Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that the reason for taking pity is not a defect in the person who takes pity. For it is proper to God to be merciful, wherefore it is written (Ps. 144:9): "His tender mercies are over all His works." But there is no defect in God. Therefore a defect cannot be the reason for taking pity.

Objection 2: Further, if a defect is the reason for taking pity, those in whom there is most defect, must needs take most pity. But this is false: for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "those who are in a desperate state are pitiless." Therefore it seems that the reason for taking pity is not a defect in the person who pities.

Objection 3: Further, to be treated with contempt is to be defective. But the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "those who are disposed to contumely are pitiless." Therefore the reason for taking pity, is not a defect in the person who pities.

On the contrary, Pity is a kind of sorrow. But a defect is the reason of sorrow, wherefore those who are in bad health give way to sorrow more easily, as we shall say further on (Question 35, Article 1, ad 2). Therefore the reason why one takes pity is a defect in oneself.

I answer that, Since pity is grief for another's distress, as stated above (Article 1), from the very fact that a person takes pity on anyone, it follows that another's distress grieves him. And since sorrow or grief is about one's own ills, one grieves or sorrows for another's distress, in so far as one looks upon another's distress as one's own.

Now this happens in two ways: first, through union of the affections, which is the effect of love. For, since he who loves another looks upon his friend as another self, he counts his friend's hurt as his own, so that he grieves for his friend's hurt as though he were hurt himself. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 4) reckons "grieving with one's friend" as being one of the signs of friendship, and the Apostle says (Rm. 12:15): "Rejoice with them that rejoice, weep with them that weep."

Secondly, it happens through real union, for instance when another's evil comes near to us, so as to pass to us from him. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that men pity such as are akin to them, and the like, because it makes them realize that the same may happen to themselves. This also explains why the old and the wise who consider that they may fall upon evil times, as also feeble and timorous persons, are more inclined to pity: whereas those who deem themselves happy, and so far powerful as to think themselves in no danger of suffering any hurt, are not so inclined to pity.

Accordingly a defect is always the reason for taking pity, either because one looks upon another's defect as one's own, through being united to him by love, or on account of the possibility of suffering in the same way.

Reply to Objection 1: God takes pity on us through love alone, in as much as He loves us as belonging to Him.

Reply to Objection 2: Those who are already in infinite distress, do not fear to suffer more, wherefore they are without pity. In like manner this applies to those also who are in great fear, for they are so intent on their own passion, that they pay no attention to the suffering of others.

Reply to Objection 3: Those who are disposed to contumely, whether through having been contemned, or because they wish to contemn others, are incited to anger and daring, which are manly passions and arouse the human spirit to attempt difficult things. Hence they make a man think that he is going to suffer something in the future, so that while they are disposed in that way they are pitiless, according to Prov. 27:4: "Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth." For the same reason the proud are without pity, because they despise others, and think them wicked, so that they account them as suffering deservedly whatever they suffer. Hence Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv) that "false godliness," i.e. of the proud, "is not compassionate but disdainful."

Articulus 2

Argumentum 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod defectus non sit ratio miserendi ex parte miserentis.

Proprium enim dei est misereri, unde dicitur in psalm., miserationes eius super omnia opera eius.

Sed in deo nullus est defectus.

Ergo defectus non potest esse ratio miserendi.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, si defectus est ratio miserendi, oportet quod illi qui maxime sunt cum defectu maxime miserentur.

Sed hoc est falsum, dicit enim philosophus, in II rhet., quod qui ex toto perierunt non miserentur.

Ergo videtur quod defectus non sit ratio miserendi ex parte miserentis.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, sustinere aliquam contumeliam ad defectum pertinet.

Sed philosophus dicit ibidem quod illi qui sunt in contumeliativa dispositione non miserentur.

Ergo defectus ex parte miserentis non est ratio miserendi.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod misericordia est quaedam tristitia. Sed defectus est ratio tristitiae, unde infirmi facilius contristantur, ut supra dictum est.

Ergo ratio miserendi est defectus miserentis.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, cum misericordia sit compassio super miseria aliena, ut dictum est, ex hoc contingit quod aliquis misereatur ex quo contingit quod de miseria aliena doleat.

Quia autem tristitia seu dolor est de proprio malo, intantum aliquis de miseria aliena tristatur aut dolet inquantum miseriam alienam apprehendit ut suam. Hoc autem contingit dupliciter.

Uno modo, secundum unionem affectus, quod fit per amorem.

Quia enim amans reputat amicum tanquam seipsum, malum ipsius reputat tanquam suum malum, et ideo dolet de malo amici sicut de suo.

Et inde est quod philosophus, in IX ethic., inter alia amicabilia ponit hoc quod est condolere amico.

Et apostolus dicit, ad Rom. XII, gaudere cum gaudentibus, flere cum flentibus.

Alio modo contingit secundum unionem realem, utpote cum malum aliquorum propinquum est ut ab eis ad nos transeat.

Et ideo philosophus dicit, in II rhet., homines miserentur super illos qui sunt eis coniuncti et similes, quia per hoc fit eis aestimatio quod ipsi etiam possint similia pati. Et inde est etiam quod senes et sapientes, qui considerant se posse in mala incidere, et debiles et formidolosi magis sunt misericordes. E contrario autem alii, qui reputant se esse felices et intantum potentes quod nihil mali putant se posse pati, non ita miserentur.

Sic igitur semper defectus est ratio miserendi, vel inquantum aliquis defectum alicuius reputat suum, propter unionem amoris; vel propter possibilitatem similia patiendi.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod deus non miseretur nisi propter amorem, inquantum amat nos tanquam aliquid sui.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod illi qui iam sunt in infimis malis non timent se ulterius pati aliquid, et ideo non miserentur.

Similiter etiam nec illi qui valde timent, quia tantum intendunt propriae passioni quod non intendunt miseriae alienae.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod illi qui sunt in contumeliativa dispositione, sive quia sint contumeliam passi, sive quia velint contumeliam inferre, provocantur ad iram et audaciam, quae sunt quaedam passiones virilitatis extollentes animum hominis ad arduum. Unde auferunt homini aestimationem quod sit aliquid in futurum passurus. Unde tales, dum sunt in hac dispositione, non miserentur, secundum illud Prov. XXVII, ira non habet misericordiam, neque erumpens furor.

Et ex simili ratione superbi non miserentur, qui contemnunt alios et reputant eos malos. Unde reputant quod digne patiantur quidquid patiuntur.

Unde et Gregorius dicit quod falsa iustitia, scilicet superborum, non habet compassionem, sed dedignationem.