem et imperfectam, quia hoc mandatum habemus a deo, ut qui diligit deum, diligat et fratrem suum.

Et in hoc sensu dilectio proximi praeeminet.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod secundum unam Glossae expositionem, hoc apostolus tunc non optabat quando erat in statu gratiae, ut scilicet separaretur a christo pro fratribus suis, sed hoc optaverat quando erat in statu infidelitatis.

Unde in hoc non est imitandus. Vel potest dici, sicut dicit chrysostomus, in libro de compunct., quod per hoc non ostenditur quod apostolus plus diligeret proximum quam deum, sed quod plus diligebat deum quam seipsum.

Volebat enim ad tempus privari fruitione divina, quod pertinet ad dilectionem sui, ad hoc quod honor dei procuraretur in proximis, quod pertinet ad dilectionem dei.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod dilectio amici pro tanto est quandoque minus meritoria quia amicus diligitur propter seipsum, et ita deficit a vera ratione amicitiae caritatis, quae deus est. Et ideo quod deus diligatur propter seipsum non diminuit meritum, sed hoc constituit totam meriti rationem.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod plus facit ad rationem meriti et virtutis bonum quam difficile. Unde non oportet quod omne difficilius sit magis meritorium, sed quod sic est difficilius ut etiam sit melius.